Implementing Europe
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116507082810 |
| Author | Christian B. Jensen |
| Published date | 01 December 2007 |
| Date | 01 December 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Implementing Europe
A Question of Oversight
Christian B. Jensen
University of Iowa, USA
ABSTRACT
This article shows that member state governments’ ability
rather than their willingness to implement directives drives
uneven implementation of European Union labor policy.
Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15
member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that adminis-
trative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in
the hands of government and exclude interest group par-
ticipation enhance governments’ ability to resolve conflicts
with the Commission over implementation. Mechanisms
that depend on cooperation with interest groups inhibit the
resolution of these conflicts. This finding undermines
the common prescription that increasing interest group
involvement should improve member state governments’
implementation of EU laws.
451
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507082810
Volume 8 (4): 451–477
Copyright© 2007
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
KEY WORDS
fire alarms
implementation
oversight
police patrols
Why are some member states able to resolve infringement cases before they
reach the European Court of Justice whereas others find themselves before
the Court again and again? Why did 29.0% of infringement cases against
France for failure to implement social and labor policy between 1984 and 2001
reach the European Court of Justice (ECJ) whereas only 5.8% of cases against
Greece went to the ECJ during the same period? Why have 29.2% of cases
against Luxembourg ended before the ECJ whereas only 6.3% of cases against
the Netherlands required ECJ action?
Because of these and related research questions, one of the most promi-
nent research agendas relating to European integration in the past several
years has revolved around member state governments’ compliance with
European Union (EU) policy. Although it is inaccurate to say that there is a
dominant approach in this literature, much of this work has come from the
‘management school’ of international treaty compliance, which reasons that
states’ compliance with international obligations is a function of their capacity
to implement rather than their willingness. With respect to EU policy imple-
mentation, member state governments fail to comply not because they do not
want to comply but because they cannot meet their obligations. They simply
do not have the capacity to implement EU policy smoothly. A growing litera-
ture seeks to provide evidence supporting the management school. However,
the most common approaches used in the literature examine the frequency
of non-compliance (often infringement) cases. Given that the frequency of
these cases is sensitive to the limited resources available to the Commission,
drawing firm conclusions about administrative capacity from the counts of
cases against various member states is problematic. Furthermore, much of the
research in this area relies on in-depth accounts of one or two member states
or on statistical analyses that depend on flawed operationalizations of
administrative capacity such as aggregated measures of bureaucratic
efficiency.
I argue that the types of mechanism that member state governments use
to conduct oversight play a significant role in the implementation of EU
policy. I examine the effect that police patrol and fire alarm oversight mech-
anisms at the national level have on those member states’ ability to resolve
infringement cases. This approach enables clear conclusions about the effect
of administrative institutions on member state governments’ implementation
of EU law. It also takes advantage of the EU as a natural laboratory for
administrative institutions.
This article seeks to contribute to the literature on EU policy compliance
by introducing two novel approaches that seek to mitigate problems in the
management school research on EU policy implementation. First, I introduce
a new approach to the operationalization of administrative institutions. Rather
European Union Politics 8(4)
452
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