III: Governmental and Administrative Institutions Institutions Politiques Et Administratives
| Date | 01 February 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002083451806800103 |
| Published date | 01 February 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
45
III
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
68.437 ACHENBACH, Jelena von — Parlamentarische Informa-
tionsrechte und Gewaltenteilung in der neueren Recht-
sprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Parliamen-
tary control and separation of powers in the ruling of the
[German] Federal Constitutional Court). Zeitschrift für Par-
lamentsfragen 48(3), 2017 : 491-515.
The constitutional right of parliament to request information from the
government is a defining part of the system of checks and balances
within the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative
branch. Most importantly, the scope of parliamentary rights to be in-
formed about executive action determines to what extent the government
can be held accountable by the parliament. Against this backdrop, the
contribution analyses how the German Federal Constitutional Court in its
case-law on parliamentary rights to information construes the separation
of powers between the German Federal Parliament and the German
Federal Government. Especially focusing on the role of the parliamentary
minority, it develops a critical account of the Court’s concept of parlia-
mentary control. [R, abr.]
68.438 AINSLEY, Caitlin — The politics of Central Bank appoint-
ments. Journal of Politics 79(4), Oct. 2017 : 1205-1219.
Monetary delegation to independent central banks is the institutional
standard for responsible monetary policy-making. Governments over-
come their own high inflation biases by delegating policy-making discre-
tion to conservative central bankers with political independence and long
terms of appointment. With a formal model of central bank appointments
and monetary policy-making, I provide results suggesting this canonical
result hinges on widespread, empirically false assumptions about the
nature of central bank preferences and the economic environment in
which monetary policy-making occurs. During periods of heightened
monetary uncertainty, delegation to an independent central bank is a
less effective institutional solution to achieving inflation goals than extant
theory suggests. I test several predictions from the model drawing
appointments and monetary policy voting records from central banks in
Hungary and the UK. [R, abr.]
68.439 ARNDT, Christoph — Public policy-making and risk pro-
files: Scandinavian centre-right governments after the
turn of the millennium. European Political Science Review
9(4), Nov. 2017 : 495-518.
Conducting a comparative case study of recent Danish and Swedish
centre-right governments, this article analyzes the stylized assumptions
on the party level by comparing two similar centre-right governments,
which differed in their voter coalitions’ risk-profile. I first argue that cen-
tre-right governments are generally constrained by the popular en-
trenchment of the universal welfare state when it comes to life course-
related welfare schemes. Second, I argue that the leeway on labor
market-related schemes is contingent on the actual risk profile of the
centre-right’s electorate, and thereby move beyond the stylized assump-
tions from recent literature. In this respect, the Danish centre-right did, in
contrast to its Swedish counterpart, gain power with an unusual high
support among working-class voters, which constrained its latitude on
labor market-related schemes. [R, abr.]
68.440 ARNOLD, Tobias ; STADELMANN-STEFFEN, Isabelle —
How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium
federalism reform through the perspective of the syn-
thetic control method. European Journal of Political Re-
search 56(3), Aug. 2017 : 680-702.
The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's
welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists.
However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what condi-
tions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article e xamines
this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation
of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered
when theorizing the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the
case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown
that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had
further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this
spending in the years after 1993. [R, abr.]
68.441 ASATRYAN, Zareh ; HEINEMANN, Friedrich ; PITLIK, Hans
— Reforming the public administration: the role of crisis
and the power of bureaucracy. European Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 48, June 2017 : 128-143.
The need to balance austerity with growth policies has put government
efficiency high on the economic policy agenda in Europe. Administrative
reforms that boost the internal efficiency of bureaucracy can alleviate the
trade-off between consolidation and public service provision. Against
such a backdrop, this paper constructs (and makes available) a novel
reform indicator to explore the determinants of public administration
reforms for a panel of EU c ountries. The findings support political -
economic reasoning: an economic and fiscal crisis is a potent catalyst for
reforms, but a powerful bureaucracy constrains the opportunities of a
crisis to promote reform. [R, abr.] [See Abstr. 68.1000]
68.442 BANDEIRA, Pablo ; FERRARO, Agustín — Integrating
participatory institutions into the traditional representa-
tive and bureaucratic model of public governance. Inter-
national Political Science Review 38(5), Nov. 2017 : 642-658.
Does more citizen participation necessarily improve the democratic quality
and/or the effectiveness of government? What forms of participation have
the potential to accomplish these goals? And, more important, how can
these participatory mechanisms b e integrated into traditional representative
and bureaucratic governance practices, in order to grasp this potential? We
discuss these questions in the article, building on theories and empirical
evidence provided by both political science and public administration
studies. The conclusion we reach is that participatory empowered mecha-
nisms, such as popular initiatives and referendums, and public-private co-
governance councils, have a clear potential to enhance the effectiveness
and responsiveness of public governance. [R, abr.]
68.443 BARBERA, Carmela, et al. — Governmental financial
resilience under austerity in Austria, England [UK] and It-
aly: how do local governments cope with financial
shocks? Public Administration 95(3), 2017 : 670-697.
