III: Governmental and Administrative Institutions; Institutions Politiques et Administratives
| DOI | 10.1177/002083451806800603 |
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
746
III
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
68.7180 AHUJA, Amit ; OSTERMANN, Susan L. — From quiescent
bureaucracy to “undocumented wonder”: explaining the
Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate. Gov-
ernance 31(4), Oct. 2018 : 759-776.
India's Election Commission (EC) h as become one of its most powerful
regulatory bodies. We use a process-tracing approach to explain the
EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democ-
racy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state
based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when
entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of
political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly
meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers.
Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to
the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak execu-
tive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under
federalism, state based electoral forces can produce strong national
institutions. [R]
68.7181 ALEMÁN, Eduardo ; MICOZZI, Juan Pablo ; RAMÍREZ,
Margarita M. — The hidden electoral connection: analys-
ing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress.
Journal of Legislative Studies 24(2), 2018 : 227-244.
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to
advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents.
The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring,
and legislative speeches. The authors examine legislators’ information
requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have
been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscru-
tinised in presidential countries. The authors focus on the case of Chile.
Making use of a new database of parliamentary questions and a com-
prehensive sample of geographical references, the authors examine how
legislators use this mechanism to forge connections with voters, and find
that targeted activities tend to increase as a function of electoral insecu-
rity and progressive ambition. [R, abr.]
68.7182 ARMALY, Miles T. — Extra-judicial actor induced change
in [US] Supreme Court legitimacy. Political Research Quar-
terly 71(3), Sept. 2018 : 600-613.
Although public support for the US Supreme Court is generally stable,
various cues and heuristics affect how individuals derive political opinions.
And while the Court is capable of conferring support on its own decisions,
information from extra-judicial sources — such as presidential candidates
— may have a potentially (de)legitimizing influence on individuals and their
attitudes. Using a survey experimental design, I manipulate the source of
negative statements about the judiciary to determine whether extra-judicial
actors are capable of altering support for the Court and, if so, whether it is
via ideological updating or is a purely affective response. I find that political
actors unrelated to the Court are capable of producing change in attitudes
and that those changes are affective. [R, abr.]
68.7183 AUEL, Katrin ; UMIT, Resul — Explaining MPs’ communi-
cation to their constituents: evidence from the UK House
of Commons. British Journal of Politics and International Re-
lations 20(3), Aug. 2018 : 731-752.
Everyone agrees that MPs should keep in touch with the people they
represent. Yet some MPs invest more in communication with their con-
stituency than others. We approach this problem with data from the
parliamentary communication allowance in the UK, where all MPs had
the same amount of budget to reach out proactively to their electors. We
base our analysis on two fundamental assumptions: that re-election is
the main goal of leg islators and that communication to signal trustworthi-
ness is one way of securing their re-election. We then examine the
impact of electoral prospects, constituency characteristics, and parlia-
mentary behaviour on communication to constituents. We find evidence
that, even in the absence of budgetary constraints, MPs’ constituency
communication depends on challenges to their re-election. [R]
68.7184 BEKAFIGO, Marija — The exercise of party and committee
leadership in the US House, 1949-2011. Polity 50(3), July
2018 : 428-469.
Existing studies of Congress argue that institutional power within the U.S.
House of Representatives has shifted from committee chairs to party
leaders during the post-World War II era. This shift was exacerbated by
the reforms of the 1970s, which democratized governing processes in
committees and enhanced the power of party leaders. I find a shift from
committee to party leadership activity that roughly confirms the expecta-
tions of previous studies, but I also find evidence that party leaders were
nearly as active as chairs in the committee era. The results show that
committee chairs and party leaders engaged in different kinds of action in
the public sphere, with party leaders having a greater connection to the
president than committee chairs regardless of era. These findings sug-
gest that the “committee era” narrative is too limited. [R, abr.]
68.7185 BORGHETTO, Enrico — Delegated decree authority in a
parliamentary system: the exercise of legislative delega-
tion in Italy (1987 -2013). Journal of Legislative Studies
24(2), 2018 : 179-196.
The substantial increase in the delegation of legislative powers from the
parliament to the executive has been singled out as one of the most
prominent changes in the Italian political system of the last three dec-
ades. It has given traditionally weak executives the opportunity to adopt
significant reforms while bypassing the notorious fetters of the ordinary
legislative process. While the literature has to date focused on the moti-
vations to delegate, there is still a research gap on what the executive
does with the delegated authority. This article analyses why, in a remark-
able number of cases, the cabinet did not use the delegations. Results
show that the existence of an agreement on the policy in question, as
well as the complexity and timing of the delegation have a significant
impact on the likelihood a delegation is used. [R, abr.]
68.7186 BOSWELL, John — Keeping expertise in its place: under-
standing arm's-length bodies as boundary organisations.
Policy and Politics 46(3), July 2018 : 485-501.
Policy and administration scholars have struggled to explain the waxing
and waning of arm's-length bodies over time and across contexts. This
article draws on the science and technology studies’ concept of boundary
work — understood as practices which both demarcate and enable
collaboration across distinct areas of expertise — to help explain varia-
tion in these institutional arrangements. Conceptualising arm's-length
bodies as boundary organisations shows how their authority rests on
their capacity to enable ongoing coordination while preserving the author-
ity and autonomy of relevant expert spheres. The article demonstrates
this analytical purchase through reference to two cases in contemporary
British government. [R]
68.7187 CHRISTENSEN, Jørgen Grønnegård ; OPSTRUP, Niels —
Bureaucratic dilemmas: civil servants between political
responsiveness and normative constraints. Governance
31(3), July 2018 : 481-498.
The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a
delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil
servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints
on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is
stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service
provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational
factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to
balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political
advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay
more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency offi-
cials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more
prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can
be generalized West European systems. [R]
68.7188 CIRONE, Alexandra ; VAN COPPENOLLE, Brenda — Cabi-
nets, committees, and careers: the causal effect of
[French] committee service. Journal of Politics 80(3), July
2018 : 948-963.
What is the value of committee service to an individual legislator? Self-
selection and party control of appointments typically obscure this rela-
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