How Populists Wage Opposition: Parliamentary Opposition Behaviour and Populism in Netherlands
| Date | 01 May 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321718774717 |
| Published date | 01 May 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718774717
Political Studies
2019, Vol. 67(2) 479 –495
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321718774717
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How Populists Wage
Opposition: Parliamentary
Opposition Behaviour and
Populism in Netherlands
Tom Louwerse1 and Simon Otjes2
Abstract
This article analyses how populist parties wage opposition in parliament. We conceptualise
opposition behaviour in terms of two independent dimensions: scrutiny (monitoring and
criticising government actions) and policy-making (participating in or directly influencing legislative
production). In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an opposition to the ruling elite in
name of ‘the people’, our hypothesis is that populist opposition parties are more likely to use
scrutiny and less likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist opposition parties. We study
the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017 as a typical example of a consensus democracy, where
populist parties have a greater opportunity to win representation and use parliamentary tools
(compared to majoritarian democracies). Our findings indicate that populist opposition parties are
particularly less likely to engage in policy-making behaviour and somewhat more likely to engage
in scrutiny behaviour.
Keywords
opposition, parliament, populism, consensus democracy
Accepted: 13 April 2018
Introduction
Political opposition is a vital characteristic of democracy, but the way in which opposition
politics is organised varies greatly between countries (Dahl, 1966). In the last quarter
century, populist parties have developed and thrived in Western democracies. A key ele-
ment of populism is their opposition to the ruling elite (Mudde, 2007). While populism
has enjoyed great scholarly attention in the past decade, the relationship between pop-
ulism and parliamentary opposition behaviour has not been analysed in detail.1
Our aim is to study the relationship between populism and the choice for a particular
type of parliamentary opposition behaviour. We develop a two-dimensional typology of
1Leiden University, The Netherlands
2University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Simon Otjes, University of Groningen, Broerstraat 4, 9712 CP, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Email: s.p.otjes@rug.nl
774717PCX0010.1177/0032321718774717Political StudiesLouwerse and Otjes
research-article2018
Article
480 Political Studies 67(2)
opposition party behaviour based on Mair’s (2009, 2011) distinction between responsible
and responsive politics. On the one side, there are parties that take responsibility for gov-
ernment policy and cooperate with others to shape it. On the other side, there are parties
that focus on representing the interests of voters but do so without taking responsibility.
These parties tend to voice opposition against unpopular policies and will try to signal
voters that they care for their concerns. On basis of this characterisation, we see opposi-
tion party behaviour as two-dimensional: first, there is a dimension that taps into the
willingness of parties to engage in policy-making, reflecting Mair’s responsible approach
to politics. The second dimension, scrutiny, taps into the extent to which parties voice
opposition to policies and scrutinise decision-makers. We argue that this reflects Mair’s
representative approach to politics. In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an
opposition to the ruling elite in name of ‘the people’, we propose that populist parties are
likely to engage in continuous and outspoken scrutiny of the government and are less
likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist parties.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the Netherlands because it combines three elements:
a consensus democracy, a left-wing populist party and a right-wing populist party. The
Netherlands is unique in Western Europe because both left-wing and right-wing populist
parties have been in parliament for more than a decade. This makes it an important case
to study parliamentary behaviour of populist parties, as it allows us to examine their
behaviour independent of their ideological orientation. As we will discuss in greater detail
below, in consensus systems, populist parties have a greater chance to win significant and
continued representation in parliament and to use parliamentary tools compared to major-
itarian systems. The open electoral system has allowed for the persistent presence of left-
wing and right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands: in 1994, the Socialist Party (the
‘Against-party’), entered parliament in 1994. It was followed in 2002 by the ‘citizens’
revolt’ of the right-wing populist List Pim Fortuyn (De Vries and Van der Lubben, 2005).
Since 2002, the lower House of the Dutch Parliament ‘has never been calm again’.2
Studying opposition parties’ use of parliamentary instruments between 1998 and 2017
offers substantial variation in the presence and size of populist parties. As a ‘typical’ case,
we argue that our study of the Netherlands is informative of general patterns of opposition
behaviour in many Western European parliaments, which have seen a similar rise of pop-
ulist parties and provide opposition parties with a wide range of parliamentary tools.
Below we will first outline our conceptualisation of opposition behaviour and discuss
how it relates to populism. We then argue in greater detail why we select the Dutch case
and what its relevance is in the broader literature. Our expectations are tested using a
range of behavioural data from the Dutch lower house. As our findings show that populist
parties indeed prefer a ‘critical opposition’ style that favours scrutiny over policy-making,
we will discuss the comparative implications of our study in the conclusion.
Opposition Behaviour: Scrutiny and Policy-Making
Our study focuses on opposition party behaviour within the parliamentary arena and spe-
cifically the use of parliamentary tools. We analyse opposition activity in parliament
using two independent dimensions: scrutiny and policy-making. As indicated above,
these dimensions are derived from Mair’s (2011: 14) observation that in European party
systems, there is a growing division ‘between parties which claim to represent, but don’t
deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent’. Some opposition
parties may use parliament primarily as an amplifier to express their opposition to the
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