Imperial ontological (in)security: ‘Buffer states’, International Relations and the case of Anglo-Afghan relations, 1808–1878
| Published date | 01 December 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066114557569 |
| Author | Martin J. Bayly |
| Date | 01 December 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of
International Relations
2015, Vol. 21(4) 816 –840
© The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066114557569
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E
JR
I
Imperial ontological
(in)security: ‘Buffer states’,
International Relations and
the case of Anglo-Afghan
relations, 1808–1878
Martin J. Bayly
London School of Economics, UK
Abstract
This article offers a new perspective on ‘buffer states’ — states that are geographically
located between two rival powers — and their effect on international relations, with a
particular focus on the imperial setting. The article argues that such geographic spaces
have often been analysed through a structuralist-functionalist lens, which has, in some
cases, encouraged ahistorical understandings on the role of buffer states in international
affairs. In contrast, the article offers an approach borrowing from the literature on
ontological security and critical geopolitics in order to access the meanings that such
spaces have for their more powerful neighbours. The article draws upon the case study
of Afghanistan and Anglo-Afghan relations during the 19th century and finds that, in this
case, due to the ambiguity of Afghanistan’s status as a ‘state’, and the failure of British
policymakers to establish routinized diplomatic engagement, Anglo-Afghan relations
exhibited a sense of ontological insecurity for the British. These findings suggest
previously unacknowledged international effects of ‘buffer states’, and may apply to
such geographic spaces elsewhere.
Keywords
19th century, Afghanistan, Anglo-Afghan relations, buffer states, critical geopolitics,
empire, imperialism, ontological insecurity, ontological security
Corresponding author:
Martin J. Bayly, International Relations Department, London School of Economics & Political Science,
Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK.
Email: m.j.bayly@lse.ac.uk
557569EJT0010.1177/1354066114557569European Journal of International RelationsBayly
research-article2014
Article
Bayly 817
Introduction
Buffer states, it seems, are back on the agenda. Following recent events in Ukraine, the
geopolitical peril of ‘intermediaries’, liminal spaces and spaces ‘in-between’ has resur-
faced, prompting a return to this perennial issue in great power management (see, e.g.,
CTV News Channel, 2014; Friedman, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014). As Chay and Ross
(1986) observed in their work Buffer States in World Politics, such states, defined as
being geographically located between two rival powers, are often to be found in the
regions in which there is most turbulence. This remains the case today, as demonstrated
by examples such as North Korea, Eastern Europe and Iraq. However, in addition to this,
from a historical perspective, the location of such states in areas in which the power of
the imperial ‘centre’ was at its most tenuous means that attention to ‘buffer states’ and
imperial history highlights the enduring sense of paranoia with which empire views its
peripheries. As Manan Ahmed (2011a: 60) observes: ‘[t]o the centre of any empire the
frontier is a site of anxiety, of potential harm, of barbarians who could be marching
towards the gate’.
Despite this contemporary and historical importance, however, the literature on buffer
states in International Relations (IR) remains surprisingly thin. Existing works tend to
emphasize the geopolitical role that such states play in mediating great power rivalries,
thereby drawing attention away from the buffer itself. In particular, there seems to be a
serious deficit in literature that explores the meanings that such spaces have for their
more powerful neighbours, especially imperial neighbours, other than as a functional
intermediary. Drawing upon the example of Anglo-Afghan relations in the 19th century,
this article argues for a new perspective on buffer states and their effect on international
relations, with a particular focus on the imperial setting. The prevailing functionalist
perspective within the IR literature obscures an alternative perspective on such states as
more of a locational concept than a definitive category; a perspective that reveals how
their role can be determined by attitudes towards them as geographies of exception, vio-
lent geographies or zones of contestation. This article argues that these representations
can have a crucial impact on diplomatic exchange.
In order to address this deficit in the literature, the article draws upon a modified ver-
sion of ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1984; Huysmans, 1998; Kinnvall, 2004; Mitzen,
2006a, 2006b; Steele, 2005, 2008; Zarakol, 2010), as well as contributions from critical
geopolitics. Ontological security allows consideration of how security-seeking between
actors is, in part, a search for cognitive stability and routinized behaviour, allowing for
identity stability and the reduction of anxiety.1 The article argues that, in certain cases
— including the example studied here — this routinized behaviour and this cognitive
stability can be hard to find, particularly when geographical spaces acquire certain mean-
ings for powerful states and empires. In such instances, cognitive instability can be con-
ducive to ontological insecurity (Giddens, 1986: 62; Zarakol, 2010). This may be a
particular problem with buffer states, and, as the article argues, this can be particularly
acute for empire.
The article utilizes as a case study the example of Afghanistan in the 19th century —
widely seen as a classic ‘buffer state’ (Rubin, 1995). In contrast to much of the literature
on this period, which tends to focus on Anglo-Russian geopolitical competition for
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