Individuality and hierarchy in Cicero’s De Officiis
| Author | Michael C Hawley |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116657693 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2020, Vol. 19(1) 87–105
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116657693
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Article
Individuality and hierarchy
in Cicero’s De Officiis
Michael C Hawley
Duke University, NC, USA
Abstract
This essay explores a creative argument that Cicero offers to answer a fundamental
question: how are we to judge among different ways of life? Is there a natural hierarchy
of human types? In response to this problem, Cicero gives an account of a person’s
possessing two natures. All of us participate in a general human nature, the character-
istics of which provide us with certain universal duties and a natural moral hierarchy.
But, we also each possess an individual nature, qualities that make us unique and which
we have an obligation to cultivate. By employing different concepts of natura to refer
either to common human nature or to particular individual nature, Cicero establishes a
basis for a normative standard that manages to affirm the superiority of certain espe-
cially valuable types of life, such as the philosopher and the statesman. At the same time,
he advances a coherent account of individuality that places high value on natural human
diversity.
Keywords
Cicero, hierarchy, natural law, diversity, individuality, classical political philosophy,
equality
Although it would go on to become one of the most read works in the history of
European philosophy, the apparent topic of Cicero’s De officiis is so commonplace
that it is almost a cliche
´: advice from father to son about how to live. Scholars have
found De officiis to be a rich source for information about Cicero’s political
agenda, his philosophical allegiances and much else.
1
But we would be remiss if
we were to ignore the literary frame Cicero selected for this particular work. In the
first book of De officiis, Cicero addresses himself in a paternal voice to someone on
the cusp of adulthood on a question that often occupies the minds of people his
son’s age (especially those whose education and resources afford them ample
options): what sort of life should I choose for myself? This question naturally
Corresponding author:
Michael C Hawley, Political Science Department, 140 Science Drive, Durham, NC 27708, USA.
Email: mch46@duke.edu
prompts a second: what sort of life is choiceworthy? Put another way: is there a
natural hierarchy of possible human lives?
There seem to be two mutually incompatible frameworks for adjudicating the
relative worth of various life paths. One archetypal answer holds that there simply
is no universal standard by which to judge; instead, we all must cultivate whatever
is unique or particular in ourselves. Against any claims to universal or absolute
standards, this position raises a banner of radical equality. John Rawls offers one
influential version of this rather modern view when he argues that we cannot
reasonably judge between life plans that meet a minimum standard of instrumental
rationality.
2
Classical – especially Greek – political philosophy is often seen as
advancing the opposite view. In place of an individualistic moral egalitarianism,
Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics appeal to a fixed and universal standard: the idea of
one best form of life according to nature.
3
Different philosophers propose various
alternatives for the ideal model: the philosopher, the great-souled man, the states-
man or the Stoic sage. All other forms of human life thus appear deviations from
this ideal and can be hierarchically ordered according to their approximation of the
standard.
4
Neither framework seems wholly satisfactory. The first offers no way of assert-
ing that a life useful and agreeable to one’s fellows is any more choiceworthy than
one of shiftless indolence. The second has the potential to deny valid expression to
the natural diversity of human talents and interests.
5
Yet, both views have been
attributed to Cicero. Some scholars have treated Cicero’s position as reflective of
classical philosophy’s consensus about a strict order of rank.
6
Others argue that
Cicero’s significance lies in being the first philosopher to break with classical
orthodoxy and endorse a more modern view of human moral equality.
7
Since he
is perhaps most famous for his natural law teaching, many have understandably
sought Cicero’s answer to the question of moral equality (or hierarchy) in light of
human diversity in De legibus, which contains his most expansive treatment of
natural law. There is remarkable consensus that Cicero offers a clear answer in
this dialogue. But that consensus disappears when scholars offer their views of what
that answer is.
This disagreement has enormous consequences for how we view Cicero’s entire
political teaching, because Cicero makes it quite clear that his political philosophy
depends upon his conception of human nature. The question of how Cicero bal-
ances views of natural moral hierarchy in light of human diversity is therefore
central to our comprehension of him as a political thinker. I propose that we
might resolve this issue by turning away from the inconclusive evidence of De
legibus and toward Cicero’s discussion of human nature and different human
types in book one of De officiis.
In De officiis, Cicero presents an account of human beings as participating in
two different ‘natures’. We all partake of universal human nature (natura universa
or natura humana), but we each also possess a particular nature (natura nostra),
which is unique to us as individuals. Cicero combines these two conceptions of
nature into a remarkable moral synthesis that is both firm and flexible, in which
human individuality plays a central role. Universal human nature provides
88 European Journal of Political Theory 19(1)
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