Human Rights after the Cold War
| Published date | 01 December 1993 |
| Date | 01 December 1993 |
| Author | David P. Forsythe |
| DOI | 10.1177/016934419301100402 |
| Subject Matter | Part A: Article |
Part A: Articles
Human Rights After the Cold War
DavidP. Forsythe
...
Abstract
The central thesis in this article is that international concern with human rights
will
remain
what it has already become: one of the major issues on international law. The end
of
the
Cold
War
has had a dual impact on international human rights, contributing both to
violations
of
rights and renewed efforts to ameliorate those violations. The complexities
of the subject
are
discussed according to these paradoxes and a synthesis.
The
first
paradox is general: the increasing consensus
not
only on the notion and core definition of
universal human rights, but also on the propriety of certain types
of
international action
to push for their implementation is joined by the fact that human rights remains one
of
the
most controversial aspects
of
world affairs.
The
next two paradoxes are derived from, but
more specific manifestations of the first. The second paradox consists of: while the
international community continues to confer legitimacy on public authorities through
bilateral and multilateral political acceptance, it also flirts with awarding legitimacy
because of
moral
factors.
The
third paradox is that the territorial state retains the most
power and legal authority relative to other actors on public policy, but at the same time
its jurisdiction is being penetrated and its operative authority weakened.
The dominant principle of present concern is the traditional emphasis in world affairs
on state independence, combined with pursuit of state security and wealth. The competing
principle is
on
international emphasis on universal human rights.
The
resulting synthesis
entails an advance for human rights and a concomitant reduction in the absolute values
of
national independence especially as translated into state security and economic policies,
but in a very
uneven
and 'ragged' way that does not completely undermine the territorial
state and its sovereignty.
Introduction
The idea
of
human
rights, or in more sexist language the rights
of
man, has proved one
of the most appealing contributions
of
Western history. Rooted in some aspects
of
Greco-
Roman culture, developed by the Enlightenment philosophes, implemented on a national
scale following the American - and less securely the French -revolutions, the abstract
conception
of
human
rights has generated broad support.
In
the 1990s from China to
Haiti, from Cambodia to Kenya, many persons demand greater attention to human rights.
The notion
of
human
rights, like other Western ideas such as the territorial state and
...
David P. Fortsythe is professor of political science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. This article
reflects a continuation and refinement of my thinking on this subject that was first published as 'Human
Rights in a Post-Cold War World', The Fletcher Forum, Summer, 1991, pp. 55-69. There have been
numerous changes in this version. I have not tried to provide copious documentation on human rights
sources. My interpretations will probably not become more persuasive by citing numerous sources. I have,
however, tried to call some recent and forthcoming publications to the attention of the reader.
393
NQHR
4/1993
sovereignty, has
been
internationalized.IZbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor
to President Carter,
wrote
provocatively in 1989 that human rights was 'the single most
magnetic political idea
of
the contemporary time'."
After the collapse
of
European communism during 1989-1991, and with the end of
the cold war, there
has
been much talk
of
a
'New
World
Order'.
Some observers
assumed that international human rights would be given greater prominence in this new
international order. By the mid-1990s it was difficult to discern much real substance to
the phrase 'New
World
Order'.
At first glance world politics seemed to be still primarily
characterized by territorial states pursuing various policies that gave
low
priority to the
internationally recognized rights of persons.
The response
of
the
international community, the most powerful members of which
are states, was slow or non-existent to a variety of gross violations
of
human rights. The
situation in the Balkans, for example, manifested brutal ethnic cleansing including
repeated military attacks on civilians and civilian installations, along with systematic rape
as a calculated strategy.
In
some areas of the former Soviet Union, atrocities against
civilians was also a daily occurrence. Mass starvation was only slowly countered in places
like Somalia, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.
Weak
and disorganized international
sanctions did not
prevent
military elements from refusing to abide by the outcome of free
and fair elections, as
in
Myanmar (Burma).
Nevertheless, the central thesis in this article is that international concern with human
rights will remain
what
it has already become: one of the major issues
of
international
relations.
The
end
of
the
cold war has had a
dual
impact on international human rights,
contributing both to violations
of
rights and renewed efforts to ameliorate those violations.
This is characteristic
of
the fate of human rights around the world after the cold war.
There is a mixed picture, showing elements
of
progress and retrogression both. Overall,
international attention to human rights is here to stay in world politics,
but
in an untidy
process involving
much
attention to competing values as well. It is doubtful that there is
a
'New
World
Order'
in
any comprehensive sense. But international relations continues
to show, as it has during contemporary times, an increased effort at the promotion and
protection
of
human rights.
.
The
overall situation was nicely demonstrated by the Vienna Conference on Human
Rights, sponsored by the United Nations during June 1993. There was strong sentiment
in favor
of
areaffirmation
of
universal human rights, broadly defined.
But
there was clear
opposition to this notion by a handful of states, led by China, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
At Vienna there was a large and assertive collection
of
non-governmental organizations
demanding greater and
more
specific attention to human rights. But many states, led by
China, were fearful
ofNGO
influence and succeeded in excluding them from most official
conference proceedings.
Most
states voted for a final conference document reaffirming
internationally recognized human rights,
but
those states mostly opted for general
discussion rather than addressing specific rights violations. states were officially in favor
of
freedom of speech,
but
they barred the
Dali
Lama
of Tibet from addressing the
conference.
1 David P. Forsythe, The Internationalization
of
Human Rights, Lexington Books, for the Free Press of
Macmillan, Lexington, MA, Inc., 1991.
2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure:
The
Birth and Death
of
Communism in the Twentieth Century,
Scribners and Sons, New York 1989, p. 256.
394
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