In the Irish Courts
| DOI | 10.1177/002201837303700308 |
| Author | R. V. Downey |
| Date | 01 July 1973 |
| Published date | 01 July 1973 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
In the Irish Courts
COURT
OF
CRIMINAL
APPEAL
IN
NORTHERN
IRELAND
POSSESSION
OF
AN
EXPLOSIVE
SUBSTANCE
R. v. Downey
THE appellant in
R.
v. Downey (1971, N. I. 224) was found
guilty of
an
offence
under
s.4 of the Explosive Substances Act,
1883, in
that
he was knowingly in possession of an 8 bore double-
barrelled shotgun in such circumstances as to give rise to a reason-
able suspicion
that
he did
not
have it in his possession or
under
his
control for a lawful object.
He
was also found guilty of having
the shotgun in his possession without afirearm certificate, contrary
to the Firearms Act (NiL}, 1969, s.I
(1)
(a).
The
first ground upon
which he appealed was
that
ashotgun is
not
an
"explosive sub-
stance", for
that
term
is not an
apt
expression to describe
the
charge in a shotgun,
nor
is "explosion"
an
apt
expression to
describe
what
happens when the charge is fired. Moreover,
the
Firearms Act, 1920 expressly provided
that
afirearm should be
deemed an explosive substance within the meaning of the
Act
of 1883, so
that
the
repeal of the
Act
of 1920
meant
that
afirearm
is not now within
that
meaning.
But
the
court
held
that
the
purpose of
the
Act
of 1920 was
not
to
make
firearms explosive
substances for the first time,
but
merely to apply
the
wide definition
of firearms so as to include in
the
definition of explosive substance
in the Act of 1883 firearms which were
not
actuated
by
an
explo-
sive.
The
repeal of the Act of 1920 therefore left the definition of
explosive substance unaffected.
The
court
held
that
it included a
shotgun, since the
Act
of 1883 includes
"any
apparatus,
machine,
implement
...
used
or
intended to be used or
adapted
for causing
...
any explosion in or with any. explosive substance."
By s.7 of the Act of 1883, the consent of
the
Attorney-General
is a condition precedent to proceeding with any charge
under
the
Act.
In
the
instant case, the Attorney-General filed a consent, which
identified
the
accused
but
which, related to
an
address
other
than
that
at
which
the
indictment alleged
that
the offence
had
been committed.
The
Crown
submitted
that
as there was no
question of
the
appellant's having been in any way prejudiced by
the
error
(which
had
been corrected in
the
indictment)
and
as
219
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