In the Irish Courts
| DOI | 10.1177/002201836402800307 |
| Published date | 01 July 1964 |
| Date | 01 July 1964 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
In the Irish Courts
HIGH
COURT
IN
EIRE
UNLICENSED
CARRIAGE OF
MERCHANDISE
A.G.
(McConville) v. Brannigan
Bys. 28(1) of
the
Road
Transport
Act, 1958, it was
enacted
that, where a
person
is convicted of an offence
under
s. 9
of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1933,
the
fine to be imposed in respect
of
asecond offence
committed
by
him
within
five years after
the
first offence shall be
not
less
than
£10;
and
on each
occasion of a
subsequent
offence
within
five years
the
fine shall
be multiplied by two
on
each occasion, to a
maximum
of
£320. Between
October
1957
and
October
1959,
the
defendant
in
A.G.
(McConville) v. Brannigan (1962,
l.R.
370) was con-
victed
on
five occasions of
nine
offences
committed
on seven
occasions between April 1957
and
August
1959.
He
was
prosecuted
and
convicted on eight
summonses
on
eight
occasions between April 1959
and
July
1959
and
the
question
arose
whether
the
penalties to be imposed were those in
the
Act
of 1933 or those
in
the
Act of 1958.
His
counsel
argued
that
the
words
"when
a
person
is convicted of an offence" in
the
Act
of 1958
must
refer to a conviction after
the
passing of
that
Act.
He
relied
upon
the
presumption
against a
statute's
having retrospective effect: see per
Lopes
L.J.
in Bourke v.
Nutt (1894, IQ.B. 725, 737). As
most
of
the
earlier convictions
had
been recorded before
the
Act of 1958
had
come into force,
it was argued
that
the
Court
could impose
the
multiplied
statutory
penalties only in
the
case of a second or later offence,
subsequent
to a first conviction recorded after
the
Act
became
effective.
The
penalties imposed for a
"second
offence" on
the
former occasions were (it was contended) improperly
imposed.
In
fact,
the
offences of which Brannigan was
convicted on
this
occasion
had
been
committed
on
dates
earlier
than
his convictions of
"second
offences", so
that
they
194
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