How Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy conflicts with ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific
Published date | 01 March 2023 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231175876 |
Author | Shaun Narine |
Date | 01 March 2023 |
Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
How Canada’s Indo-Pacific
strategy conflicts with
ASEAN’s outlook on the
Indo-Pacific
Shaun Narine
Department of Political Science, St. Thomas University,
Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada
Abstract
Despite giving lip service to the importance of respecting the “centrality”of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy
(CIPS) conflicts with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Instead,
Canada defines its position in the Indo-Pacific through the lens of American priorities
and perspectives. For its part, the AOIP expresses an ASEAN consensus position but
fails to capture the highly complex and varied views of different ASEAN states toward
the US and China. The ASEAN states are status-quo powers navigating a region that is
undergoing profound strategic and economic changes. By allying itself so firmly with
the US, Canada participates in sowing tension in the Indo-Pacific and may face poten-
tial consequences in the longer term. CIPS allows little room for the complex regional
relations that the ASEAN states are trying to balance.
Keywords
Canadian foreign policy, US relations, Asia Pacific, Indo-Pacific, China, ASEAN
On 27 November 2022, Global Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly released Canada’s long-
awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy (CIPS). This paper examines CIPS by comparing it to
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
Corresponding author:
Shaun Narine, Department of Political Science, St. Thomas University, 51 Dineen Drive, 88 Arbour Brook
Lane, Fredericton, New Brunswick, E3B 5G3, Canada.
Email: narine@stu.ca
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2023, Vol. 78(1-2) 172–192
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00207020231175876
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(AOIP). The latter policy, released by the ASEAN in 2019, outlines ASEAN’s collab-
orative and mutually beneficial vision for the Indo-Pacific region. By contrast,
Canada’s policy follows an American agenda and as such, is focused largely on con-
taining and undermining China’s political, economic, and technological rise.
This paper argues that CIPS, despite giving lip service to the importance of respecting
“ASEAN centrality,”conflicts with the AOIP’s expressed aims and tenets.Instead, Canada
defines its position in the Indo-Pacific through the lens of American priorities and perspec-
tives. The AOIP expresses an ASEAN consensus position but fails to capture the highly
complex and varied views of different ASEAN states toward the US and China. The
ASEAN states are status-quo powers navigating a region that is, inevitably, undergoing
profound strategic and economic changes. By allying itself so firmly with the US,
Canada participates in sowing tension in the Indo-Pacific and in the longer term, may
face potential consequences for that. CIPS allows little room to acknowledge the
complex regional relations that the ASEAN states must consider.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first examines the history of the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept and explains why the term “Indo-Pacific”is associated
with the “containment”of China. The second section explains the history and characteris-
tics of the ASEAN AOIP. The third section details CIPS. The fourth section reviews “The
States of Southeast Asia 2022,”a survey of the opinions of regional elites that captures the
complexity of their responses to China’sriseandtheUS’s presence in the region. The fifth
section draws these elements together to contrast the AOIP with the CIPS. It argues that the
AOIP reflects ASEAN’s aspiration to reinforce the norms and principles of interaction that
have helped to create regional prosperity. By contrast, CIPS is shaped by Canada’sper-
ceived need to be a compliant extension of American power.
The history of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”and its
different versions
In 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe discussed Japan’s economic interests
across the Indian and Pacific Oceans and his desire to bring these together.
Between 2011 and 2013, the US, India, and Australia used the term “Indo-Pacific”
in their foreign policy lexicons.
1
In 2012, Australian analysts referred to the
“Indo-Pacific”and referenced it in Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper.
2
In
2016, Abe enunciated his vision of a “FOIP”that would build a regional order on
“expanded connectivity, open institutions, and freedom in politics, commerce, and
1. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: Problems and prospects,”
International Affairs 96, no.1 (2020): 151.
2. Ibid.; Jeffrey Reeves, Canada and the Indo-Pacific: An Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada Policy Paper
(Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 22 September 2020), https://www.asiapacific.ca/
publication/canada-and-indo-pacific-asia-pacific-foundation-canada (accessed 16 April 2023), 15.
Narine 173
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