Humanitarian Intervention and a Cosmopolitan UN Force
| Author | James Pattison |
| Published date | 01 April 2008 |
| Date | 01 April 2008 |
| DOI | 10.3366/E1755088208000128 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND A
COSMOPOLITAN UN FORCE
JAMES PATTISON
Abstract: The current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention are
inadequate. As the crisis in Darfur has highlighted, the international community
lacks both the willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention and the ability
to do so legitimately. This article considers a cosmopolitan solution to these
problems: the creation of a standing army for the United Nations. There have
been a number of proposals for such a force, including many recently. However,
they contain two central flaws: the force proposed would be, firstly, too small
and, secondly, too dependent on major states. Accordingly, I argue that, to
be a substantial improvement on the current situation, such a force would
need to be, firstly, much larger and, secondly, in the hands of cosmopolitan
democratic institutions. This two-part solution would solve the problems faced
by current interveners, but is unlikely to be realised soon. Accordingly, I argue
that our immediate efforts should instead be concentrated on improving regional
organisations’ ability to intervene.
Keywords: Cosmopolitan democracy, humanitarian intervention, regional
organisations, responsibility to protect, United Nations
At the 2005 UN World Summit, the heads of the member states agreed, in the
phraseology of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty (ICISS 2001a), that there is a universal ‘responsibility to protect’ pop-
ulations from egregious violations of human rights. In doing so, they indi-
cated their preparedness to undertake humanitarian intervention ‘should peace-
ful means be inadequate’ and when ‘national authorities are manifestly failing to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity’ (UN 2005: 30). Despite this agreement, the international com-
munity lacks the tools necessary to discharge effectively this responsibility to
Journal of International Political Theory, 4(1) 2008, 126–145
DOI: 10.3366/E1755088208000128
© Edinburgh Univeristy Press 2008
126
Humanitarian Intervention and a Cosmopolitan UN Force
protect. That is, the current agents of humanitarian intervention have a number of
significant flaws. These flaws are well known, so a brief sketch here will suffice.
To start with, humanitarian intervention by the UN is dependent on UN
Security Council agreement. This means that the permanent five Council
members can block humanitarian intervention whenever they choose. When
the Security Council does agree to intervene, the UN does not have its own
troops or standing army to undertake intervention. It instead relies on ad hoc
contributions of troops from member states. But member states have been
increasingly reluctant to commit their soldiers, so UN missions often do not have
enough troops to fulfil their mandates. Moreover, the troops provided by member
states frequently lack the necessary equipment, have trouble coordinating, and
are deployed extremely slowly. The UN therefore runs into serious difficulties
when tasked with missions that go much beyond traditional peacekeeping.
By contrast, many mid- and large-sized Western, liberal democratic states
have the military and non-military resources to intervene, and this increases their
chances of being effective. But this effectiveness is limited: a number of these
states would face a high level of resistance. For instance, Daniele Archibugi
(2005: 224) argues that, after the war in Iraq, the US does not have the credibility
in the eyes of the world to carry out humanitarian intervention. It is likely to face
extreme local opposition, which decreases its chances of achieving of a success-
ful outcome. Conversely, non-western states may face less resistance, but tend
to be limited to intervention in nearby or neighbouring states at best, given their
lack of air- and sea-lift capacity. Moreover, nearly all states are highly selective
interveners, choosing to stand by on many occasions (most notably in Rwanda).
Moving on, regional and sub-regional organisations lack the military
infrastructure to intervene effectively. The EU is by far the most capable regional
organisation. The Helsinki Headline Goal, adopted in 1999, requires the EU
to develop a 60,000-strong military force, to be deployable within sixty days,
and sustainable for at least one year in the field (Terriff 2004: 152). But this
force has not yet been established; the EU seems instead to have scaled back
these proposals to the less ambitious ‘battlegroups’ concept.1At the moment,
then, the EU lacks the ability to deploy a significant force. It is a similar story
for the African Union (AU). Article 4(h) of the Charter of the AU permits it
to intervene in grave circumstances (war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity). There are also proposals for an African Standby Force, in the control
of the AU, to be in place by 2010. But, although a great improvement on its
predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, the AU suffers from massive
shortfalls in funding and equipment, which severely limit its ability to intervene
effectively. Other regional organisations, such as ASEAN, explicitly reject the
notion of intervention to protect people against large-scale abuses of human
rights (Emmers 2004: 145).
Overall, there are two central problems with the current agents and
mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. First, there are too many occasions
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