In What Sense are Human Rights Political? A Preliminary Exploration
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00905.x |
| Author | Laura Valentini |
| Published date | 01 March 2012 |
| Date | 01 March 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
In What Sense are Human Rights Political?
A Preliminary Explorationpost_905180..194
Laura Valentini
The Queen’s College, University of Oxford
Philosophical discussion of human rights has long been monopolised by what might be called the ‘natural-law view’.
On this view,human rights are fundamental moral r ights which people enjoy solely by virtue of their humanity. In
recent years, a number of theorists have started to question the validity of this outlook, advocating instead what they
call a ‘political’view. My aim in this article is to explore the latter view in order to establish whether it constitutes a
valuable alternative to the ‘natural-law view’. In particular, I distinguish between three ways in which human rights
can be political: in relation to their (1) iudicandum,(2) justification and (3) feasibility constraints. I argue that it makes
sense to think of human rights as political in relation to both their iudicandum and their justification but in a way that
is not alwaysadequately captured by proponents of the political view.Moreover,I also claim that, if wetake the political
view seriously, we still need to engage in the sort of abstract moral reasoning that characterises the natural-law
approach and which proponents of the political view significantly downplay.
Keywords: human rights; justification; interpretation; feasibility; natural law
The notion of human rights is one of the most politically powerful ideas of our time.
Since their appearance in the 1948 Universal Declaration, human rights have been the
object of intense political discussion as well as philosophical theorising. Until very
recently, the dominant philosophical approach to the analysis of human rights has fol-
lowed natural-law theory. On this view, there are normatively salient interests attached to
our status as human beings, and the task of human rights is to protect them. In other
words, human r ights are fundamental moral rights people enjoy solely by virtue of their
humanity.
This ‘natural-law approach’1to human rights has been variously advocated by theorists
such as Alan Gewirth (1982),James Griffin (2008) and John Tasioulas (2009).Central to this
view is the idea that the function of human rights is independent of the existing political
reality of human rights. To establish whether something (X) qualifies as a human right we
need not look at human-rights practice, at the purpose human rights are supposed to serve
in real-world politics. Instead, we need only consider whether X is a normatively salient
interest attached to our status as human beings that is weighty enough to place duties on
others to respect or protect it.2
Over the past few years,the adequacy of the ‘natural-law approach’has been increasingly
called into question. In particular, liberal political philosophers have started to doubt the
appropriateness of a theory of human rights merely reproducing natural-law principles
under a different name. The reason why we care about human rights, so the argument goes,
has very much to do with their political reality. Human rights are a political-legal construct
that emerged under particular circumstances, and a good philosophical theory of human
rights should be responsive to this fact. To offer a theory of the good life and call it a ‘theory
of human rights’ is to make a category mistake (Raz, 2010, p. 327).
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00905.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012 VOL 60, 180–194
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
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