Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95
| Author | Daniel Druckman,Moorad Mooradian |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343399036006007 |
| Published date | 01 November 1999 |
| Date | 01 November 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990–95*
MOORAD MOORADIAN & DANIEL DRUCKMAN
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
The impacts of six attempts to mediate the conflict over the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh in
the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union were compared. Each mediation was intended to get
the direct parties – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh – to the negotiating table. Nearly
4,000 events were recorded for a six-year period from 1990 through 1995. Each event was coded in
terms of a six-step scale ranging from a significant action toward peace (+3) to substantial violence
directed at an adversary (–3). Time-series analyses of changes in the extent of violence showed no
change from before to after any of the mediations. A significant change did occur, however, between
the months preceding and following the period of intensive combat between April 1993 and February
1994. These results support the hypothesis that a mutually hurting stalemate is a condition for negoti-
ating a ceasefire and reduced violence between warring parties. A number of theoretical and practical
implications of the findings are discussed.
Introduction
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has a
long history. In 1921, Joseph Stalin and
Vladimir Lenin, working through the
Caucasian Bureau of the Russian
Communist Party, pacified Mustafa Kemal,
the demanding leader of the Turkish
Nationalist Army, by assigning the dis-
puted territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to
Azerbaijan. This decision angered the
Armenian leaders who, having been forced
into the Soviet Union, learned that Stalin
had little patience for their complaints,
holding out the prospect of severe recrimi-
nations if actions were taken by them. The
conflict thus remained latent during the
Stalin era, leading to a perpetuation of the
myth of brotherly cooperation between the
neighboring Soviet Republics.
The leadership transition from Stalin to
Khrushchev in 1953 provided opportunities
for the Armenian leaders to express their dissat-
isfactionwith the statusquo. Moscow wasover-
whelmed with protests from the Armenians
and petitions from thousands of Armenians
living in Nagorno-Karabakh favoring annexa-
tion to Armenia. Although the protests con-
tinued to be made to Khrushchev’s successors,
they fell on deaf ears. Bolstered by Gorbachev’s
open policies, the protests took on a strong
nationalist flavor, preparing the way for an
independent Armenia. In 1990, just before the
Soviet Union was about to be dissolved, the
conflict between Armenia, the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians, and Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh escalated dramatically,
becoming the first and arguably the most
violent conflict between post-Soviet republics.
709
journal of
peace
R
ESEARCH
© 1999 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 36, no. 6, 1999, pp. 709–727
Sage Publications (London, Thousand
Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
[0022-3433(199911)36:6; 709–727; 010545]
* The data used for the analyses performed in this study
are available on www.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR
at SAGE Publications on December 7, 2012jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Our analysis of the conflict begins in
1990. We compare the effectiveness of
several efforts to mediate the conflict
between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians concerning
the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh in
the Caucasus region of the former Soviet
Union. We focus on the period from
January 1990 to December 1995, with dis-
cussion beyond the latter date for discerning
longer-term changes in relations among
these parties. For the sake of clarity in
analysis, Armenia and the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians are considered one
party to the conflict, Azerbaijan is another,
and the mediators the third parties.
During the focal period of this study, six
major attempts were made to mediate the
conflict. Each is described briefly in chrono-
logical order.
Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan
Nazarbayev: September 1991
With the collapse of Moscow’s control of the
Soviet republics imminent, President Yeltsin
of Russia and President Nazarbayev of
Khazakhstan took the initiative to fill the
leadership vacuum that each anticipated
would follow. It is likely that the personal
ambitions of these presidents, more than the
fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, motivated them
to intervene in the conflict. Three months
into the mediation President Gorbachev
resigned and these mediators turned their
attention elsewhere.
Iranian Mediation: February to May
1992
Iran’s close historical relationship with both
Armenia and Azerbaijan gave its mediation
efforts legitimacy. Its desire to maintain this
relationship, to bolster its standing as a
regional power, and to prevent Turkey from
gaining regional dominance combined to
motivate its team to intervene. However,
when the discussions in Tehran col-
lapsed, the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) assumed the
lead intervention role squeezing the Iranian
team out as a non-member of its organiz-
ation.
Nazarbayev Intervention: August 1992
Fearing a Russian incursion into Kazakh-
stan, President Nazarbayev vehemently
defended the principle of non-alteration of
borders above national self-determination.
For this reason his intervention was per-
ceived differently by the Armenians (as
biased) and the Azerbaijanis (as fair). These
asymmetrical perceptions led to the collapse
of this short-lived mediation.
CSCE Intervention: February 1992 to
December 1994
This conflict provided an opportunity for
the CSCE to establish itself as an effec-
tive regional conflict prevention/settlement
organization. It created the Minsk Group of
nine national representatives to deal with the
conflict. However, its lack of experience
with these types of conflicts and reduced
solidarity among its members combined
with Russia’s regional ambitions and
Turkey’s advocacy role to weaken the inter-
vention. As its member-states attempted to
advance their own agendas, the CSCE
became increasingly indecisive through the
course of the three-year intervention.
Russian Mediation: November 1993 to
December 1994
Vladimir Kazimirov, Russia’s envoy to the
Minsk group, began shuttle diplomacy as a
challenge to the CSCE’s role as lead medi-
ator. At this time, Azerbaijan launched a
counter-offensive to drive the Armenian
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 36 / number 6 / november 1999710
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