Identity and War
| Published date | 01 November 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12084 |
| Date | 01 November 2013 |
Identity and War
Mary Kaldor
London School of Economics
Abstract
This article makes two arguments. First, sectarian identity (ethnic, tribal or religious) is an outcome of war rather than a
cause of war, even though such identities make (selective) use of memory. The implication of this proposition is that
war should be interpreted less as an external contest of will between two sides but rather as a one-sided and/or paral-
lel effort to construct unidimensional political identities as a basis for power. Power derived from identity so con-
structed is likely to be authoritarian and repressive. Second, different methods of communication provide the basis for
different modalities of power and this matters; power diffuses through all forms of communication. But the language
of violence is much less amenable to freedom and human emancipation than other nonviolent forms of communica-
tion. The arguments are elaborated through a critique of the work of the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt and his
notion of the friend–enemy distinction as a basis of political authority. The article concludes by arguing that in a global
era, when traditional inter-state war is declining, there are greater possibilities for multiple identities and a layering of
political authority, even though there are also efforts to resurrect the friend–enemy distinction in many ‘new wars’and,
above all, in the war on terror.
Policy Implications
•Understanding that war is a way of constructing political identity rather than a contest between different political
identities has profound implications for policy in conflict zones. Instead of intervening on one side, separating
sides, or finding apolitical compromise, policy needs to emphasise how to prevent or marginalise violent processes
of identity construction.
•The argument that sectarian identity is an outcome of war rather than a cause has implications for global efforts at
mediation and reconciliation of conflicts. Instead of sectarian compromise, global policy should aim at promoting
multiple identities and strengthening nonsectarian identities.
•The war on terror can be interpreted as an effort to resurrect the friend–enemy distinction and establish a perma-
nent ‘state of exception’–the suspension of rights. Terrorism should be treated as a global risk rather than as an
enemy and addressed through rights-based law enforcement.
•A global layering of political authority is an expression of multiple identities and is more amenable to human
emancipation than binary identities based on the friend–enemy distinction
Is not war merely another kind of writing and lan-
guage for political thoughts? In one word, the art
of war, in its highest point of view is policy, but
no doubt a policy which fights battles instead of
writing notes (Clausewitz, 1968, p. 358).
[O]ne’s point of reference should not be to the great
model of language (langue) and signs but to that of
war and battle. The history which bears down and
determines us has the form of a war rather than that
of a language: relations of power not relations of
meaning…(Foucault, 1980, pp. 114–15).
The hope of harmony in the contemporary world
lies to a great extent in a clearer understanding
of the pluralities of human identity and in appre-
ciation that they cut across each other and work
against a sharp separation along one single line
of impenetrable division (Sen, 2006, p. xiv).
What if we understand war not as a direct exercise of power
but as a way to fix meaning through which power is exer-
cised? War and diplomacy, as well as otherpractices like cul-
ture or science, can be regarded as forms of
communication, ways of representing the world that pro-
foundly affect, regulate or constrain how human beings l ive.
They are forms of discourse. But they are not the same; they
function differently. The central argument of this article is
that different modes of communication, different forms of
discourse and the ways they relate to each other have pro-
foundly different consequences for the organisation of soci-
ety –for social relations and the nature of power.
©2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2013) 4:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12084
Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 4 . November 2013
336
Research Article
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