Improving Conventional Stability in Europe
| Date | 01 May 1989 |
| Author | Fred Chernoff |
| Published date | 01 May 1989 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788900900505 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
439
IMPROVING
CONVENTIONAL
STABILITY
IN
EUROPE
OPPORTUNITIES
AND
CHALLENGES
FOR
THE
BUSH
ADMINISTATION
Fred
Chernoff
1
The
Bush
administration
takes
office
with
significant
opportunities
for
greater
Western
security;
both
Europeans
and
Americans
are
anxious
to
know
whether
the
new
administration
will
be
willing
and
able
to
take
advantage
of
the
opportunities.
The
two
most
immediate
arms
control
questions
to
face
President
Bush
will
have
to
do
with
strategic
nuclear
weapons
and
conventional
forces.
The
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
at
work
negotiating
a
strategic
arms
agree-
ment.
The
new
administration
will
have
to
decide
whether
to
pursue
the
negotiating
line
of the
Reagan
administration
or
to
re-evaluate the
goals
and
rough
weapons
limits
so
far
outlined
by
the
two
sides.
The
conventional
force
talks
are
of
great
importance
for
Western
security,
although
they
have
received
little
attention
in
the
United
States -
particularly
compared
with
the
strategic
arms
negotiations.
Strategic
weapons
represent
much
more
explosive
power
than
the
conventional
forces
in
Europe.
But
the
latter
are
of
similar
importance
in
the
larger
security
picture;
among
other
things,
the
level,
structure
and
balance
of
those
forces
affect
the
chances
that
strategic
weapons
would
be
used.
The
US
Presidential
campaign
virtually
ignored
the
conventional
talks.
If
the
Bush
administration
genuinely
desires
a
conventional
arms
agreement
it
must
begin
immediately
to
work
for
progress
in
the
new
Conventional
Forces
in
Europe
(CFE)
negotiations.
This
does
not
mean
that
proposals
and
counter-
proposals
should
start
to
fly
fast
and
furiously.
It
means,
rather,
that
the
new
administration
should
immediately
assess
its
views
of
the
problems
it
will
face
and
develop
its
ideas
about
how
to
deal
with .them.
It
means
also
that
the
administration
should
have
an
arms
control
team,
familiar
with
the
negotia-
tions,
ready
to
step
in
and
assume
leadership
within
the
alliance.
The
Soviets
have
already
begun
to
challenge
the
new
administration:
President
Gorbachev,
in
his
December
1988
address
to
the
United
Nations,
offered
substantial
unilateral
cuts
in
Soviet
forces
deployed
in
Eastern
Europe.
The
West
has
staked
out
an
opening
position
for
numerical
equality
between
the
two
alliances.2
2
The
new
administration
must
begin
its
term
prepared
to
go
to
work
on
CFE
1
Much
source
material
for
this
article
comes
from
interviews,
conducted
in June
and
July
of
1988,
with
defence
and
foreign
ministry
officials
of
Belgium,
the
Federal
Republic
of
Germany,
France,
Italy,
the
Netherlands,
United
States,
and
the
United
Kingdom
and
NATO’s
International
Staff.
Their
cooperation
is
gratefully
acknowledged.
2
Gorbachev
offered
to
reduce
Soviet
tank
strength
in
Europe by
10,000
and
Soviet
troops
by
500,000.
Michael
Dobbs,
’Gorbachev
Announces
Troop
Cuts
of
500,000’,
Washington
Post,
8
Dec.
1988,
pp.
A1,
A30.
On
9
December,
NATO
Foreign
Ministers
offered
a
proposal
for
tank
and
troop
equality
in
the
CFE
area,
which
would
require
cuts
on
the
Eastern
side
about
ten
times
as
great
as
those on
the
Western
side.
Cf.
’Equality
Comrades,’
Economist,
17
Dec.
1988,
pp.
46-7.
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