In the Scottish Courts
| DOI | 10.1177/002201837704100108 |
| Published date | 01 January 1977 |
| Date | 01 January 1977 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
In
the Scottish Courts
Comments
on
Cases
SPEEDING
ACQUITTAL
Smith .
Ranlcin
Acquittals
on
charges
of
speeding
are
usually
for technical
reasons,
for
example
in
relation
to the difficulties in
proving
speed. But
in Smith v. Rankin
(High
Court,
Justiciary
Appeal,
20
October
1976
unreported)
the
acquittal
related
to the
absence
of
sufficient
speed
restriction
signs.
For
some
days
prior
to
the
date
of
the
alleged offence, signs
had
been
erected
in
the
manner
prescribed
by
the
Regulations
on
the
stretch
ofroad
in
question.
But
on
the
day
the
accused
drove
along
the
road
one
of
the
signs
marking
the
beginning
of
the
restriction
had
been
knocked
down
and
was
lying in pieces on
the
grass verge.
The
absence
of
this
sign
led
the
Sheriff
to
acquit
and
the
prosecutor
appealed.
The
High
Court
refused
the
appeal,
holding
that
ss, 75( I)
and
(3)
of
the
Road
Traffic
Regulation
Act
1967
must
be
construed
strictly on
the
question
of
what
are
"prescribed
traffic
signs"
and
that
there
required
to be
one
prescribed
sign
on
each
side
of
the
carriageway
at
the
beginning
of
the
speed
limit.
It
mattered
not,
said the
Court,
that
all
other
prescribed
signs
were
in
order
and
that
the
appellant
knew the
locus
and
was
aware
that
it
had
been
previously
propertly
restricted.
This
decision
confirmed
for
Scotland
the view
taken
in the English case
of
Mackereth
v.
Madge
(1967 112SJ. 98).
BILL OF
ADVOCATION
Skeen v.
Girdwood
For
the
then
Procurator
Fiscal
at
Paisley,
the
Bill
of
Advocation
raised
in
Skeen
v.
Girdwood
(justiciary
Appeal,
12th
October
1976,
unreported)
proved
to be
third
time
unlucky.
Twice
last
year
he was
successful in
bringing
a Bill in
respect
of
refusal by a
Sheriff
to
adjourn
a
case
at
his
instance
(see
Skeen
v.
Skerret
(1976S.L. T.
(Notes)
6; 40
j.C.L.
120)
and
Skeen
v.
McLaren
(1976S.L.T.
(Notes)
14; 40j.G.L.121)
but
this
time
the
High
Court
refused
the
prayer
of
the
Bill.
Once
again,
the
problem
was
adjournment
of
atrial.
On
the
original
date
set,
the
accused
was
unable
to
attend
because
of
illness,
his solicitor
having
previously
intimated
this fact by
letter
requesting
an
adjournment.
His
case
was
adjourned,
but
it
appeared
that
the
new
55
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