The recent economic and fiscal crisis provides an opportunity for learning
lessons of general and practical relevance about how governments face
shocks affecting their financial conditions. This article draws on the
resilience concept to investigate the organizational capacities that are
deployed and/or built by local governments (LGs) to respond to such
shocks, looking at their combinations and interactions with environmental
conditions. The article presents the results of a multiple-case analysis of
12 European LGs across Austria, Italy and England. The analysis allows
us to highlight and operationalize different patterns of financial resilience,
that is, self-regulation, constrained or reactive adaptation, contented or
powerless fatalism, that are the result of the interaction and development
over time of different internal and external dimensions. [R]
68.444 BATES, Stephen ; GOODWIN, Mark ; McKAY, Stephen —
Do UK MPs engage more w ith Select Committees since
the Wright Reforms? An interrupted time series analysis,
1979-2016. Parliamentary Affairs 70(4), Oct. 2017 : 780-200.
The 2010 Wright Reforms are the most significant changes to the Select
Committee system in the UK House of Commons since their inauguration
in their modern form in 1979. We use interrupted time-series techniques
(ARIMA) to test the impact of the Wright Report on the level of MPs’
engagement with those Select Committees covered by the Wright Re-
forms using proxy measures of membership attendance and turnover
rates. We find little or no evidence that the Wright Report had an impact
on these outcomes. We argue that some of the claims made regarding
the successes of Select Committees and the Wright Reforms are over-
blown or, at least, premature and inadequately supported by evidence,
and that further reforms may be needed if the aims of the Wright Commit-
tee are to be realized more fully. [R]
68.445 BECKER KANE, Jenna — Lobbying justice(s)? exploring
the nature of amici influence in state Supreme Court de-
cision making. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 17(3),
Sept. 2017 : 251-274.
Governmental and administrative institutions
46
Most studies of amicus influence in both federal and state courts assume
that the information provided in these briefs is the mechanism through
which amici influence court outcomes. However, the question of how
individual state supreme court judges respond to this third-party information
and whether or not judicial responses are conditioned by differing methods
of judicial retention is rarely theorized. Using social-psychological theories
of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, this article investigates how
ideological predispositions and electoral institutions structure the respon-
siveness of state high-court judges to amicus brief information. Utilizing an
original dataset of more than 14,000 votes of state high-court judges across
three distinct areas of law, this article tests competing theories of amicus
influence to determine how state high-court judges utilize amicus informa-
tion to render judicial decisions. [R, abr.]
68.446 BEN AYED, Choukri — L’éducation prioritaire interrogée
du point de vue de l’égalité juridique et de la politique
d’égalité (The “priority education” policy, questioned
from the stand points of the legal equality framework and
the equality policy [in France]). Revue française d'Adminis-
tration publique 162, 2017 : 369-383.
This article questions the status of “priority education” within French
education policy. In particular, it questions its labelling as an affirmative
action. Beyond the rhetorical effects (“giving more to those who are
less”), this qualification does not stand up to examination. First, from a
legal point of view, the “priority education” policy does not necessarily fit
in with the prospect of a derogatory law; it is more in line with policies of
redistribution, “social and territorial catch-up”. Then, in terms of allocation
of resources, the article highlights that, despite official discourses, the
persistence of an unequal treatment to the detriment of pupils living in
the so called “priority education areas”. [R]
68.447 BENOÎT, Cyril — L’organisation de la régulation condi-
tionne-t-elle le changement institutionnel? Le cas du sec-
teur pharmaceutique en France et en Angleterre (Do or-
ganizational characteristics really matter for institutional
change? The case of pharmaceutical regulation in
France and England). Revue internationale de Politique
comparée 23(4), 2016 : 491-517.
When it comes to economic regulation, institutional change has tradition-
ally been examined through the lens of agency theory, which contrasts
the strictness of traditional bureaucratic structures with the fluidity attrib-
uted to regulatory entities organized around the principles of New Public
Management. We challenge this assumption, on the basis of a compara-
tive analysis of the evolutions of the regulation of the pharmaceutical
market in France and England. To explain the nature and pace of institu-
tional change, we insist on the role played by the order of reforms and on
power relationships within sectors. [R, abr.]
68.448 BERENS, Sarah ; SCHILLER, Armin von — Taxing higher
incomes: what makes the high-income earners consent
to more progressive taxation in Latin America? Political
Behavior 39(3), Sept. 2017 : 703-729.
When do high-income earners get "on board" with the fiscal contract and
accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? We argue that the
common opposition of the affluent to more progressive taxation is not
merely connected to administrative limitations to coercively enforce
compliance, but also to the uncertainty that high-income earners associ-
ate with the returns to taxes. Because coercion is not an option, there is
a need to convince high-income earners to "invest" in the public system
via taxes. Trust in institutions is decisive for the fiscal contract. Expecting
that paid contributions will be used in a sensible manner, high-income
earners will be more supportive of progressive income taxation. We
study tax composition preferences of a cross-section of Latin American
countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for 2012. [R, abr.]
