Imperial Manila: How institutions and political geography disadvantage Philippine provinces
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891119841441 |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Author | Rollin F Tusalem |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2020, Vol. 5(3) 235–269
Imperial Manila:
ª The Author(s) 2019
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How institutions
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891119841441
and political geography
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disadvantage
Philippine provinces
Rollin F Tusalem
Department of Political Science, Arkansas State University, USA
Abstract
Critics of Philippine democracy have pointed out that the unitary system employed since the
country became a sovereign state in 1946 led to the prolonged underdevelopment of sub-national
regions (provinces). Hence, policy makers have put forward the argument that a shift to a Federal
system is necessary because of the imperial Manila syndrome. This is the notion that political,
economic, and social underdevelopment is more prevalent the farther away a province is from the
capital, Metro-Manila, which has been a longstanding theory of ‘core-periphery’ dynamics in
political geography. Using sub-national data derived from Philippine provinces, the study finds that
provinces farther away from Manila in terms of geodesic distance are indeed disadvantaged not
only in terms of economic, poverty, and human development indicators, but also in terms of
dependence on internal revenue allotments which inhibits local growth. Physical distance from the
capital also decreases rural funds for provincial development. The implications suggest that a
Federal arrangement can promote peripheral growth and development, but it certainly is not a
panacea.
Keywords
charter change, core-periphery relations, decentralization, Federalism, institutional design,
Philippine politics, politics of development, unitary system
Corresponding author:
Rollin F Tusalem, Department of Political Science, Arkansas State University, PO Box 1750, AR 72467, USA.
Email: rtusalem@astate.edu
236
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 5(3)
Introduction
Do political institutions and geographic distance affect economic, political, and social develop-
ment in peripheral regions? This is a perennial question that has confounded the minds of scholars
of Philippine politics. In 2018, these fundamental questions are being debated in the Philippine
Congress where lawmakers are considering changing the constitution to shift the form of govern-
ment from a unitary to a Federal system. The consensus among Philippine lawmakers is that
institutional engineering can address underdevelopment in the provinces (Straits Times, 2018).
This clarion call for a drastic shift in governance is based on the notion that the unitary system in
place since the country became a sovereign state is the reason that far-flung regions outside the
capital have remained economically backward, due to what has been recognized as the ‘imperial
Manila syndrome’. This term refers to how the developmental agenda of the nation has been held
captive by the capital of the country, such that the national government and legislators have
prioritized the economic development of the capital and the surrounding provinces adjacent to
it, much to the deterioration of the provinces that are far away from the capital (Boquet, 2017;
Joaquin, 1990; Lambatin, 2018; Martinez, 2004). This syndrome is manifested in how the strong
presidential form of government allowed the national government to fully concentrate economic
and financial resources within the core (the capital), such that public finances controlled at the top
do not redound to the benefit of the geographically distant rural provinces, generating “bad center-
periphery politics and undermin[ing] the spirit of decentralized political power in the country”
(Mendoza and Ocampo, 2017: 3). This led provincial politicians to demand adoption of the Federal
system of government because “the overly centralized grip of the national government in Manila
over the provinces has created an imbalanced distribution of power and wealth since the birth of the
Republic” (Manila Standard, 2018).
The persistence of “core-periphery” unbalanced development also led some Philippine politi-
cians to call for the decongestion of the current capital and to create new urban centers that can
reduce the agglomeration of economic, human, and political activity within imperial Manila and its
adjacent provinces, following the Brasilia and Canberra model of naming a new capital to induce
nationwide economic growth. By adopting this framework in tandem with introducing Federalism,
there is optimism that inclusive growth can occur and that provinces that are geographically distant
from the core can reach economic parity with Manila and its surrounding provinces (Boquet, 2017:
647).
The current Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, supports a constitutional convention to
address the imperial Manila syndrome, leading him to issue an Executive Order in 2016 mandating
the creation of a consultative committee with the task of educating the population about the flaws
of the unitary system that has been put in place. Duterte explained that adopting a Federal system
will empower provinces, as they “will be largely autonomous and be allowed to retain most of their
income, rather than remitting it to the central government” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2016: 1).
Duterte also argues that when provinces are allowed to tax their citizens and retain the revenues
they earn from the natural resources that arise from their jurisdictions they can experience
“economic parity” with other provinces adjacent to Manila.
As the policy debate continues about institutional reform, it is imperative to systematically
assess whether or not the proponents of Federalism have a legitimate claim that can be empiri-
cally evaluated. Considering that the Philippines has had a unitary-centralized political system
since independence, it is expected that developmental trajectories are concentrated within the
capital and that as distance from the capital grows underdevelopment worsens. This is because
Tusalem
237
unitary-centralized states allocate all political, economic, and social power at the center. Further,
most unitary-centralized states only possess one core area that constrains growth to the periphery
(Glassner and Fahrer, 2004). If development is to occur, such unitary-centralized states must
restrict economic growth in adjacent concentric spheres near the capital (core), and regions that
are furthest from the capital will suffer from neglect and abandonment by the national govern-
ment. Since political power is amassed in a strong national government, sub-national units that
lack self-determination are shackled to subordination and servitude based on the whims of
political leaders that only serve the interests of the citizens in the capital, which remains hier-
archical and top-down (Elazar, 1997).Thus, as distance grows from the center, it is expected that
the delivery of public goods and services, disaster-response efforts, anti-poverty programs,
financial assistance, and basic infrastructure programs will deteriorate (Lambatin, 2018). To
address if these claims are valid, this empirical study addresses the following longstanding
questions (which to date remain anecdotal): Does geographic distance promote regional under-
development and the persistence of poverty in the Philippines? Is geographic distance from the
capital a major variable that prohibits provinces from increasing their revenue potential? Does
geographic remoteness disadvantage a country’s sub-national units by not targeting them with
developmental aid in terms of rural priority funds? Lastly, does a centralized state also promote
financial dependence on national-level “fiscal transfers” that prohibits growth in far-flung
regions?1
Based on a time-series analysis of Philippine provinces across time, it is found that provinces
that are farther away from the capital in terms of its geodesic distance are more likely to experience
higher rates of poverty, and economic, social, and political underdevelopment. Further, a prov-
ince’s geodesic distance away from the capital is also correlated to lower levels of provincial
revenues and receiving lower levels of developmental aid from the national government. Finally, it
is also shown that geodesic distance away from the capital promotes financial dependence on the
national government through “Internal Revenue Allotments” (IRAs hereafter), which spurs and
prolongs systemic poverty and underdevelopment. The results conveyed in this study affirm that
theories calling for a shift to a Federal structure have merit. State centralization that has been
practiced in the Philippines since it gained its independence contributes to rural underdevelopment.
Thus, institutional debates concerning changing the form of government or attempts on further
political and fiscal decentralization are on justifiable grounds, although the shift to a Federal
system may not entirely be a panacea.
The study proceeds as follows. First, I elaborate on the arguments of those who believe that the
Philippines’ ascent towards economic growth has been obstructed by the ‘imperial Manila syn-
drome’, which validates the call for constitutional changes that would lead to the adoption of
Federalism. The second part will provide an important discussion on how the state centralization
implicit in the Philippine polity is a manifestation of established theories on core-periphery
dynamics that have been articulated in the past by scholars in political geography. This is to be
followed by a brief discussion of other empirical cross-national studies that...
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