How can political liberalism respond to contemporary populism?
| Date | 01 April 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885120911305 |
| Published date | 01 April 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
How can political
liberalism respond to
contemporary populism?
Andrew Reid
University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract
Populism – which positions a ‘true people’ in opposition to a corrupt elite – is often
contrasted with liberalism. This article initially outlines the incompatibility between
populism and normative theories of political liberalism. It argues that populism is an
unreasonable form of politics by liberals’ standards because: it unfairly excludes those
who are not deemed to be part of the true ‘people’; and it is objectionably anti-pluralist
in the way that it assumes unity amongst the ‘people’. Despite this, it is hard to derive
specific duties to contain or challenge populism per se from a liberal perspective,
though such a duty might be present for some forms of contemporary right-wing
populism that combine populism with illiberal goals. Underpinning this view is a
belief that many populist movements articulate grievances that are at least somewhat
legitimate. The article concludes by arguing that there might be circumstances where a
populist movement could, against this backdrop of injustice, advance the liberal cause.
However, this is not because there are ways of dissolving the tension between political
liberalism and populism, but because political liberals might be justified in violating the
regulatory norms that they believe ought to govern politics in some, exceptiona l,
circumstances.
Keywords
Democracy, liberalism, normative theory, populism
Corresponding author:
Andrew Reid, Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS), University of Birmingham,
Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK.
Email: A.Reid@bham.ac.uk
European Journal of Political Theory
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885120911305
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2022, Vol. 21(2) 299–320
Introduction
The increased popularity of right-wing populist movements in recent years has led
to speculation about the future of liberalism and even, in some quarters, predic-
tions of the demise of established liberal democracies. Dominant normative theo-
ries of political liberalism presuppose widespread observance of liberal norms and
the internalisation of liberal values amongst citizens. Even if this was always a
slightly idealised picture, recent developments, including the rise of Trump, the
Freedom Party in Austria, Front National in France, and Alternative fu
¨r
Deutschland in Germany, mark the culmination of two decades of gradually
increasing popularity for populist right-wing parties in established democracies.
The popularity of these movements appears to show a rejection of liberalism
amongst a significant portion of the public, or, in liberal terms, an increase in
‘unreasonable’ behaviour. This unravelling of support for liberal institutions is
inconsistent with the optimistic picture painted by (amongst others) Rawls in his
paradigmatic account of political liberalism (Badano and Nuti, 2018: 147). Left-
wing populist movements have also emerged since the financial crisis, though they
have not enjoyed the same widespread electoral success as the populist right. There
is disagreement about whether these movements might present an avenue for lib-
eral renewal (Ferrara, 2018; Wolkenstein, 2019).
The empirical reasons for these developments are complex, and I do not attempt
to resolve them here. Instead, I offer a normative re-evaluation of the relationship
between liberalism and populism, and respond to recent scholarship on the issue.
I focus on three interrelated questions. First, does political liberalism offer a com-
pelling normative critique of populism? To this, I answer yes. Populist politics
involves, at its heart, a distinction between an ‘in’ group worthy of respect in
the political sphere, and an ‘out’ group that are not; usually these are framed as
the ‘true’ sovereign people and a corrupt elite.
1
I argue that both the way that the
‘out’ group is constructed and the assumed homogeneity of the ‘in’ group are
objectionably anti-pluralistic in a way that is incompatible with the ideal of respect
that is central to political liberalism.
Second, I ask whether this incompatibility with political liberalism implies a
duty of containment towards populist parties. Political liberals tend to believe that
a subset of unreasonable behaviour ought to be ‘contained’, in the sense that anti-
democratic measures ought to be taken to stop people acting in these ways (Quong,
2011: 293). I believe the case for a distinct obligation to contain populism per se is
weak, and the duty of containment only applies where populist movements also
have wider anti-liberal policy goals that present a threat to core liberal institutions.
As it stands this will only apply to a subset of right-wing populist groups.
Third, I ask whether citizens always have an obligation to eschew populist
movements, even where their other political views align with them. I suggest
that there are cases where it is permissible for citizens to pursue populist politics
or support populist parties, although I am less convinced that many existing pop-
ulist movements meet these standards. Determining the permissibility of populism
300 European Journal of Political Theory 21(2)
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