III Governmental and Administrative Institutions / Institutions Politiques et Administratives
| DOI | 10.1177/00208345221091615 |
| Date | 01 April 2022 |
| Published date | 01 April 2022 |
194
III
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
72.1810 ABIZADEH, Arash — Representation, bicameralism, politi-
cal equality, and sortition: reconstituting the Second
Chamber as a randomly selected assembly. Perspectives
on Politics 19(3), Sept. 2021 : 791-806.
The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legis-
lative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality
of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and
protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism,
with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institu-
tional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representa-
tive democracy: elections are a mechanism of people’s political agency
and of accountability, but run counter to political equality and impartiality,
and are insufficient for satisfactory responsiveness; sortition is a mecha-
nism for equality and impartiality, and of enhancing responsiveness, but
not of people’s political agency or of holding representatives accountable.
The justification advanced here is grounded in egalitarian premises about
the need to protect state institutions from capture by the powerful few and
to treat all subjects as political equals. [R, abr.]
72.1811 ANEY, Madhav S. ; DAM, Shubhankar — Decree power in
parliamentary systems: theory and evidence from India.
Journal of Politics 83(4), Oct. 2021 : 1432-1449.
We analyze decree powers in India. We show that bicameral minority gov-
ernments in India systematically use ordinances to circumvent parliament
and prosecute their legislative agendas. They promulgate m ore ordi-
nances, enact less legislation, and often repromulgate lapsed ordinances.
These patterns suggest that, with bicameral minority governments, the lo-
cus of lawmaking shifts to the executive branch. While both majority and
minority governments invoke ordinances, the latter do so systematically to
get around their parliamentary deficit. In the hands of minority govern-
ments, then, the mechanism effectively helps to defy the will of the parlia-
mentary majority. [R, abr.]
72.1812 ARTER, David — Digging in the "secret garden of politics":
the institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of mem-
bership ballots in the selection of Finnish parliamentary
candidates. Scandinavian Political Studies 44(3), Sept. 2021 :
346-368.
This article is the first expressly to focus on membership ballots as an in-
strument in the selection of parliamentary candidates in Finland, a polity
in which the nomination process is inclusive and decentralised. A Finnish
case study is of comparative interest for three main reasons: (1) Finland
is one of the few European countries in which candidate selection is regu-
lated by the state; (2) challenging much of the literature, the com bination
of democratised selection procedures and an intraparty preference voting
system has not incentivised individualistic parliamentary behaviour and re-
duced legislative party unity; (3) contrary to the trend towards the democ-
ratisation of nominations elsewhere, membership ballots, from being rou-
tinised and internalised in the four larger historic parties, have become the
exception rather than the rule in Finland today. [R, abr.]
72.1813 ASKIM, Jostein ; KARLSEN, Rune ; KOLLTVEIT, Kristoffer —
Public office as a stepping-stone? Investigating the ca-
reers of ministerial advisors. Political Studies Review 19(4),
Nov. 2021 : 539-557.
Ministerial advisors have become an essential aspect of executive
branches worldwide, thus making the ministerial advisor office a potential
route for young politicians aspiring to an expanding political class. The ar-
ticle studies which professions ministerial advisors migrate to following
their ministerial careers, how ministerial advisors’ post-ministerial careers
compare to their pre-ministerial careers, and if the variance in careers can
be explained by the resources that ministerial advisors obtain while in gov-
ernment. Empirically, the article draws on a cohort of 139 ministerial advi-
sors in Norwegian governments between 2001 and 2009; it covers posi-
tions in the political sphere and the public, private and voluntary occupa-
tional sectors over a period from each ministerial advisor’s youth to the
end of 2017. The bibliographic data are combined with surveys and elite
interviews. The results show that more than expanding the political class
as a recruitment ground for future Members of the Parliament and
ministers, ministerial advisor appointments serve as stepping-stones to ca-
reers outside of politics. [R, abr.]
72.1814 BARRETT, R ichard A. — Inferior domestic treaty institu-
tions lead to less democracy and security: the case of the
United States. Democracy and Security 17(2), 2021 : 115-
147.
At present, the US institution handling international agreements is replete
with uncertainty about the precise role of different branches of the govern-
ment and the rules government actors are to follow. The result is inferior
democratic rule and a worse bargaining position in world affairs. This arti-
cle surveys the institution’s current problems with treaties, congressional-
executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. It explains the ju-
dicial response and why historical practice has not led to a resolution, but
an exacerbation of problems. It lays out the costs of these problems and
articulates how cementing the Senate’s role in agreements would greatly
augment both democracy and security. [R]
72.1815 BLACKHAWK, Maggie, et al. — Congressional representa-
tion by petition: assessing the voices of the voteless in a
comprehensive new database, 1789-1949. Legislative Stud-
ies Quarterly 46(3), Aug. 2021 : 817-849.
For much of American political history, the electoral franchise was re-
stricted to only a portion of the population. By contrast, the right to petition
was considered universal and enshrined in the First Amendment, giving
voice to the voteless. Petitioning thus served as a fundamental mechanism
of representation. Still, fundamental questions remain: How was petition-
ing used, how did Congress respond to petitions, and did the petition allow
for partial representation of the marginalized and unenfranchised? We ad-
dress these questions by analyzing the Congressional Petitions Database
(CPD), an original endeavor tracking virtually every petition introduced to
Congress from 1789 to 1949. [R, abr.]
72.1816 BOROŃSKA-HRYNIEWIECKA, Karolina — National parlia-
ments as “multi-arena players” in the European Union? In-
sights into Poland and France. Journal of European Integra-
tion 43(6), 2021 : 701-716.
Have national parliaments become ‘multi-arena players’ in the field of EU
affairs? Through the means of cross-country comparison of Poland and
France this study probes how national parliaments juggle their activities
between domestic and EU-level realms with regard to four EU-oriented
arenas: ex-ante scrutiny of national governments, the Early Warning
Mechanism for subsidiarity control, the political dialogue with the European
Commission, and the ‘green card’ initiative. The paper detects what con-
ditions parliamentary activity in particular arenas and to what extent do-
mestic legislatures act autonomously within them. The findings are coun-
terintuitive and yet clearly demonstrate that what drives parliamentary mo-
bilization in EU affairs is not the institutional strength of a parliament in EU
scrutiny, but rather Member of Parliament’s perception of their institutions’
EU-related roles. [R]
72.1817 CARRERI, Maria — Can good politicians compensate for
bad institutions? Evidence from an original survey of Ital-
ian mayors. Journal of Politics 83(4), Oct. 2021 : 1229-1245.
Can competent political leaders bring significant policy changes to com-
munities otherwise doomed by “bad” informal institutions? This question
has remained unanswered because of the lack of a convincing measure of
politicians’ competence. I develop a novel survey technique to measure
the administrative competence of executive politicians, and I apply it in in-
terviews with 306 Italian mayors. I study the impact of mayors’ administra-
tive competence on the policies they enact, using a difference-in-differ-
ences approach. Results show that more competent mayors are associ-
ated with better policies, but the association is only present in cases where
the quality of informal institutions is low. In these municipalities, the elec-
tion of more competent mayors translates into a more effective use of
funds, an increase in long-term investments, and better service provision
without an increase in taxes. [R, abr.]
To continue reading
Request your trial