How much is the fish? When foreign policy meets fishing interests in the EU’s Arctic endeavour
| Author | Andreas Raspotnik,Andreas Østhagen |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117820920915 |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820920915
International Relations
2021, Vol. 35(2) 256 –276
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117820920915
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How much is the fish? When
foreign policy meets fishing
interests in the EU’s Arctic
endeavour
Andreas Raspotnik
and Andreas Østhagen
Fridtjof Nansen Institute
Abstract
This article explores the interaction between European Union (EU) foreign policy and the external
dimension of fisheries policy in a specific case: a dispute over snow crab fisheries around the
Norwegian Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. We do two things: first, we examine a specific case
that concerns both EU foreign policy and fisheries policy in order to understand the workings
of the EU regarding these two policy domains. Second, we connect the dots between the EU’s
external fisheries policy and the EU as a foreign policy actor in general, examining how intra-
institutional dynamics matter when studying policy and its related developments in Brussels. This
analysis of the snow-crab dispute between the EU and Norway illustrates how a relatively minor
issue in fisheries policies is also relevant to the study of the foreign policy of the EU, and more
generally for the links between foreign policy and fisheries as a nexus that is increasingly relevant
in international politics.
Keywords
Arctic, European Union, fisheries policy, foreign policy, Spitsbergen treaty
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has traditionally been regarded as a global actor sui generis,
subject to much controversy on its role in international relations (IR) over the last dec-
ades.1 Moving away from such unique, rather simplifying and popular conceptualisation
of the EU and its external actions, scholars have argued for a more nuanced understand-
ing of what EU foreign policy is.2 EU foreign policy is no longer perceived from and
limited to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common
Corresponding author:
Andreas Raspotnik, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1326 Lysaker, Norway.
Email: andreas.raspotnik@thearcticinstitute.org
920915IRE0010.1177/0047117820920915International RelationsRaspotnik and Østhagen
research-article2020
Article
Raspotnik and Østhagen 257
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) but is seen as extending to such policy areas as
trade, development, enlargement or external environmental policy.3 Despite the persis-
tent sensitivity of Member States in this field, the EU’s supranational institutions have
gained considerable influence and agenda-setting clout in broad EU foreign policy
issues, ranging inter alia from international food standards to climate negotiations and,
more recently, international sanctions.4
Studies over the last decade have proved the linkages between internal policy devel-
opment and the EU as a foreign policy actor in domains such as trade, climate negotia-
tions, and human rights.5 However, some policy areas are still poorly understood or even
under-researched, involving various policy domains where EU competences differ, and
diverging interests collide, change and develop over the course of time. One such domain
is fisheries. Despite multiple studies that highlight the negative consequences of EU
fisheries in external waters and the linkages to the concept of sustainability,6 there has
been limited research on how the makings of EU fisheries policies directly affects EU
external policies beyond the domain of fisheries.
In this article, we shed light on a distinct case of an extended EU foreign policy issue
that cannot be neatly disentangled as either foreign or fisheries policy. We highlight how
the latter does not only influence the former, but how the two are inherently intertwined
in a re-constitutive relationship where actions in one domain (fisheries) limits the room
for manoeuvre in the other realm (foreign policy).
Our case study is the Arctic: a region where the EU has expressed explicit foreign
policy interests, while it is also heavily engaged in different forms of fisheries. The EU’s
most recent Arctic policy endeavour serves as an interesting case study as EU Arctic
policy does not solely relate to foreign policy but is rather an unconventional mix of
internal, cross-border and external policies brought together under a vaguely geographi-
cally defined umbrella.7 The enigma within this unique regional case is a specific dispute
between two close economic and political partners, the EU and Norway; over licences to
catch snow crab in the maritime zones around Svalbard. There is an interesting empirical
puzzle to this specific case: why has the EU as an international actor chosen to pursue
this limited and rather insignificant dispute (in terms of EU-wide consequences both in
terms of political and economic goals), when the negative outcomes of it might outweigh
the positive?
Answers to this question, however, are partly found in recent scholarly work that has
looked at this dispute specifically unpacking its layers and storyline.8 The more interest-
ing question – theoretically – therefore is what this dispute teaches us about the links
between foreign and fisheries policy. The EU/Norway dispute over snow crab is matter
of both. Decisions concerning this issue are not made within the ‘traditional’ realm of EU
foreign policy (and mainly by the Member States), but within the realm of fisheries
policy, a domain where the European Commission (hereafter ‘Commission’) has exclu-
sive competence derived from the EU Member States.
We start from the premise that individuals and intra-institutional dynamics matter
when studying policy and its related developments in Brussels.9 ‘Policy documents do
not emerge from a pre-given political mandate; they actually emerge from lengthy pro-
cesses of drafting, consultation, and negotiation. The task is to examine not only policy
implementation but also its conception’.10 For that reason, our analysis also goes a step
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