Individual differences in political aggression: The role of social integration, perceived grievances and low self-control
| Author | Lieven J.R. Pauwels,Ann De Buck,Vanja Ljujic |
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818819216 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818819216
European Journal of Criminology
2020, Vol. 17(5) 603 –627
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1477370818819216
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Individual differences in
political aggression:
The role of social integration,
perceived grievances and low
self-control
Lieven J.R. Pauwels
Ghent University, Belgium
Vanja Ljujic
VU Amsterdam and NSCR, The Netherlands
Ann De Buck
Ghent University, Belgium
Abstract
Several models have been suggested for studying (self-reported) aggression. Less frequently,
these theories are empirically applied to explain individual differences in political aggression. The
present study examines the role of distal, intermediate and proximate mechanisms in a net-sample
of 6020 young adults. Using log-linear structural equation modelling, the independent effects
of cumulative social integration, perceived personal and group injustices and low self-control
are assessed. It is assumed that these factors contribute to the ‘crystallization of discontent’
by fostering religious authoritarianism, political powerlessness, support for extremist beliefs
and online exposure to extremist content. Support for extremist content and online exposure
to extremist content are strong predictors, and function as different routes towards political
aggression. The results support an integrated approach towards the study of political aggression.
Implications for future studies are discussed.
Keywords
Low self-control, online exposure to extremist content, perceived injustice, political aggression,
support for extremist beliefs
Corresponding author:
Lieven J. R. Pauwels, Ghent University, Universiteitstraat 4, 9990 Ghent, Belgium.
Email: lieven.pauwels@ugent.be
819216EUC0010.1177/1477370818819216European Journal of CriminologyPauwels et al.
research-article2018
Article
604 European Journal of Criminology 17(5)
Introduction
Contemporary problems of political violence, radicalization and (home-grown) terror-
ism (Sageman 2017; Silke and Schmidt-Petersen, 2017) pose a twofold threat to Western
societies. On the one hand, they threaten (a fundamental sense of) personal and aggregate
safety and security. On the other hand, they challenge the institutional capacity of
Western countries to prevent, protect and punish politically motivated violence in demo-
cratic ways (Heitmeyer, 2003). Like the rest of Europe, Belgium has become a highly
diversified socio-cultural landscape of (sometimes conflicting or even contrasting) inter-
ests, beliefs, values and identities. According to Blazak (2001), extreme right groups,
including racist skinheads, specifically target ‘anomic’ youth populations for recruit-
ment. Recruiters, usually older neo-Nazi or skinheads, utilize convenient ideological
platforms that promote social inequality and exclusion on the basis of ‘race, class, caste,
sex, and other invidious distinctions’ (Scheper-Hughes, 2004: 2). However, the indoctri-
nation of young people into a world of violence is not only based on intolerant and hate-
ful out-group attitudes. Similar to their extreme right, racist counterparts, terrorist
recruiters utilize potential grievances among disadvantaged groups, and carefully choose
vulnerable individuals (Coolsaet, 2015). Not surprisingly, infamous recruiters such as
Khalid Zerkani have targeted youngsters in and around Molenbeek, the most impover-
ished district of Brussels (Leman, 2017).
Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, a multitude of studies have been conducted
on political violence, especially on the field of Islamist terrorism (Baker, 2003;
Khosrokhavar, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Contemporary studies on far-right extremism
have paid a lot of attention to explaining individual differences in (permissive attitudes
towards the use of) violence (De Waele and Pauwels, 2016; Heitmeyer, 2003). This led
many policy makers to see other forms of politically or religiously motivated aggression
as a domain, thereby forgetting that plenty of studies have been conducted to explain and
understand participation in racist and far-right movements (for example, Blee, 2007;
McGirr, 2015; Suttmoeller et al., 2017). Besides that, a small but growing number of
studies empirically test theory-driven models of hate-crime, prejudice and bias-moti-
vated behaviours (see Hall, 2013; Heylen, 2015). But, in general, Christmann’s (2012)
remark that the field of terrorism and violent extremism studies is characterized by an
absence of large-scale empirical studies remains valid today (see also Schuurman and
Horgan, 2016). Therefore contemporary scholars of ‘violent extremism’ can also learn a
lot from studies of political protest (for an overview and critique, see Opp, 2009).
In this study, the focus is on self-reported political aggression and not on political
violence. Because violence, and especially political violence, is a very heterogeneous
concept, we have decided not to focus on the concept of violence but to connect with the
social psychological research tradition focusing on self-reported aggression, namely to
focus on political aggression (Allen and Anderson, 2017). Aggression and violence are
often used synonymously in the fields of political science and criminology; however, in
social psychology, violence refers to the most serious acts of aggression, that is, behav-
iour intended to cause harm (whether or not attempted or successful) (Allen and
Anderson, 2017; Parrott and Giancola, 2007). It is questionable whether the most serious
forms of violence are represented in self-reported delinquency studies (Kivivuori, 2011).
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