68.449 BERNABEL, Rodolpho — Does the electoral rule matter
for political polarization? The case of Brazilian Legisla-
tive Chambers. Brazilian Political Science Review 9(2),
2015 : online.
This study explores the effects of electoral rules on political polarization in
the legislative branch of government. Since in Brazil the districts are also
the states, and senators are chosen according to the plurality-majority rule
while representatives are determined by a proportional rule, the comparison
between legislative chambers enables one to test whether the plurality-
majority rule induces politicians to behave less moderately, and whether
the proportional rule has the opposite effect. To estimate these effects, roll
call data from 1988 to 2010 was analyzed and legislators' ideal points were
estimated using WNOMINATE. Evidence in favor of the hypothesis was
found, although not in every circumstance. [R]
68.450 BLANC, Didier — Le contrôle parlementaire des proposi-
tions de directives sous la XIVe législature (2012-2017)
(Parliamentary control of draft directives in the 14th
[French] legislature, 2012-2017). Revue du Marché com-
mun et de l'Union européenne 611, Sept. 2017 : 462-472.
Art. 88-4 and 88-6 of the Constitution broaden the range of control
instruments used by the French Parliament. The first allows the assem-
blies to express their concerns about, in particular, draft directives,
whereas the latter makes them the guardians of the principle of subsidi-
arity for any "European draft legislative act", a category to which draft
directives can also belong. To the extent that these acts constitute the
original vehicle for European normative integration, the National Assem-
bly and the Senate regularly pass motions against them under the consti-
tutional system. Throughout the fourteenth legislative term (2012-2017),
they have shown both the consistence of parliamentary considerations
and the diversity of positions reflecting the same variety of figures in
European legal activity. [R, abr.]
68.451 BOIN, Arjen, et al. — Does organizational adaptation really
matter? How mission change affects the survival of US
federal independent agencies, 1933-2011. Governance
30(4), Oct. 2017 : 663-686.
Public administration scholars tend to take for granted that organizational
adaptation is important. This common notion that public organizations
must adapt to stay alive has not been put to the test in the field of public
administration, however. Intriguingly, organization ecologists find that
adaptation does not matter and might even be counterproductive for
individual organizations. They argue that the absence of adaptation —
which they refer to as structural inertia — actually enhances the likeli-
hood of survival. But organization ecologists focus mostly on nonpublic
organizations. This prompts the question whether adaptation in public
organizations really matters. In this article, we test these contrasting
claims (while controlling for design features) on a population of US
federal independent public agencies (n = 142). We conclude that proac-
tive adaptation increases termination hazards. [R, abr.]
68.452 BÖLLER, Florian — Debating war and peace: US Con-
gress and the domestic legitimization of military interven-
tions. Democracy and Security 13(3), July-Sept. 2017 : 196-
219.
This article investigates how members of US Congress legitimized their
votes in four cases of military interventions after the Cold War (Iraq 1991,
2002-2009; Somalia 1993; Libya 2011). Using an original dataset on
congressional rhetoric, the qualitative content-analysis highlights that the
domestic legitimization of military interventions hinges on members of
Congress’s perception of external threats and national interests. So far,
IR research focused on the executive and the war powers literature
offered mainly quantitative accounts on voting patterns within the legisla-
tive branch — especially for the US case. The relevance of national
interest arguments within congressional debates confirms the expecta-
tions of neoclassical realism while contradicting previous studies about a
dominant discourse in US society, which legitimizes interventions with
universal values, such as democracy promotion or human rights. [R]
68.453 BROUARD, Sylvain ; HÖNNIGE, Christoph — Constitutional
courts as veto players: lessons from the United States,
France and Germany. European Journal of Political Re-
search 56(3), Aug. 2017 : 529-552.
The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitu-
tional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democ-
ratization. Employing Tsebelis’s veto-player theory, this article focuses on
the spatial configuration of veto-players in the legislative process and
then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in
the Pareto-efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is
absorbed by other veto-players should not in theory veto new legislation.
It is argued that courts are conditional veto-players. Their veto is de-
pendent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the
pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empiri-
cally support the analysis, data from the US, France and Germany from
1974 to 2009 [are] used. [R, abr.]
68.454 BUCCIOL, Alessandro, et al. — A large scale OLG model
for the analysis of the redistributive effects of policy re-
forms. European Journal of Political Economy 48, June
2017 : 104-127.
The paper presents a large-scale overlapping generation model with
heterogeneous agents, where the household is the decision unit. We
calibrate the model for three European countries — France, Italy and
Sweden — which show marked differences in the design of some public
programs. We examine the properties in terms of annual and life-cycle
redistribution of a number of tax-benefit programs, by studying the impact
of removing from our model economies some or all of them. We find that
whether one considers a life cycle or an annual horizon, and whether
behavioral responses are accounted for or not, has a large impact on the
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