House of Lords
| DOI | 10.1177/002201839405800304 |
| Published date | 01 August 1994 |
| Date | 01 August 1994 |
| Subject Matter | House of Lords |
HOUSE
OF
LORDS
REMAND PRISONER'S
RIGHT
TO SUE HOME OFFICE
Racz v Home Office
The decision
of
the House of Lords in Racz v Home Office
[1994]
2 WLR
23 is of potential importance for those on remand in prison awaiting trial,
since it established the vicarious liability of the Home Office for
misfeasance in public office
of
prison officers which amounts to tort
against a prisoner. As important, in practice, however, is the decision
of
the House that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, the
case was not one in which trial by jury should be ordered. The prisoner
claimed damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages in respect
of torts which he alleged to have been committed against him by way of
ill-treatment which he had experienced at the hands of prison officers,
namely assault and battery, negligence and misfeasance in public office.
Ebworth J struck out the claim in respect of the misfeasance and on
appeal the Court of Appeal held that the Home Office could not be
vicariously liable for misfeasance in public office by prison officers. The
prisoner also claimed that he was entitled to have his actions tried by a
jury, but both the judge and the Court of Appeal rejected that submission.
On further appeal to the House
of
Lords, it was held that a claim against
the Home Office in respect
of
a prison officer's misfeasance in public
office can be struck out only if the inevitable result of the prisoner's
averments was to establish that the wrongdoing of the prison officer was
so unconnected with his authorised duties as to be independent
of
those
duties. Upon the second question, however, the House took the same view
as the courts below: although the question which would' go to trial on the
reinstatement of the original claim raised an issue which would be one
of
fact and degree, the House was
of
opinion that it did not contain any
factor which could be said to rebut the presumption against the trial by
jury enacted by s 69(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
The allegation
of
misfeasance in public office was made in order to deal
with what was said to be the wrongful removal
of
the prisoner to a strip
cell, an act which might not be within the scope
of
assault and battery or
of
negligence. The Court
of
Appeal upheld the striking out of this claim,
on the basis of the decision
of
the House of Lords in R v Deputy Governor
of
Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague
[1991]
3WLR 340;56 JCL 66. There, the
prisoner claimed damages for false imprisonment on proof of his removal
to a strip cell, but the House
of
Lords, reversing both the courts below,
held that there could be no false imprisonment of a prisoner who was
lawfully confined under s 12(1) of the Prison Act 1952, and, secondly,
that restraint which was not in accordance with the Prison Rules 1964
could not provide a prisoner with a right of action for a breach
of
statutory duty. Lord Bridge pointed out, however, that, if the false
imprisonment had been committed by a fellow-prisoner, an action would
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