Identifying the level of major power support signaled for protégés: A latent measure approach
| Published date | 01 May 2019 |
| Date | 01 May 2019 |
| Author | Mark David Nieman,Roseanne W McManus |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318808842 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Identifying the level of major power
support signaled for prote
´ge
´s: A latent
measure approach
Roseanne W McManus
Political Science Department, Pennsylvania State University
Mark David Nieman
Political Science Department, Iowa State University
Abstract
Major powers signal support for prote
´ge
´s in order to reassure them and deter harm against them. Yet, it is not always
clear how to identify who a major power’s prote
´ge
´s are or the degree of support signaled. Major powers have a variety
of complementary signals to choose among, including alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and others. It
can be difficult to weigh the importance of individual signals, especially since different major powers do not deploy
each signal in the same way. We address this challenge using a Bayesian latent measurement model, which provides a
theoretically coherent means of identifying the overall level of support signaled by a major power for a prote
´ge
´. Our
approach yields a cross-sectional time-series dataset, providing a continuous measure of the degree of support signaled
by major powers for all minor powers from 1950 to 2012. Our model also provides insights regarding which signals
of support are most informative when sent by each major power. We find considerable variation among major powers
regarding which of their signals are most meaningful, but in general alliances and military exercises tend to be among
the most important signals. In further applications using our latent measure, we also assess under which conditions
major powers are likely to increase their signals of support for prote
´ge
´s, as well as predict whether a major power will
intervene in conflicts involving its prote
´ge
´s.
Keywords
alliances, hierarchy, latent variable, measurement model, military intervention, signaling
Introduction
Major powers typically sit atop networks of prote
´ge
´s,
weaker states that share a major power’s foreign policy
orientation and whose security the major power wishes
to ensure. Understanding major power–prote
´ge
´relations
is key to studying many topics in international relations,
including hierarchy, balance of power, signaling, and
deterrence. But who exactly are a major powers’ pro-
te
´ge
´s, and how do major powers signal support for their
security?
Early research on major powers and prote
´ge
´s focused
on alliance relationships (e.g. Waltz, 1979; Morrow,
2000), meaning that alliances were the only signal of
support that received analytical attention. By not
considering that major powers might wish to ensure the
security of countries other than their formal allies, this
approach implicitly treated a major power’s set of pro-
te
´ge
´s as equivalent to its alliance partners. More recently,
scholars have noted how other gestures, such as nuclear
deployments (Fuhrmann & Sechser, 2014), troop
deployments (Martinez Machain & Morgan, 2013;
Allen, Bell & Clay, 2018), arms transfers (Yarhi-Milo,
Lanoszka & Cooper, 2016), military exercises (Blanken-
ship & Kuo, n.d.), and even leadership visits and state-
ments (McManus, 2018), can also function as signals of
Corresponding author:
mdnieman@iastate.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2019, Vol. 56(3) 364–378
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343318808842
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial