How to think beyond sovereignty: On Sieyes and constituent power
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116642170 |
| Author | Lucia Rubinelli |
| Published date | 01 January 2019 |
| Date | 01 January 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2019, Vol. 18(1) 47–67
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116642170
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Article
How to think beyond
sovereignty: On Sieyes and
constituent power
Lucia Rubinelli
Polis Department, Magdalene College, University of Cambridge,
UK
Abstract
Historians and political theorists have long been interested in how the principle of
people’s power was conceptualised during the French Revolution. Traditionally, two
diverging accounts emerge, one of national and the other of popular sovereignty, the
former associated with moderate monarchist deputies, including the Abbe
´Sieyes, and
the latter with the Jacobins. This paper argues against this binary interpretation of the
political thought of the French Revolution, in favour of a third account of people’s
power, Sieyes’ idea of pouvoir constituant. Traditionally, constituent power has been
viewed as a variation of sovereignty, but I show it to be an independent conceptualisa-
tion of people’s power. Sieyes’ political theory led him to criticise and refuse contem-
porary theories of sovereignty in favour of what he understood as a fully modern
account of people’s power. Based on extensive research in the archives, I show how
Sieyes opposed the deployment of sovereignty by the revolutionary Assemblies and
recommended replacing it with the idea of constituent power.
Keywords
Sieyes, constituent power, popular sovereignty, national sovereignty, French Revolution
Summoned to Versailles for the meeting of the Estates General, on 17 June 1789,
the Assembly of the Third Estate passed a motion declaring itself a National
Assembly.
1
Following the wording put forward by the Abbe
´Sieyes, the deputies
declared that ‘the only suitable denomination for the Assembly is that of National
Assembly, both because its members are the only legitimately and publicly verified
representatives, and because they have been directly sent by almost the totality of
the nation’ (Madival and Laurent, 1862).
2
In affirming this, the representatives of
Corresponding author:
Lucia Rubinelli, The Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, The Alison
Richard Building, 7 West Road, Cambridge CB3 9DT, UK.
Email: lr391@cam.ac.uk
the Third Estate theorised, declared and enacted a radically new paradigm of
political organisation. They claimed that political authority lay not in the hands
of the monarch, who consulted the Estates as a merely deliberative body, but in the
will of the people. Comprising equal, free individuals, the people ultimately held
political power, the exercise of which no longer consisted in negotiations between
the three orders of society but enshrined the expression of the popular will. This
transfer of political authority from the monarch to the people was initially wel-
comed by almost all the deputies of the third Estate as self-evident and necessary.
However, once the power of the Assembly had been stabilised and it started work-
ing on the first draft of the Constitution, references to the idea of popular power
became gradually more problematic (Hont, 2004). No consensus could be built
around any definition of the newly established popular authority, nor around the
institutional mechanisms through which it was to be expressed and implemented.
In late August and early September 1789, the Assembly debated the questions of
the imperative mandate and the royal veto. On both occasions, the issues at stake
were far more than the simple discussion of the proposed measures, giving rise to
one of the most problematic, enduring and relevant debates in modern politics.
They sought directly to articulate the principle of popular power with the authority
of the state.
These debates, addressing the problem of the people’s political identity, the
concrete implications of their political authority, their role and position in relation
to representatives, are studied by scholars interested in both political theory and
intellectual history. Following a traditional and authoritative reading of the revo-
lutionary archives, most authors identify two conceptualisations of the principle of
people’s power which, relying on the notion of sovereignty, attributed it either to
the nation or to the people.
3
For example in the debate on the imperative mandate,
the former position is usually associated with a large number of deputies strongly
opposing the practice in the name of the indivisible character of national sover-
eignty. Arguing that sovereignty, instead of being attributed to an ensemble of
uncoordinated individuals able to control the representatives, was to be associated
with the nation qua superior collective body, moderate deputies sought to keep the
country compact and united under the national will as freely interpreted by
Assembly members. The alternative understanding of sovereignty is often asso-
ciated with the most radical deputies who argued that the attribution of sovereignty
to the nation (and thus to the Assembly) prevented the people from actually
exercising their political power. Consequently, they defended the imperative man-
date as an instrument privileging the people’s will over that of the representatives
and relied on the notion of popular sovereignty to implement the fundamentally
inalienable character of people’s political authority.
4
Whilst this second position
was predominantly voiced by exponents of what was later called the Jacobin club,
the first stance was supported by various groups of monarchist deputies who
shared the desire to affirm the principle of people’s power but sought to limit the
forms and means by which it was to be exercised.
5
I do not wish to deny the fundamental role played by these political and con-
ceptual poles throughout the revolution. However, in this paper I argue that the
48 European Journal of Political Theory 18(1)
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