Human Genetics and the Law: Regulating a Revolution

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00168
Date01 September 1998
AuthorRoger Brownsword,Margaret Llewelyn,W.R. Cornish
Published date01 September 1998
Human Genetics and the Law: Regulating a Revolution
Roger Brownsword,
*
W.R. Cornish,
**
and Margaret Llewelyn
***
Whilst the science of genetics, which dates back to Gregor Mendel’s pioneering
work in the last century, is hardly new, its public profile has never been higher. At
every level, genetic technology and its applications — whether concerning the
isolation and location of particular human genes (such as the BRCA-1 and BRCA-
2 genes for breast cancer), the cloning of the Edinburgh sheep, or the mixing and
marketing of modified soya — is the subject of media attention and public debate.
Genetics, without question, is hot news; whether, however, it is also good news is
altogether more moot. For this is a science that elicits vastly different reactions: at
one pole, we find celebration and boundless optimism; at the other, we have
profound suspicion and dire prediction; and, between these extremes, there is a
broad spectrum of opinion in which a positive view of genetics is qualified by
expressions of caution and concern. Most dramatically, perhaps, it is the Human
Genome Project — a prodigiously expensive international voyage of scientific
discovery — that prompts our deepest uncertainties and equivocations: do we
really want to unravel the mysteries of the biological dimension of human life; do
we really want to have the knowledge and power to control and fine-tune that
dimension; do we really want such awesome responsibility? Whatever our
response, it is no exaggeration surely to say that we stand at the threshold of a
revolution — a revolution in biotechnology, but equally a revolution in the terms
of human social existence.1
On the face of it, the legal community, with its tendency towards gentle
incrementalism, is not particularly well-equipped to handle any kind of revolution,
let alone a revolution of the proportions indicated by modern genetics. As one
writer has recently put it, once we let the genetics genie out of the bottle, we will
(among other things) ‘tie the lawyers up in . .. knots ... . ’2In some areas —
patents is perhaps the best example — lawyers have already grappled with some of
these knots. Thus, while the politicians in the European Union have spent a decade
debating, and finally agreeing, the terms of the Directive on the Legal Protection of
The Modern Law Review Limited 1998 (MLR 61:5, September). Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 593
* Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield
** Faculty of Law University of Cambridge
*** Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield
1 See, eg, Patrick Dixon, The Genetic Revolution (Eastbourne: Kingsway Publications, 1993); and
Daniel Callahan, ‘The Genetic Revolution’ in David C. Thomasma and Thomasine Kushner (eds)
Birth to Death: Science and Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 13.
2 Tim Radford, ‘Double Jeopardy’ The Guardian Weekend, May 23 1998, 20, 22.

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