Independence vs. Accountability: Proving the Negative Correlation
| Author | Miroslava Scholten |
| Date | 01 March 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1023263X1402100110 |
| Published date | 01 March 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Legal Debate |
21 MJ 1 (2014) 197
LEGAL DEBATE
INDEPENDENCE VS. ACCOUNTABILITY:
PROVING THE NEGATIVE CORRELATION
M S*
§1. INTRODUCTION
Independence and accountability … accountability and independence … these have
become two ‘usual suspect s’ when talking about independent regu latory agencies (IRAs),
the classic question being whether IRAs can be accountable, if they are independent.1
While the contradiction between these two terms seems quite obvious, in recent
years, scholars seem to have given more attention to the issue of how to accommodate
these arguably mutually exclusive notions. According to Majone, ‘independence and
accountability should be seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than
mutually exclusive’.2 Busuioc distinguishes between ex ante (statutory provisions),
ongoing (direct in uence) and ex post (accountability) controls and argues that it is the
ongoing control that precludes any independence; accountability and independence
can therefore co-exist.3 Which is the right way? Are accountability and independence
mutually complementary or mutua lly exclusive?
is article proves the negative correlation bet ween accountability and indep endence.
It shows that the more independence there is, the less available accountabilit y channels
and accountabilit y instruments become, a nd the other way around. It does so by bringi ng
* Postdoctoral res earcher, Utrecht University, Faculty of Law, Economic s and Governance, member of
the Utrecht Centre for Re gulation and E nforcement in Europe (R ENFORCE) and Europa Law In stitute,
contact at: M.Sc holten@uu.nl.
I would like to th ank Margot Aelen for her comments on t he earlier version of this a rticle.
1 P. M agn et te, ‘ e Politics of Regulation i n the European Union’, in D. Geradin, R . Muňoz and N. Petit
(eds .), Reg ulation through Agenc ies in the EU: A New Paradigm of Europea n Governance (Edwa rd Elgar,
London 2 005), p.12; E . Vos, ‘Indepe ndence, Ac countabi lity a nd Transpa rency of Eu ropean Re gulato ry
Agencies’, in D. Geradi n, R. Muňoz and N. Petit (eds.), Regulati on through Agencies in the EU: A New
Paradigm of European Governance, p. 126; M. Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?’,
1European Law Journ al 2 (1995), p.183.
2 G. Majone, ‘Independence v s. Accountability? Non-Majoritaria n Institutions and Democratic
Government in Europe ’, EUI Working Papers in Political and Soci al Sciences 94/3 (1994), p.26.
3 M. Busuioc, ‘Accountabil ity, Control and Independence : e Case of Europe an Agencie s’, 15European
Law Journal 5 (200 9), p.599–615.
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