How have EU ‘fire-fighters’ sought to douse the flames of the eurozone’s fast- and slow-burning crises? The 2013 structural funds reform
| Author | Ramona Coman |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148118768188 |
| Published date | 01 August 2018 |
| Date | 01 August 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118768188
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2018, Vol. 20(3) 540 –554
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148118768188
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How have EU ‘fire-fighters’
sought to douse the flames
of the eurozone’s fast- and
slow-burning crises? The 2013
structural funds reform
Ramona Coman
Abstract
This article examines the debates surrounding the Regulation 1303/2013 on structural funds,
arguing that the rules adopted in the midst of the eurozone crisis to strengthen the governance of
the euro area had spill-over effects on cohesion policy. It shows how, in the fast-burning phase of
the crisis (2010–2013), some actors pushed forward the idea of suspending structural funds in case
of non-compliance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, making funding conditional on
Member States’ compliance with the rules of the new economic governance, and how, after the
entry into force of this Regulation, in the slow-burning phase of the crisis (from 2013 onwards), a
greater number of actors has been calling for a more flexible interpretation of the rules. To explain
the disruption between t1 and t2, the article examines the change in the power relations between
and within institutions and the change in ideas.
Keywords
conditionality, European Structural and Investment funds (ESI), eurozone crisis, fast-burning
crisis, slow-burning crisis, Stability and Growth Pact
The economic crisis that hit the European Union (EU) in 2010 has strained European
integration. In order to save the euro, when the crisis erupted in Greece, the EU institu-
tions unanimously required the adoption of new rules to enhance the coordination of
macroeconomic policies and to increase the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). Remarkably, most of these decisions not only changed eurozone policies
(Bickerton et al., 2015; Fabbrini, 2013; Puetter, 2012; Schmidt, 2015b), but also impacted
other policies of the EU. This article scrutinises how some EU institutions struggled to
introduce the principle of macroeconomic conditionality in Regulation 1303/2013 on
Institute for European Studies, Political Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
Corresponding author:
Ramona Coman, Institute for European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles, Avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 39, CP
172, 1050 Brussels, Belgium.
Email: Ramona.Coman@ulb.ac.be
768188BPI0010.1177/1369148118768188The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsComan
research-article2018
Original Article
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