In Focus: Moving on from Macron? The 2022 French Presidential Election

DOI10.1177/20419058221108778
Published date01 June 2022
Date01 June 2022
AuthorBenjamin D. Hennig
20 POLITICAL INSIGHT JUNE 2022
In Focus
Moving on from Macron?
The 2022 French
Presidential Election
Benjamin D. Hennig maps the recent French election, which saw
Emmanuel Macron retain power but growing signs of discontent
among France’s electorate.
La République en marche! In 2017,
Emmanuel Macron stormed into the
Élysée Palace with a new political
movement that presented an oer of
a fresh alternative to France’s established parties.
French voters followed Macron’s march, giving
his centrist vision a sweeping endorsement
at a time when many European and western
states were swinging to the right. Five years
ago, Macron’s pro-European liberal messaging
resonated especially in urban areas, helping
him to a convincing vote share of 66 per
cent in the second round of the presidential
election against his counterpart Marine Le Pen
of the National Rally (Rassemblement national
formerly National Front).
Where France did follow other countries in
2017 was the trend for voters to turn away from
the established parties, in the French case the
Socialists and the Republicans who held the
presidential posts between them since 1981. By
the time of the 2022 election, Macron’s ‘Republic
on the Move’ party had become part of the
established parties itself.
That the 2022 election saw another Macron-
Le Pen showdown was partly down to ongoing
soul-searching of the (former) established
parties, but also due to political inghting on
both wings of the political spectrum. Divisions
within the political left prevented Jean-Luc
Mélenchon from entering the second round.
Having gained momentum in the nal weeks
ahead of the election, he nished third, only 1.2
per cent points behind Le Pen from the political
right who received 23.15 per cent in the rst
round. Macron secured the pole position with
27.85 per cent, even higher than the 24.01 per
cent he received in the rst round in 2017.
In the second round of voting, Macron
secured 58.55 per cent, down from 66.1 per
cent in 2017. Le Pen received 41.45 per cent
of the votes, up from 33.9 per cent in 2017.
Turnout was 71.99 per cent, only slightly
lower than in the rst round (72.07 per cent)
but down from 74.46 in 2017.
The geographical distribution of votes
appears to have remained similar to the
previous election as shown in the population-
weighted maps in this feature. Le Pen’s
electorate is found in an ever-more connected
patchwork, mainly across rural areas. She
remains strongest in the north and southeast
of the county, often correlating with regions
that have higher unemployment rates. This
might also explain Le Pen’s stronger showing
in some of the more deprived urban fringes
of cities, including Lille in the north and along
the Mediterranean coast. The inner urban
areas remain Macron’s stronghold, despite
the softened prole that Le Pen aimed at
presenting during the campaign, including a
move away from her previous much stronger
Eurosceptic stance.
The voting patterns show that Macron failed
to reach out to voters who are against a Le Pen
presidency but didn’t vote for him in the rst
round. In the previous election he was more
successful in gathering the none National
Rally-vote behind him in the second round.
Macron’s at times controversial political reforms
dened his rst term in oce. The Yellow Vest
movement and other public unrest over his
reform plans helped the political right to keep
their momentum going, while the political
left became ever more disillusioned over the
incumbent President: Macron’s presentation as
being not on the right was no longer sucient
to gain signicant support from the left in the
second round of the vote.
Voter disillusionment and declining support
from the left in the second round of voting
becomes apparent when we look at the per
cent point change of votes across the country.
Macron’s vote has almost consistently been in
decline across the country, rst and foremost
in large parts of the major urban areas. Even
more signicant changes – in the double-
digit range – can be observed especially
in the Bretagne and the central south in
the Auvergne as well as the Pyrenées, all of
which provided a much more secure basis for
Macron’s 2017 victory.
While the nal outcome of the election
still marked a decisive victory for Macron, this
change in votes combined with a large share
of abstentions and spoilt votes dampened
some of the incumbent’s feeling of elation
after the victory. The lowest turnout since 1969
and the second lowest ever, give a picture of a
discontented electorate.
Macron’s victory was met with relief across
Europe. Whether this will lead to a Renaissance
– the new name of Macron’s party for the
parliamentary election campaign – of the
French President’s fortunes remains to be
seen. The challenge of uniting an ever more
divided French Republic during times of
ongoing global crises has grown even further.
French democracy has been put to the test
at this election and resisted its extremist
alternative yet again. But the far right has
shown persistence and voter disillusion and
dissatisfaction has clearly been growing. It will
require more than rebranding a party from
a Republic on the Move into Renaissance to
convince the electorate that there is a rebirth
of liberal politics coming in Macron’s second
term. Otherwise Macron’s political renaissance
will be a short lived one.
Benjamin D. Hennig is Professor of
Geography at the University of Iceland and
Political Insight June 2022.indd 20Political Insight June 2022.indd 20 01/06/2022 11:4901/06/2022 11:49

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