How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations
| Author | Anne Schwenkenbecher |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211000926 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211000926
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(4) 901 –918
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00323217211000926
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How We Fail to Know:
Group-Based Ignorance
and Collective Epistemic
Obligations
Anne Schwenkenbecher
Abstract
Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance.
Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid
to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between
different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these
can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic
obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations concern not
just our own knowledge and beliefs but those of others, too and (2) that our epistemic obligations
can be held collectively where the epistemic tasks cannot be performed by individuals acting in
isolation, for example, when we are required to produce joint epistemic goods.
Keywords
collective action, group knowledge, social epistemology, inaction, collective ignorance, epistemic
obligations, joint epistemic goods
Accepted: 16 February 2021
Introduction
Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of
ignorance. Examples of collectively caused problems that are due to group ignorance
abound: they can arise in very large populations that are not group agents in the strict
sense (List and Pettit, 2011) but also in tightly structured organizations. Groups of people
panic-buying essential supplies because of a pending pandemic give rise to a collective
action problem that may be the result of ignorance. Suboptimal communication structures
in organizations can mean partial and asymmetric levels of knowledge and ignorance,
leading to members making underinformed or misinformed decisions. Another example
College of Arts, Business, Law and Social Sciences, Murdoch University, Murdoch, WA, Australia
Corresponding author:
Anne Schwenkenbecher, College of Arts, Business, Law and Social Sciences, Murdoch University,
90 South St., Murdoch, WA 6150, Australia.
Email: A.Schwenkenbecher@murdoch.edu.au
1000926PSX0010.1177/00323217211000926Political StudiesSchwenkenbecher
research-article2021
Article
902 Political Studies 70(4)
is pluralistic ignorance, which can be responsible for publicly upholding social norms that
people privately no longer agree with (Bicchieri, 2017). It is often the case that we fail to
do good because we do not know what to do or even that we are able to produce some
good at all. Sometimes, we may be blamed for collectively failing to do good or to pre-
vent harm, but when?
Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing: if we are blame-
lessly ignorant of some feature of our action or unaware that some consequence would
follow from it we will usually not be blamed for its negative outcome. But when is igno-
rance blameless? According to Gideon Rosen (2004), ignorance is only blameworthy if
an agent has previously failed in fulfilling their epistemic obligations. Daniel Miller
(2017: 1568) recaps Rosen’s position as follows: ‘epistemic obligations amount to obliga-
tions to do certain things that will or might result in an improved epistemic position with
respect to one thing or another’.
Whereas individual agents’ ignorance and its impact on their moral responsibility and
blameworthiness have attracted a fair amount of attention in the literature, hardly any-
thing has been written on ignorance as it can obtain in groups of agents, even though the
phenomenon described seems ubiquitous. One of the few exceptions is Säde Hormio
(2018: 7), who – fittingly – remarks that ‘literature on collective ignorance and what it
means for responsibility has so far been quite thin on the ground’.1
Having said that, philosophers who have written about responsibility for collective
inaction tend to invoke an epistemic condition. Very roughly, it goes like this: agents can
be held responsible for failing to collectively produce an outcome only if there was an
obvious or salient solution to a collective action problem that a reasonable person should
have been aware of (Held, 1970; Isaacs, 2011; May, 1992; Petersson, 2008; Pinkert,
2014). It is fair to say that these philosophers do not specifically address the question of
what type of knowledge must obtain within a group in order to successfully address joint
necessity cases and, relatedly, what types of ignorance would stymie collective endeav-
ours in a way that removes blameworthiness.
This article attempts to close both of these gaps in theorizing. It explores group-based,
or collective, types of ignorance and, correspondingly, examines what our collective epis-
temic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems are. Before I continue, let me
add a caveat: I am using the term ‘groups’ fairly loosely here to cover all collectivities
from so-called ‘random collections’ – pluralities of agents that are in principle capable of
intentionally producing certain outcomes or performing actions together such as arbitrary
bystanders (Held, 1970) – to group agents such as corporations (List and Pettit, 2011).
The differences between these groups matter for my main argument only when it comes
to collective epistemic obligations, which is where I will directly address this issue.
In the next section (‘Group-Based Ignorance’), I discuss varieties of group-based igno-
rance. Then, I will demonstrate how group-based ignorance can lead to morally subopti-
mal collective outcomes (‘How Collective Ignorance Can Affect the Collective Production
of Morally Important Goods’). Finally, I will turn to the question of what it means for
groups to have collective epistemic obligations (‘Collective Epistemic Obligations’).
Collective inaction resulting from group-based ignorance is blameworthy where collec-
tive epistemic obligations have been violated.
Group-Based Ignorance
Some of our collective failings are due at least in part to ignorance. What exactly does it
mean to be ignorant of something? According to the standard view defended by Pierre Le
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