Homicidal Wives and the Inequity of a Statute: Re Royse1
| Published date | 01 November 1985 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1985.tb00875.x |
| Date | 01 November 1985 |
| Author | N. S. Price |
Nov.
19851
NOTES
OF
CASES
723
travel to Manchester, although Manchester may be the last place
he wishes to
go
and his motive in boarding the plan is to escape
pursuit.” Lord Bridge adds that where
D.
knows there is a “moral
certainty” that a particular result will occur,
D.
can be said to
intend that result. It
is
interesting that the words “moral certainty”
were used by Lord Hailsham in
Hyarn18
to illustrate how the
blowing up of an aircraft could be equated with an intention to kill
the passengers, even if
D.’s
motive is to obtain the insurance
moneys. This illustration is adapted in
Moloney
and, since it is
arguable that knowledge of a moral certainty is simply foresight of
a
very highly probable consequence put in different terms, it seems
that the “homely example” of Lord Bridge does little to assist an
understanding
of
intention.
It is thus clear that in
Moloney
Lord Bridge has attempted to
clarify the meaning of intention. One of the practical effects of the
judgment will probably be fewer directions from judges. Another
may be greater clarity and uniformity when a direction is given.
However, we must wait to
see
whether juries will find it any easier
to spot intention when they see it, or whether similarly simple facts
will come before the House of Lords in another
10
years.
J.
A. LAWRENCE*
HOMICIDAL WIVES
AND
THE
INEQUITY
OF
A
STATUTE: RE ROYSE~
MRS. Royse had stabbed her husband to death whilst mentally ill,
and was subsequently convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of
diminished responsibility. She was thereafter compulsorily detained
for under two years in a mental hospital and following her release
returned to the former matrimonial home, which was comprised in
her late husband’s estate.* By his will the husband had left
everything to Mrs. Royse but she could not inherit, by reason of
the common law rule which excludes a person who unlawfully kills
from benefiting from his crime, a rule now recognised by statute in
the Forfeiture Act 1982 which dubs the rule “the forfeiture rule”
and gives the court a discretion to relax its effects save in cases of
murder. It was first held that this rule applied to a case of
manslaughter due to diminished responsibility in
re Gile~,~
where
the wife killed her husband with a single blow from a chamber pot,
although the rule has never applied in the case of an insane
defendant within the M’Naughten rules4
Mrs. Royse had killed her husband before the 1982 act was
passed, in 1978, but sought to escape from the consequences of the
*’
1985 2 W.L.R. at
664.
’*
119753 A.C. at 74 (quoting Law Commission Report
No. 10).
Articled clerk (Freshfields, London) and supervisor, Downing College, Cambridge.
[1984] 3 All E.R. 339; C.A. (Ackner and Slade L.JJ.).
In
fact
Mrs.
R. was arguing in separate proceedings that she was entitled
to
a
[1972] Ch. 544;
88
L.Q.R.
12 (ALG).
See
re
Giles,
supra
n.3. at 552.
beneficial interest in the house:
[1984]
3 All E.R. 341c.
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