Human dignity in historical perspective: The contemporary and traditional paradigms
| Author | Oliver Sensen |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885110386006 |
| Published date | 01 January 2011 |
| Date | 01 January 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
10(1) 71–91
!The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885110386006
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Article
Human dignity in
historical perspective:
The contemporary and
traditional paradigms
Oliver Sensen
Tulane University, USA
Abstract
Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become increasingly prominent in
the political discourse on human rights. In United Nations documents, for instance,
human dignity is currently presented as the justification for human rights. In this paper
I shall argue that the contemporary way in which human dignity is thought to ground
human rights is very different from the way human dignity has been understood tradi-
tionally. My aim is to contrast the contemporary paradigm of dignity to a different one
that has been prominent historically from Cicero onwards. My conclusion is that if one
wants to use the contemporary conception of dignity, one cannot refer to the history of
philosophy for support of this conception, and if one wants to use this history in
support, one would have to employ a different conception of dignity that uses a different
pattern of thought.
Keywords
absolute value, dignitas, human dignity, human rights, Kant, Stoic
Introduction
Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become increasingly prominent
in the political discourse on human rights. To take one important example, human
dignity is currently said to be the justification for human rights in United Nations
documents. In this paper I shall argue that the way in which human dignity is often
thought to ground human rights – as it is implied by UN documents and contem-
porary sources – is very different from the way human dignity has been understood
traditionally. In the following I shall first characterize the influential contemporary
view of human dignity, using the UN documents as an illustration. I shall then
Corresponding author:
Oliver Sensen, Department of Philosophy, 105 Newcomb Hall, Tulane University, 6823 St. Charles Avenue,
New Orleans, USA
Email: sensen@tulane.edu
introduce a different paradigm of dignity that has been prominent historically.
I shall refer to the views of Cicero, Leo the Great, Pico della Mirandola and
Kant as examples of this paradigm. Finally, I shall spell out the contrast between
what I call the contemporary and the traditional patterns of thought.
1
My aim in
this paper is therefore to distinguish different patterns of thought, and illustrate
their importance in historical context.
The contemporary paradigm of dignity
In contemporary usage, dignity – when it is thought to be more than a mere con-
vention – is often referred to as an inherent value of human beings.
2
Human dignity
is seen as a term with strong moral implications; in particular, it is often said that
one should respect other people because of their dignity.
3
In justifying why one
should respect others, the good (the inherent value of the individual) is seen as prior
to the right (the principle that demands respect for others), and the rights of those
affected are seen as being prior to the duty of the agent. Accordingly, Josef Seifert
expresses the contemporary view as follows:
When we speak of the dignity of human life, we mean an objective and intrinsic value.
We speak of a value and intrinsic goodness greater than, and different from, a modest
aesthetic value of an ornament or the intellectual value of a chess player ...which do
not directly impose moral imperatives on us. Instead, when we speak of human dig-
nity, we speak of morally relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a moral
call and an obligation to respect it.
4
That is, human beings possess the objective and inherent value property called ‘dig-
nity’, and because of this they can make rights claims on others. Not many propo-
nents of human dignity reflect on the ontological status of this value. However,
scholars who do, such as Seifert, consider the value to be a non-relational property,
5
that is, a property that does not change according to the different circumstances or
relations in which a human being finds himself. The distinguishing feature of this
property is a moral importance: each human being has an ‘intrinsic and objective
preciousness’.
6
Dignity is said to be a value that is ‘incommensurably higher’
7
than
other values (e.g. things one values for pleasure or use). This view of dignity as an
ontologically distinct value property is a stark form of value realism, such as one
might find in G. E. Moore and Max Scheler.
8
The way one can detect such a value is
often said to be by intuition as direct recognition. For instance, Seifert writes: ‘As
life, and human life, this value called ‘‘dignity’’ is an ultimate and irreducible phe-
nomenon which cannot be defined properly speaking but can only be unfolded and
brought to evidence.’
9
Seifert’s view that the inherent value property cannot be
defined is based on his interpretation of G. E. Moore’s intuitionism.
10
Not every
proponent of the contemporary paradigm of dignity holds an intuitionist epistemol-
ogy, however. For instance, a number of contemporary Kantians provide arguments
for an absolute value of human beings.
11
For now it is only important to note the
72 European Journal of Political Theory 10(1)
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