In court
| Published date | 01 March 1994 |
| DOI | 10.1177/026455059404100125 |
| Date | 01 March 1994 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
58
INCOURT
i
If
an
offender
is
sentenced
to
80
hours
commumty
service
by
a
magistrates’
court,
is
subsequently
sentenced
to
160
hours
at
the
Crown
Court
for
a
further
offence
and
then
is
subject
to
breach
proceedings
after
completing
only
14
hours
in
total,
what
are
the
powers
of
which
court
to
revoke
and
re-sentence?
In
R
v
MEREDITH
(Crim
LR
February
1993),
the
offender
was
brought
back
before
the
Crown
Court
and
was
re-
sentenced
to
6
months
imprisonment
in
respect
of
the
magistrates’
court
offence
and
18
months
concurrent
for
the
Crown
Court
offence.
He
appealed,
submiting
that
he
was
in
breach
only
of
the
first
order.
The
Court
of
Appeal
upheld
the
re-
sentencing
decision
stating
that,
if
the
appellant
was
right,
it
would
’lead
to
the
remarkable
result
that
he
could
never
be
in
breach
of
the
second
order,
because
the
time
would
never
arrive
for
him
to
start
performing’
that
order.
’Once
two
CSOs
are
made,
they
are
for
all
practical
purposes
one
order
and
he
was
in
breach
of
both’.
This
robust
commonsense
approach
does
not
fit
readily
within
the
complex
statutory
provisions
of
CJA
1991
sch
2.
Magistrates
have
no
power
to
commit
an
offender
to
the
Crown
Court
to
be
dealt
with
for
breach
of
a
magistrates’
court
order
and
the
Crown
Court
appears
to
have
no
power
(under
sch2
para
8)
to
deal
with
a
magistrates’
court
order
simply
because
it
chooses
to
revoke
its
own
order
and
impose
a
custodial
sentence.
The
Court
of
Appeal
appear
to
have
regarded
the
offender
as
if
he
were
subject
to
a
single
order
of
Crown
Court
status
but,
as
David
Thomas’
commentary
points
out,
what
would
be
the
situation
if
the
offender
first
received
100
hours
from
the
Crown
Court
followed
by
40
hours
from
a
magistrates’
court
for
a
different
offence
and
had
completed
120
hours
when
breached?
The
logic
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
would
suggest
that
the
offender
is
still
in
jeopardy
before
the
Crown
Court,
yet
this
would
seem
patently
unfair.
The
Court
of
Appeal
also
considered
the
legitimacy
of
re-sentencing
the
offender
to
custody
without
a
pre-
sentence
report
prepared
for
that
occasion
and
concluded
that
the
1991
Act
does
not
require
a
fresh
report
to
be
considered.
Custody
was
justified
here
not
on
grounds
of
seriousness
but
because
of
wilful
and
persistent
refusal
to
comply
with
the
order,
thus
deemed
a
refusal
of
consent
under
sl(3)
which
is
not
governed
by
the
normal
provisions
requiring
a
PSR.
j ~
.. ~
»
&
’
*
#
%
*
*
%
Convicted
at
Crown
Court
of
handling
a
stolen
cheque,
the
defendant
was
released
on
bail
for
the
preparation
of
a
pre-
sentence
report.
On
subsequently
receiving
nine
months
imprisonment,
he
appealed
on
the
ground
that,
when
the
case
had
been
adjourned,
he
had
not
been
warned
that
a
custodial
sentence
might
be
passed
and
that
he
was
entitled
to
believe
that
a
community
order
would
be
imposed
Dismissing
his
appeal,
the
Court
of
Appeal
stated
that
the
sentencer
had
adjourned
the
case
because
of
the
mandatory
requirement
to
obtain
a
report
under
CJA
1991
s3(1)
and
was
not
obliged
to
indicate
to
the
defendant
that
he
was
still
liable
to
be
sentenced
to
imprisonment.
R
v
WOODLIN
Crim
LR
January
1994.
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