Inequality, elections, and communal riots in India
| Published date | 01 July 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221091307 |
| Author | H Zeynep Bulutgil,Neeraj Prasad |
| Date | 01 July 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Inequality, elections, and communal riots
in India
H Zeynep Bulutgil
Department of Political Science, University College London
Neeraj Prasad
Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam
Abstract
How does inequality within and between ethno-religious groups influence the likelihood and frequency of communal
riots? Using evidence from India, this article finds that low within-group and high between-group inequality dampens the
likelihood and frequency of communal riots. Theoretically, the article suggests that the instrumental logic, which posits
that ethnonationalist politicians use violence to stoke ethnic cleavages and mobilize support, best accounts for this finding.
We argue that to be politically competitive, ethnonationalist politicians need their supporters to identify foremost with
their ethnic identity. When inequality within groups is high and/or inequality between groups is low, citizens are less likely
to focus on ethnicity as their primary identity. In such contexts, politicians may use communal riots to improve their
electoral prospects by reinforcing the salience of ethnicity. Empirically, the article relies on a time-series cross-district
analysis of inequality and Hindu–Muslim riots in India to test the instrumental argument against theoretical alternatives.
To illustrate the causal logic, the article also uses the analysis of a communal riot that occurred in Muzaffarnagar, Uttar
Pradesh. Analyzing three aspects of the riot – background conditions, timing, targets of propaganda – we evaluate the
different predictions of the instrumental argument. The article concludes with the suggestion that communal riots are
distinct from cases of mass violence – such as civil wars, genocide, and ethnic cleansing – and could be conceptualized,
along with other types of small-scale political violence, as a separate class of events with their own internal logic.
Keywords
communal violence, elections, India, inequality, political violence, riots
Does economic inequality within or between ethno-
religious groups impact the likelihood of communal riots?
If so, what is the nature of this impact? The main finding of
this article, based on evidence from India, is that higher
levels of within-group inequality and lower levels of
between-group inequality result in a higher likelihood of
ethno-religious riots. We argue that this finding is compa-
tible with the instrumental argument that leaders of ethno-
nationalist parties incite (or refuse to suppress) violence to
serve their political interests. Specifically, these parties turn
to communal violence to enhance the relative salience of
ethno-religious cleavages when such cleavages seem less
salient and compete with other types of political divisions.
Our main theoretical move is that the underlying
logic of the instrumentalist explanation is applicable
to the relationship between economic inequality and
political violence. This argument posits that ethnona-
tionalist politicians use violence to stoke ethno-
religious cleavages and mobilize support.
1
Existing
studies typically emphasize the observable implications
of this argument as they apply to political institutions.
Corresponding author:
n.v.prasad@uva.nl
Author names in alphabetical order.
1
By ethnonationalist politicians, we refer to those who are
committed to an ethnic agenda and prioritize the gains and rights
of their co-ethnics. These politicians often compete with parties
emphasizing other issues.
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(4) 619–633
ªThe Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00223433221091307
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial