III Governmental And Administrative Institutions / Institutions Politiques et Administratives
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00208345221117662 |
| Published date | 01 August 2022 |
| Date | 01 August 2022 |
497
III
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
72.4637 AGUNYAI, Samuel Chukwudi ; OJAKOROTU, Victor —
The Nigerian legislative committee system, corruption, and con-
stituency woes: lessons Nigerians can learn from the Singapo-
rean legislative committee system. Taiwan Journal of Democracy
17(2), Dec. 2021 : 97-123.
Legislative committees are a critical part of any democratic, parlia-
mentary, internal operating system. It is impossible to overstate their
responsibilities in lawmaking, ensuring responsible representation of
constituents, and monitoring government institutions to make certain
that there is accountability to the public. However, the extent to which
the Nigerian Parliament performs these functions through its commit-
tee system has been viewed with suspicion, as members who are
supposed to expose corruption are deeply involved in it. In contrast,
Singaporean parliamentary committees have had some success in
combating corruption, as evidenced in the ranking of the country as
the least corrupt in Asia. Given the significant difference in the tw o
committee systems, the essay asks the question: What can Nigerians
learn from the Singaporean parlia mentary committee system about
corruption control? [R, abr.]
72.4638 AINSLEY, Caitlin — Federal Reserve appointments and
the politics of Senate confirmation. Public Choice 190(1-2), Jan.
2022 : 93-110.
This paper examines the politicization of Federal Reserve (Fed) ap-
pointments. In contrast to the extant appointment literature’s almost
exclusive focus on ideological proximity as a predictor of Fed nomi-
nations and confirmations, I theorize that senators will be more likely
to vote against confirmation when their constituents have little confi-
dence in the Fed because it allows them to more credibly defer blame
on the Fed for economic downturns. Drawing on novel estimates of
state-level confidence in the Fed as well as new common space esti-
mates of senators’ and central bankers’ monetary policy preferences,
I demonstrate that when constituents do not have confidence in the
Fed, senators are less likely to vote in favor of confirmation regard-
less of their ideological proximity to the nominee. [R, abr.]
72.4639 BADAS, Alex ; SIMAS, Elizabeth — The [US] Supreme
Court as an electoral issue: evidence from three studies. Political
Science Research and Methods 10(1), Jan. 2022 : 49-67.
Judicial nominations, particularly those to the Supreme Court, have
been a salient topic in recent presidential and senate elections. How-
ever, there has been little research to determine whether judicial
nominations motivate political behavior. Across three studies w e
demonstrate the important role judicial nominations play in influenc-
ing political behavior. We find that Republican subjects are more
likely to select a primary candidate who prioritizes confirming con -
servative Supreme Court nominees. Among Democratic subjects,
however, we find that Democratic candidates who prioritize the Court
might actually suffer negative electoral consequences. Overall, our
results demonstrate the importance of judicial nominations as an
electoral issue. [R, abr.]
72.4640 BALLARD, Andrew O. — Bill text and agenda control in
the US Congress. Journal of Politics 84(1), Jan. 2022 : 335-350.
The study of agenda power has largely been the study of negative
agenda power. But standard measures of negative agenda power are
insufficient to measure the majority’s agenda choices: they only con-
sider a small proportion of bills, only detail how often negative agenda
power fails (rather than succeeds), and cannot help us understand
positive agenda power. To understand the incentives and strategies
of agenda decision-making, then, we must know about members’
preferences on all bills. I develop an approach to estimate members’
preferences on all bills, by generating quantitative characterizations
of the policy content in each bill. I use the resulting estimates to ex-
amine both positive and negative agenda power using all bills and to
directly compare levels of agenda power between chambers of the
US Congress. [R, abr.]
72.4641 BEESLEY, Celeste ; HAWKINS, Darren ; MOFFITT, Nich-
olas — What leads government officials to use impact evidence?
Journal of Public Policy 42(1), March 2022 : 20-42.
Although the amount of policy-relevant academic research has grown
in recent years, stud ies still find that policy practitioners seldom em-
ploy such research in their decisionmaking. This study considers po-
tential methods for increasing government officials’ use of academic
studies (impact evidence). We investigate how administrative ac-
countability mechanisms as suggested by principal-agent ap-
proaches — screening, monitoring, autonomy and sanctions — cor-
relate with practitioner engagement with impact evidence. Original
survey data from 300 governm ent officials in two developing coun-
tries, Peru and India, suggest that all four mechanisms are correlated
with self-reported interest in or use of impact evidence. When we
measured the actual use of such evidence on a website we created
to facilitate that outcome; however, we found that only sanctions (in-
come) correlate with actual use. [R, abr.]
72.4642 BJØRNSKOV, Christian ; VOIGT, Stefan — Emergen-
cies: on the misuse of government powers. Public Choice 190(1-
2), Jan. 2022 : 1-32.
Nine out of 10 constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, in-
tended to help governments cope with extraordinary events that en-
danger many people or the existence of the state. We ask two ques-
tions: (1) does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help
governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events?
(2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We
find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the
executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence
of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unex-
pected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the
most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pre-
text to enhance their power. [R, abr.]
72.4643 BLATRIX, Cécile ; EDEL, Frédéric ; LEDENVIC, Philippe,
eds. — L’action publique au défi de l’urgence écologique (Public
action and the challenge of the ecological emergency). Revue
française d’Administration publique 179, 2021 : 521-714.
Introduction by the editors. Articles by Bruno VILLALBA; Pierre
CHASSÉ; Claire DEDIEU; Isabel DIAZ; Alice MAZEAUD; Martin
BORTZMEYER, Robin DEGRON; Frédérique BERROD.
72.4644 BOLTON, Alexander ; THROWER, Sharece — Legisla-
tive constraints, ideological conflict, and the timing of executive
unilateralism. Legislative Studies Quarterly 47(1), Feb. 2022 : 3-36.
Whether unilateral actions are used to circumvent legislative policy
preferences is a central question in separated systems. Although ex-
ecutives have incentives to engage in this behavior, US policymaking
studies offer little evidence of it. We explore how intervals between
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