High Court
| DOI | 10.1177/002201839505900301 |
| Published date | 01 August 1995 |
| Date | 01 August 1995 |
| Subject Matter | High Court |
HIGH
COURT
SECURE ACCOMMODA
nON
FOR DELINQUENT CHILDREN
Liverpool City Council v B
Where a young person is charged with a serious offence, he may be remanded
in the care of a local authority, the council
of
which will normally
accommodate him in one of its children's homes; but if he there misbehaves
himself (eg by absconding), application might have to be made for him to
be placed in secure accommodation. Section 25 of the Children Act 1989
provides for such accommodation and s 92(2) provides that an application
for such accommodation is a family proceeding and therefore dealt with in
the Family Division
of
the High Court. There was no provision for any of
the criminal courts to apply, or apply for, such accommodation, for, as
Ewbank J observed in Liverpool City Council v B
[1995]
I WLR 505, secure
accommodation is regarded as protective and 'is a benign and not a penal
jurisdiction'. As the criminal courts' lack of jurisdiction was found in
practice to be inconvenient, s 60 of the Criminal Justice Act
1991
provides
that where a person is remanded and is placed in accommodation by the
local authority as a result of the order of a youth court or other magistrates'
court, any application to be made for accommodation restricting the liberty
of
that person shall be made to
'that
court'. In Liverpool City Council v B
(above), it became necessary to decide the meaning
of
the term 'that court'
in that context. There, a young person had been charged in Manchester
with a number
of
offences committed in that city. His home and that of his
parents was, however, in Liverpool, so the Manchester City Youth Court
remanded him to the care
of
the Liverpool City Council. When it became
necessary to apply for an order for secure accommodation, the Liverpool
Council applied to the Liverpool Youth Court, it being natural for them to
apply to a Liverpool court in respect
of
a Liverpool child who was in the
care
of
the Liverpool Council. That court declined jurisdiction on the
ground that s 60, which enacts that where a court had remanded a child
into the care of a local authority and it becomes necessary to seek a secure
accommodation order, that application must be made to 'that court'.
It
was
submitted that those words in the section must refer back to the court which
initially made the remand.
Ewbank J agreed that
'at
first glance that would appear to be the clear
meaning
of
the words', but he concluded that 'when the legislative history
is considered, a different interpretation emerges'. The sole purpose of s 60
was to extend the jurisdiction to order secure accommodation from the
family proceedings court.
It
was therefore solely for the purpose
of
extending
the jurisdiction that it was provided that it was to be extended from the
family proceedings court to 'that court'. The intention, therefore, was to use
the words 'that court' in a generic sense meaning 'a youth court rather than
a family proceedings court'. In the judge's opinion, it was appropriate that
the Liverpool council should apply to a Liverpool court in respect
of
children committed to their care. As s 60 means no more than that the
authority should apply to the appropriate youth court, rather than to the
appropriate family proceedings court, the Liverpool court was in error in
declining jurisdiction.
213
To continue reading
Request your trial