Inadmissible Admissions and Unfair Evidence—Time to Reappraise?
| Author | Bertram Raisbeck |
| Published date | 01 November 1988 |
| Date | 01 November 1988 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201838805200405 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
INADMISSIBLE
ADMISSIONS
AND
UNFAIR
EVIDENCE-TIME
TO
RE-
APPRAISE?
Bertram Raisbeck*
Before the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984came into force
there was a plethora of case law on the admissibility of confessions,
complete irreconcilability of cases on evidence discovered in
consequence, and some uncertainty as to when judicial discretion
to exclude improperly or unfairly obtained evidence would be
exercised.
On the admissibility of confessions, some judicial pronounce-
ments stressed the law's disapproval of police improprieties in
obtaining confessions (the "disciplinary" approach), allying this
with protection of the right of silence and suspects' rights (the
"fairness" approach); others stressed the need to concentrate
on the credibility of the confession statement (the "reliability"
approach), often allying this expressly or tacitly with the need to
ensure thatthe criminal justice system works adequatelyin ensuring
the conviction of detected criminals (the "efficiency" approach).
This disciplinary-fairness and reliability-efficiency dichotomy evin-
ced the basic conflict faced by the judiciary in the area of
confessions, and the cases showed their vacillation between the
approaches.
In the area of unfair evidence other than confessions, a much
more robust attitude was taken; only occasionally would such
evidence be excluded inthe discretion of the judge, almost invari-
ably when the police impropriety in obtaining the evidence was
adjudged totally reprehensible.
Evidence discovered in consequence of an inadmissible con-
fession was itself admissible, but whether that evidence could be
linked to the confessor by reference to the mere fact that a
confession statement had been made, or whether the relevant part
•Head of Department of Legal Studies, Coventry Polytechnic.
400
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