How cynical can ideal theory be?
| Author | Aaron James |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088215626739 |
Journal of International Political Theory
2016, Vol. 12(2) 118 –133
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1755088215626739
ipt.sagepub.com
How cynical can ideal
theory be?
Aaron James
University of California, Irvine, USA
Abstract
This article characterizes the aims of a practice-based method of justification and
explains why its form of “ideal theory” need to only assume that a group of agents
“ideationally” endorse an aim or end. Our interpretation of a practice, according to
its aims or ends, can thus be quite realistic about the selfish or corrupt motives of any
particular agent. This helps to answer “selectorate theory” cynics that view rules (in
trade, etc.) as equilibrium solutions among elites optimizing for their personal “political
survival.” Even when that is so, reason can still have an audience in politics in the
“ideational” recognition of values (e.g. as upheld in the classical theory of free trade).
Keywords
Fair trade, ideal theory, ideational coordination, practice-dependence, public reason,
selectorate theory
Economists often engage public life, giving reasoned arguments to government officials
in defense of specific policies. The presumption in this is that someone near the levers of
power is listening to the arguments on their merits and potentially moved to set policy
accordingly. But that presumption could be mistaken; it is a factual, presumably scien-
tific proposition that the weight of evidence might not support. And, indeed, according
to the “selectorate theory” of political economy, officials are almost never listening to
and moved by the arguments on their merits. They choose policies only according to
what will maximize their personal “political survival,” where they survive in power by
choosing policies that deliver personal payoffs to enough members of a “selectorate,”
from which they need to attract a “winning coalition” as against their ever-hungry rivals
for office (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Corresponding author:
Aaron James, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA.
Email: aaron.james@uci.edu
626739IPT0010.1177/1755088215626739Journal of International Political TheoryJames
research-article2016
Article
James 119
The selectorate school develops this basic picture in sophisticated game-theoretic
models, which are said to cover all decisions of policy (all of which yield payoffs for
selectorate members in personal shares of private or public goods), as well as the
political institutions of selection themselves (which shape who and how many such
members must be personally pleased if they are to continue to support an incumbent
rather than a rival). Of course, nothing follows from a game-theoretic model by itself,
however mesmerizing the Machiavellian optic. Yet, the models are impressive for their
credible detail, scope of application, and explanatory fruit, especially for comparative
politics. Consequently, they seem to offer evidence in favor of a general theory of how
policy is normally, and perhaps invariably, decided. Indeed, if evidence is a matter of
inference to the best explanation, the models might be said to provide relatively con-
clusive evidence—unless or until we have a better, comparably powerful account of
the workings of politics.
The models can of course be challenged on straightforward empirical grounds (e.g.
Clarke and Stone, 2008). They also raise specifically philosophical questions. When
economists publicly give their arguments, from “economic rationality,” “social welfare,”
“efficiency,” and the like, who exactly is their audience? Who is it is appropriate to
address with economic arguments, presented on their merits? If science did show that we
can be assured that no one is listening and moved accordingly, as selectorate theory sug-
gests, would there be any point in continuing to speak publicly? One option would be to
stop speaking; there is plenty of science to do (in modeling and mathematics, data gath-
ering, clarification of policy trade-offs, with no suggestion of how trade-offs ought to be
resolved, etc.), and as long as economists stick to science, there is no question of practi-
cal audience since no one (beyond the ivory tower) is being addressed. Alternatively,
economists could abandon their scientific aspirations and become a mere lobbying shop
(albeit while maintaining an air of scientific authority, as a political rouse to heighten
their influence). If most economists would be uncomfortable with these options, as I
suspect, there is another: continue to make policy interventions publicly, but, for the sake
of consistency, explain why public appeal to economic reason has a clear-headed point,
a real audience in political institutions, and why the attempt to speak for economic rea-
son can at least be credibly hoped to make a policy difference.
This a philosophical challenge, so the economist might ask the philosopher for assis-
tance. Yet, many political philosophers are in much the same predicament: while they
may instead appeal to moral reasons of justice, presented on their merits, the appeal may
not have an audience in politics, and so be as pointless or inapt as economic argument.
What, then, is the practically minded intellectual to do? Simply shout from the rooftops,
in what may be vain hopes that sound economic or moral reason will somehow be heard
and followed?
Roughly, my answer to this question is “yes.” Economic and moral arguments can be
addressed to the “ideational” political culture that at once shapes a society’s policy direc-
tion, its institutions of political selection, and the incentives of power-hungry officials
striving to keep up with political cultural trends. While I doubt that selectorate theory is
empirically adequate, my present philosophical claim is one of consistency: the models
can be correct, more or less, without undercutting the appropriateness of speaking up for
reason in public argument. Even if selectorate models capture a considerable part of the
To continue reading
Request your trial