Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations
| Author | Harald Schoen |
| Published date | 01 March 2008 |
| Date | 01 March 2008 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1465116507085955 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Identity, Instrumental
Self-Interest and Institutional
Evaluations
Explaining Public Opinion on Common
European Policies in Foreign Affairs
and Defence
Harald Schoen
Johannes Gutenberg University, Germany
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses public opinion on common European
policies in foreign affairs and defence. It proposes three
models of support for common policies in these fields.
Drawing on Eurobarometer data, the analysis shows that
instrumental self-interest and territorial identities contribute
considerably to explaining support for common foreign
affairs and defence policies. Moreover, support for common
policies is strongly driven by domain-specific evaluations of
the European Union’s performance. These findings suggest
that popular support for common European policies in
foreign affairs and defence has an experiential base. Thus,
elites have an incentive to respond to public opinion when
making policy decisions, so this analysis supports the liberal
view in international relations rather than the realist account.
5
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507085955
Volume 9 (1): 5–29
Copyright© 2008
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
KEY WORDS
common defence and
security policy
common foreign policy
European integration
public opinion
responsiveness
Introduction
After early ambitious attempts to establish common European policies in
defence and foreign affairs failed, for a considerable period European inte-
gration in these domains advanced slowly, if at all. In the 1990s, however,
integration proceeded at a considerably higher rate. The Maastricht Treaty
established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second
pillar of the European Union. In more recent years, with the establishment of
a High Representative for the CFSP, decision-making was made more
efficient, troops were assigned to the European Union (EU) and the EU began
to engage in civilian and military crisis management (e.g. M. Smith, 2004).
The Constitutional Treaty goes even further as it includes creating the position
of a Foreign Affairs Minister of the EU, widening of the so-called ‘Petersberg
tasks’, a mutual defence clause and a terrorism-related solidarity clause.
Notwithstanding the Constitutional Treaty’s failure in 2005, European inte-
gration has advanced in foreign affairs and defence and is likely to progress
further in the future (e.g. Howorth, 2001; Ojanen, 2006).
Whereas political science has paid considerable attention to advances
toward common European policies in foreign affairs and defence (e.g.
H. Smith, 2002; K. Smith, 2003; M. Smith, 2004), only a few studies deal with
public opinion. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 55–63) found that the per-
missive consensus among Europeans on European integration did not extend
to foreign affairs and defence. Several more recent studies reported trends of
public opinion on collective defence (Manigart and Marlier, 1993; Everts, 1995;
Sinnott, 1997; Everts and Sinnott, 2002). Prior analyses also explored the
location of foreign affairs and defence in the structure of citizens’ preferences
over EU policy (Sinnott, 2000; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; see, for party mani-
festoes, Gabel and Hix, 2002). Loveless and Rohrschneider (2006) showed that
attitudes towards current defence institutions have a bearing on EU support
in Eastern Europe. At the same time, only a few studies addressed the sources
of Europeans’ attitudes toward common foreign and security policy (e.g.
Rattinger, 1996). In this line of research, Carrubba and Singh (2004) showed
that Europeans have different goods in mind when thinking about a common
defence policy, whereas Ray and Johnston (2007) explored Europeans’
opinions about the EU’s role in European defence as compared with NATO.
In summary, though prior research has produced interesting results, we still
do not know much about the sources of public opinion on common European
policies in foreign affairs and defence.
Findings on these sources have considerable implications concerning the
image of public opinion and the role it can play in policy-making. According
to the traditional view (e.g. Lippmann, 1922; Almond, 1950), voters are not
European Union Politics 9(1)
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