Identity change in a context of intergroup threat: Regional identity mobilization in Bolivia
| Author | Anaïd Flesken |
| Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Published date | 01 February 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0263395717697343 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
research-article2017
Special Issue Article
Politics
2018, Vol. 38(1) 51 –67
Identity change in a context
© The Author(s) 2017
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of intergroup threat: Regional
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717697343
DOI: 10.1177/0263395717697343
journals.sagepub.com/home/pol
identity mobilization in Bolivia
Anaïd Flesken
University of Bristol, UK
Abstract
The consequences of marginalized ethnic group emancipation for historically privileged groups
are rarely examined, despite assertions that the disruption of traditional power balances leads
to backlash. This article addresses identity change in a ‘most probable case’ of intergroup threat,
examining reactions to indigenous empowerment in Bolivia. After translating theory on identity
change into testable implications, it explores meso-level rhetoric of the Santa Cruz Autonomy
movement through diverse sources and micro-level identification through time-series survey data.
It finds evidence for the constructionist power of discourse: its ability to create societal consensus
on collective identity in a relatively short time span.
Keywords
Bolivia, identity, political discourse, rhetoric
Received: 27th May 2016; Revised version received: 26th October 2016; Accepted: 22nd December 2016
Introduction
Collective identities are constructed and hence, in theory, also amenable to re-
construction. Yet how, and how quickly, identities change remains up for debate
(Hale, 2004). While this question has received some attention recently (e.g. Chandra,
2012; Wimmer, 2008a), much work on identity politics is still based on differing
assumptions as to the speed of identity change. On the one hand are studies in nation-
alism and related topics that hold that collective identity change is a long-term pro-
cess, unfurling only over many generations. On the other hand are studies, particularly
on ethnic conflict, that assume that political entrepreneurs are able to manipulate
collective identities for personal gain (see Weber et al., 2016).
Corresponding author:
Anaïd Flesken, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, 3 Priory Road,
Bristol BS8 1TU, UK.
Email: anaid.flesken@bristol.ac.uk
52
Politics 38(1)
In the latter works, collective identity change occurs relatively quickly: political elites
alter the conception of the collective identity in public discourse, which is increasingly
accepted by rank-and-file citizens and invested with meaning. Political elites are hence
able to create consensus on a new collective identity and in doing so create the identity
itself. However, empirical research on the links between political rhetoric and citizen
conceptions of collective identity is very young and so far remains inconclusive. Some
studies suggest that political rhetoric indeed has a deteriorating effect on ethnic relations,
and not only when the rhetoric is negative (Sprague-Jones, 2011): the mere mention of
ethnic diversity suffices as it increases the salience of differences in society (Helbling
et al., 2013). Other studies do not find evidence for any link between rhetoric and atti-
tudes and suggest not to overestimate the ‘constructionist power’ of political rhetoric
(Boonen and Hooghe, 2014: 56; see also Hjerm and Schnabel, 2010). Yet the majority of
studies do not directly examine collective identity conceptions, either at the elite or indi-
vidual level, nor are their cross-sectional designs able to examine dynamic processes such
as identity change.
This article fills this gap. It examines processes of identity contestation and consensus
at both the elite and individual levels over time and in a context of rapid socio-political
transformation: the department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia. The steady rise of the indige-
nous–peasant-based political left in the 2000s, culminating in the election of Bolivia’s
first indigenous president and the announcement of sweeping political and economic
reforms, appeared to threaten the privileged position of (mainly white and mestizo, that
is, mixed) landholders in the resource-rich department of Santa Cruz. In reaction to the
threat, the elite mobilized for regional autonomy and supported their demands with a
discourse on a regional cruceño identity. Such shocks to a society’s power relations are
said to provide fertile ground for identity change: members of the historically privileged
group may assert their identity in reaction to perceived challenges to their hegemonic
status (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2008b). But while such instances, for example,
through supremacist or anti-immigrant movements, have been documented (Doane,
1997), less is known about whether they do indeed affect consensus on identity change in
the population at large. In the United States, the forerunner in much of the political sociol-
ogy and psychology of ethnic relations, research on white identity has only just begun
(e.g. Jardina, 2014; Schildkraut, 2015). As a most likely case for identity change, the
Bolivian context provides a useful probability probe of hypotheses about the link between
elite and societal conceptions of identity.
Following an introduction to the Bolivian context, the article outlines a conceptual
framework for the analysis of identity change at both elite and mass levels, translating the
sociological theoretical literature on identity boundaries into testable implications. In par-
ticular, I propose to examine an identity’s boundary location, its salience and its permea-
bility in order to obtain measures of societal consensus or contestation on collective
identities. The following sections take a first step in applying the operationalization to the
Santa Cruceño context. Given the intersubjectivity of identity and identity change, the
empirical examination is necessarily a medley of methods. For the elite level, I draw on
historical and anthropological accounts as well as local expert interviews and newspaper
analysis to map out how the Santa Cruz elite (claimed to) perceive a threat to cruceños,
and how they reacted to that: first with an emphasis on a regionally circumscribed rather
than an ethnic boundary, and then with a renewed ethnicization of this regional boundary
and an increased focus on the negative out-group. I then go on to examine whether this
Flesken
53
elite conception of the group boundary is reflected in the wider population through the
use of representative time-series survey data. I show that consensus indeed developed:
identification first increased and spread to all social spheres and, from around 2008
onwards with the switch of the discourse towards the focus of the negative out-group, also
had an exclusionary effect on those with weaker historic ties to the department, namely,
highland indigenous immigrants. While consensus seems to somewhat lessen again from
2010 onwards, the article hence lends support to the ‘constructionist power’ of political
discourse to affect identity change, and to do so in a relatively short time span.
On Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the most unequal countries in Latin America, and socio-economic situ-
ation and ethnic background usually coincide. Long-term structural and direct discrimi-
nation long marginalized the country’s indigenous population, such that indigenous
Bolivians fare consistently and considerably worse in developmental indicators such as
poverty, malnutrition, infant mortality, literacy rates and land ownership (Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 2006; Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2006; United Nations Development
Programme, 2011; see also Gisselquist, 2013). Indigenous Bolivians mobilized against
this marginalization from the 1970s, but only began to see some success in the 1990s,
when changes in the political structure opened up spaces for indigenous movements and
parties (Van Cott, 2005). In December 2005, the continued mobilization culminated in the
election of Evo Morales as the country’s first indigenous president and the subsequent
initiation of constitutional reform, which was to lead to the pronouncement of the
Plurinational State of Bolivia and the recognition of its indigenous population as an inte-
gral part of it.
It was widely perceived that Bolivia’s indigenous movement had succeeded in elevat-
ing the indigenous category to be equal in both power and status with that of the non-
indigenous – white or mestizo – population. Some among the non-indigenous population,
however, perceived this process not as equalizing power relations but as inversing the
status quo, fearing that the indigenous movement’s advance would now curtail their own
interests. This reaction was particularly pronounced in Santa Cruz, a relatively wealthy
department in the south-east of the country.
While Bolivia is rich in natural resources, these resources are unevenly distributed:
most are found in the eastern lowlands of the Amazon and little in the western highlands
of the Andes. Of Bolivia’s nine departments, the south-eastern lowland departments of
Tarija and Santa Cruz together produce 82.3% of the country’s gas output and 41% of its
gross domestic product (GDP). With 28.2%, Santa Cruz is the single largest contributor
to Bolivia’s GDP (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008). Santa Cruz’ situation as Bolivia’s eco-
nomic powerhouse has bestowed upon the department a steady stream of immigrants.
According...
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