Independence and Accountability
| Author | Andrew Preece,Barrie Houlihan |
| Published date | 01 October 2007 |
| Date | 01 October 2007 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0952076707081584 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Independence and
Accountability
The Case of the Drug Free Sport Directorate, the UK’s
National Anti-Doping Organisation
Barrie Houlihan
Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough University, UK
Andrew Preece
Director, PMP, UK
Abstract The UK National Anti-Doping Organisation (NADO), the Drug Free Sport
Directorate (DFSD), is located within the same organization, UK Sport, which
is responsible for maximizing elite sport success. This article evaluates the
demand for an independent NADO, which comes not only from within the
UK but also from international anti-doping agencies. The concept of
independence is examined within the context of broader concerns with
accountability and the relationship between the NADO and its stakeholders.
Using data from a survey of both National Governing Bodies of sport (NGBs)
and elite athletes and interviews with major policy actors it is argued that the
concern of elite athletes and NGBs is less with the location of the NADO
within UK Sport, but with questions of accountability and communication. It
is argued that enhanced independence would, in itself, be no guarantee of
either neutrality or of greater effectiveness and may well be counter
productive. Moreover, using Hood’s rationale for administrative reform there
is little evidence that a more independent NADO would be more efficient,
equitable or robust. However, it is also argued that the current network of
accountability relationships is focused on secondary stakeholders and those
primary stakeholders, such as elite athletes and their NGBs, are marginal thus
risking an erosion of the current high level of trust.
Keywords accountability, anti-doping policy, organizational independence, stakeholders,
UK Sport
DOI: 10.1177/0952076707081584
Barrie Houlihan, School of Sport and Exercise Sciences, Loughborough University,
Loughborough LE11 3TU, UK. [email: b.m.j.houlihan@lboro.ac.uk]
Andrew Preece, PMP, Ground Floor, Century House, 11 St Peter’s Square,
Manchester M2 3DN, UK. [email: AndyPreece@pmpconsult.com] 381
© Public Policy and Administration
SAGE Publications Ltd
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
0952-0767
200710 22(4) 381–402
Introduction
The modern history of doping in sport has been characterized by wide variation in
state response with indifference and subversion being more common than
anti-doping activism (Houlihan, 2002). However, between the late 1980s and the
end of the century the pattern of state response was radically altered by a series of
events which included the Ben Johnson doping scandal at the 1988 Seoul Olympic
Games, the collapse of communism in Europe, and the extensive doping
discovered during the 1998 Tour de France. Not only did these events increase the
salience of doping within the governments of most major ‘sports powers’ but they
also contributed to the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in
1999. The primary role of WADA was to establish a harmonized global anti-
doping policy framework. To this end WADA published, in 2003, the World Anti-
Doping Code together with a series of International Standards and models of best
practice.
One of the models of best practice stated that not only should each country
establish a national anti-doping organization (NADO) but that ‘the NADO should
be independent in decisions and actions from the sports organizations. The
principle of independence from elite athlete development underpins anti-doping
programs world-wide, and ensures the integrity of anti-doping work’ (WADA,
2004: Introduction). While it was accepted that most NADOs would be estab-
lished by governments rather than by National Olympic Committees (the default
solution) the implication that anti-doping activity should be separate from elite
athlete development presented a number of countries with a dilemma due to the
close involvement of most governments in the talent identification and develop-
ment process. This dilemma was especially acute in the UK, which had located
responsibility for anti-doping activity within the same organization that had
responsibility for maximizing Olympic medals, UK Sport.
In parallel with the deliberations within WADA there had been a steady stream
of criticism of the location of the Drug Free Sport Directorate (DFSD; the title of
the UK NADO) within UK Sport. For example, in 2003 Lord Moynihan, later to
become Chairman of the British Olympic Association, argued that ‘it cannot be
right that the organisation that funds and represents elite sport should at the same
time be involved in doping control’ (Lords Hansard, 23.12.2003, col 1762).
The unease that Lord Moynihan and others expressed prompted UK Sport to
commission an independent review of the location of its anti-doping functions.
The report, published in 2004, recommended relatively minor changes to the exist-
ing arrangements and concluded that there was no compelling argument for the
removal of responsibility for anti-doping policy from UK Sport (PMP Consulting,
2004). However, the report did not halt the expressions of concern. The independ-
ent review of sport in the UK, ‘Raising the Bar’, published in 2005 and co-chaired
by two former Ministers for Sport, Kate Hoey and Lord Moynihan, reiterated the
call for an independent anti-doping organization. Concluding that ‘the UK system
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