How foreign pressure affects mass mobilization in favor of authoritarian regimes
| Author | Sebastian Hellmeier |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066120934527 |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120934527
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(2) 450 –477
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066120934527
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E
JR
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How foreign pressure affects
mass mobilization in favor of
authoritarian regimes
Sebastian Hellmeier
V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Abstract
Authoritarian regimes are frequent targets of international pressure in the form
of economic sanctions or threats thereof. Existing research shows that foreign
interventions can carry several unintended consequences for politics and the economy
in the targeted countries. One of the side effects of such interventions is boosting
support for incumbent autocrats. Public demonstrations in support of embattled
leaders are one aspect of this dynamic. This article investigates the link between
foreign pressure and domestic mobilization in favor of ruling autocrats. It is argued
that pressure simultaneously increases regime supporters’ willingness to participate in
rallies and the regime’s demand to display and even overstate regime support. Foreign
pressure facilitates mobilization as autocrats can fuel nationalist sentiments and frame
foreign interventions as an attack on the nation as a whole. At the same time, rallies
are a strategic tool to reduce political opportunities for the opposition and to signal
resolve to the international community. Empirically, I conduct the first quantitative
analysis that evidences the existence of a relationship between international pressure
and mobilization in support of incumbent autocrats. Using monthly data on rally events
in all authoritarian regimes between 2003 and 2015, I find that sanctions but also threats
significantly increase pro-government mobilization. In addition, I show evidence for a
moderating role of media freedom in the targeted state, highlighting the importance of
how international events are portrayed in national news.
Keywords
International Relations, nationalism, civil society, sanctions, foreign policy,
authoritarianism
Corresponding author:
Sebastian Hellmeier, Varieties of Democracy Institute, Department of Political Science, University of
Gothenburg, Box 711, Gothenburg 40530, Sweden.
Email: sebastian.hellmeier@gu.se
934527EJT0010.1177/1354066120934527European Journal of International RelationsHellmeier
research-article2020
Article
Hellmeier 451
Introduction
Authoritarian leaders do everything they can in order to stay in power. For this purpose,
they rig elections, crack down on dissidents, restrict civil liberties, or violate human
rights. In some cases of blatant wrongdoing, Western countries and international organi-
zations react with condemnation and sanctions. For instance, the European Union (EU)
imposed sanctions on Venezuela for human rights violations and a decline in democratic
institutions in 2017. Sanctions are a highly popular diplomatic tool among Western
actors. The United States alone has more than 30 active sanction programs in place, and
the United Nations Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes since 1966.1
The track record of economic sanctions in terms of success is mixed at best. There is
an ongoing debate about the determinants of sanction effectiveness (e.g. Von Soest and
Wahman, 2015; Bapat et al., 2013), as well as the normative implications of the adverse
side effects of sanctions (Peksen, 2019). One of the potential unintended consequences
of putting pressure on a country is increased public support for incumbent leaders during
times of international conflict. In many cases, citizens in authoritarian regimes take to the
street to support the incumbent government in response to foreign interventions. Former
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, for instance, organized a massive campaign in
which he condemned Western sanctions back in 2011. Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela
repeatedly spearheaded rallies against U.S. interference with Venezuelan politics. Similar
events and campaigns took place in Cuba and Iran, where leaders used interventions by
Western countries as focal points to mobilize their supporters and spark nationalist senti-
ments. Except for some recent scholarship on the role of nationalist protests in autocra-
cies (Weiss, 2014) and the consequences of sanctions for anti-government protests
(Allen, 2008; Grauvogel et al., 2017), little is known about the link between international
pressure and domestic mobilization.
This article argues that foreign pressure—understood as diplomatic means short of
the use of force—facilitates the mobilization of regime supporters and bystanders while,
at the same time, raising the regime’s demand to display public support. International
pressure provides autocrats with powerful mobilization frames that motivate rally par-
ticipation. In line with the rally-around-the-flag approach (Galtung, 1967), autocrats can
exploit nationalist sentiments and portray regime support as a civic duty to defend the
nation against a foreign enemy. These framing effects should be moderated by media
freedom in the target country. The more autocrats control public discourse, the easier it
is to make their narrative resonate with the wider public. On the demand side, foreign
pressure, together with international attention, sometimes opens windows of opportuni-
ties for the opposition to challenge the incumbent government. Pro-government rallies
can help the regime to counter these challenges and avoid the costs of direct repression
as it hogs international spotlight. In addition, they signal resolve and domestic support
for the policy that caused international conflict (Weiss, 2014). Whereas nationalist
frames facilitate the mobilization of regime supporters, the regime might coerce others
to participate in an attempt to overstate support in public.
To evaluate this argument empirically, I provide the first cross-country quantitative
study of the relationship between international pressure in the form of diplomatic threats
and economic sanctions and pro-government mobilization in non-democracies. The
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