‘Information Aid’ and the Dissemination of Innovation
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00178.x |
| Published date | 01 February 2013 |
| Date | 01 February 2013 |
| Author | Djims Milius |
‘Information Aid’ and the
Dissemination of Innovation
Djims Milius
University of Cape Town
A response to ‘Intellectual Property, Dissemination of Innovation and
Sustainable Development’ Claude Henry and Joseph E. Stiglitz*
Developing countries do not or seldom contribute to
expanding the technology frontier. This is supported by
evidence that they rather absorb their knowledge stock
from the frontier (Barton, 2007). That capacity differs in
places and speaks, in part, to the problem of dissemina-
tion of innovation so accurately identified by Henry and
Stiglitz (2010), which is primarily one of information. In
response, Archibugi and Filippetti (2011) convincingly
argue that solving the problem starts with better under-
standing the forces underlying the generation and trans-
fer of knowledge and innovation.
Of the two main questions posed in the original arti-
cle, the first is answered with persuasive evidence that
IPRs’ global reach may hinder rather than further the
production and dissemination of knowledge. The recom-
mendation is first to stop the spread of the current dys-
functional system, and then adopt a different model to
increase social benefits.
The second question is a more difficult one, suggest-
ing that the costs of the system might actually be higher
than the benefits reaped. There are simple reforms such
as streamlining standard grant and breadth that primar-
ily aim to fix the broke patent system. And then there
are more radical changes which the authors suggest
‘might yield even higher benefits’.
What then to make of the authors’ observation that IP
is but one aspect of innovation which has come to dom-
inate others, and of the suggestion to give more weight
to non-IP instruments that further innovation?
Gathering insights from both contributions reveal the
various tensions that arise along the way which have to
do with the dynamic nature of technological change.
First, though knowledge is a public good once pro-
duced, it is costly to generate and can be costly to trans-
fer from an agent to another. Secondly, that though the
most important input into the production of knowledge
is knowledge itself, the capacity to absorb knowledge
profitably is what makes it useful to firms, and particu-
larly SMEs.
To single out globalisation of IP in the health sector as
responsible in part for detrimental outcomes in develop-
ing countries is an appropriate diagnosis, though the
remedy suggested might need qualifying further. It is
correct that compulsory licensing is part of making
knowledge exploitable for users, and more resources
should be devoted to facilitate acquisition and applica-
tion of the knowledge generated.
1
There are two main implications: spillover effects
should be welcomed as an inevitable outcome of wilfully
transferring the codified part of knowledge protected
through IPRs; in addition, technological know-how should
be exchanged essentially as the tacit and unsevered part
of an effective technology package.
As observed in the case of climate change technology,
information spillovers will reduce the cost of knowledge
transfer and absorption in the long run.
2
It is more pro-
ductive to focus on measurable impacts of tech transfer,
and building on the original authors’ insight, we must
be aware of the information requirements associated
with running an efficient compulsory licence system.
3
The subject of enabling ‘fast and broad’ dissemination
of innovations hence runs into fundamental problems
anticipated by Henry and Stiglitz. These have to do with
whether we can devise a tech transfer system based on
the incentive and competition model existing for
network utilities regulation developed in the UK, for
instance.
4
Is it therefore sensible to argue for price-cap
type regulation with a development component, for
compulsory licensing in the area of health technology
utilisation?
5,6
The implications of seeing compulsory licensing as an
‘infrastructure’service for public health in developing coun-
tries are far-reaching. The demands for reform of the intel-
lectual property rights regime in this particular area would
require an evaluationof the provisions for emergency com-
pulsory licensing permitted by TRIPs and the Doha Declara-
tion adjusted by a clearer statement for technology
transfer for improved healthtechnology utilisation.
7
*Henry, C. and Stiglitz, J. E. (2010) ‘Intellectual Property,
Dissemination of Innovation and Sustainable Development’,
Global Policy. Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 237–251.
DOI: 10.1111 ⁄j.1758-5899.2010.00048.x
Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 1 . February 2013
ª2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2013) 4:1 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00178.x
Response to Article
122
To continue reading
Request your trial