House of Lords
| DOI | 10.1177/002201837003400404 |
| Published date | 01 October 1970 |
| Date | 01 October 1970 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
House
of
Lords
ONE
TRIAL
OF A SERIES OF
OFFENCES
Ludlow
v.
Metropolitan
Police
Commissioner
IN this case (1970 , I
All
E.R. 567),
the
appellant was charged in
the
one indictment
with
two offences,
attempted
larceny
and
robbery
with violence.
The
first charge arose
out
of his being seen coming
out
of a window of
the
staff room of a public house, in which alater
examination revealed
that
all
the
drawers
had
been opened
and
searched.
The
second charge arose
out
of his snatching back a
bank
note from a public house employee to whom he
had
given it in
payment
and
then
assaulting him.
The
Court
of Appeal held
that
the
two offences were properly charged in the same indictment
and
that
it could
not
be said
that
the
trial
judge
should have exercised his
discretion
and
ordered aseparate trial on each
count:
see R. v.
Ludlow
(34 ].C.L. 23; 1969, 3 W.L.R. 640; 3
All
E.R. 701).
The
House of Lords has now upheld
the
conviction.
In
the
first place, the
House concluded
that
Widgery
L.].
was right in R. v.
Kray
(1969, 3
All
E.R.,
at
p. 944) in holding
that
two offences
can
constitute a
series, within the Indictments Act, even though
the
word 'series' is
not
wholly
apt
to describe less
than
three.
In
the
second place, in
the
determination of
the
question whether the two offences in question
are
of
"a
similar
character",
a
court
should have
regard
to con-
siderations
both
of law
and
fact, so
that
it is
not
merely afactual
resemblance of
the
events constituting the two offences which must
be taken into account. Thirdly, in order to establish
the
two offences
as a "series" of offences of
"a
similar
character",
it is necessary to
establish some nexus between
them;
and
"nexus",
said
Lord
Pearson
(at
p. 573
j),
"is a feature of similarity which in all the circumstances
of
the
case enables the offences to be described as a series".
Upon
the
facts,
the
House held
that
the necessary similarity existed, since there
was the same essential ingredient of actual or
attempted
theft, in
neighbouring public houses,
at
an
interval of only 16 days.
The
offences were therefore similar in law
and
in fact.
The
appellant claimed
that,
even
if
joinder
of
the
two offences
in one indictment was permitted
under
the Indictments Act, the
trial
judge
had
wrongly exercised his discretion when he refused to
order separate trials.
He
first argued boldly
that
the
joinder
of counts
259
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