Institutional design for a post-liberal order: why some international organizations live longer than others
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Author | Maria Josepha Debre,Hylke Dijkstra |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066120962183 |
962183EJT0010.1177/1354066120962183European Journal of International RelationsDebre and Dijkstra
research-article2020
EJ R
I
Article
European Journal of
International Relations
Institutional design for a
2021, Vol. 27(1) 311 –339
© The Author(s) 2020
post-liberal order: why some
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international organizations
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120962183
DOI: 10.1177/1354066120962183
live longer than others
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Maria Josepha Debre
and Hylke Dijkstra
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
Abstract
Many international organizations (IOs) are currently under pressure and the demise
of the liberal international order is the talk of town. We theorize that institutional
characteristics help to explain why some IOs survive external pressures where others
fail. We test this argument through a survival analysis of 150 IOs (1815–2014). We find
that the only significant variable explaining the death of IOs is the size of the secretariat:
IOs with large bureaucracies are good at coping with external pressures. In addition,
IOs with diverging preferences among members and those that are less institutionalized
are more likely to be replaced with successor organizations. We find that institutional
flexibility included in the treaties does not have an effect on survival. This is surprising
because the purpose of flexibility clauses is precisely to deal with external shocks.
Finally, we also find that systemic and domestic factors do not explain IO failure. In
conclusion, we should not write off the liberal international order all too quickly: large
IOs with significant bureaucratic resources are here to stay.
Keywords
International Organizations, Institutional Design, Failure, Survival, Life Cycle
Introduction
The arrival of the post-liberal international order is the talk of town (e.g. Allison, 2018;
Colgan and Keohane, 2017; Ferguson et al., 2017; Glaser, 2019; Mearsheimer, 2019).
And while it remains to be seen how deep the crisis of liberal internationalism actually
Corresponding author:
Maria Josepha Debre, Department of Political Science, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, Maastricht,
Limburg, 6200 MD, The Netherlands.
Email: m.debre@maastrichtuniversity.nl
312
European Journal of International Relations 27(1)
runs (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann, 2020; Ikenberry, 2018), many international
institutions are in a survival mode. The Trump administration is causing havoc across
global governance; states are leaving the European Union (EU), United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International
Criminal Court; and the emerging powers are setting up their own institutions. The ulti-
mate way for states to show that international institutions have outlived their purpose is
to disband them. This is not a new phenomenon: no less than 39% of the international
organizations (IOs) (218 out of 561) created since 1815 have ceased to exist (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2020; see also Pevehouse et al., 2020).
This article therefore asks why some IOs survive where others fail, thereby contribut-
ing to the emerging literature on the decline and death of IOs (von Borzyskowski and
Vabulas, 2019; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020, 2021; Gray, 2018; Shanks et al., 1996;
Strange, 1998). The article differentiates between death, replacement, and integration as
three distinct types of failure and theorizes that institutional design is critical to under-
stand whether IOs can survive external pressures. Two features of institutional design are
potentially relevant for survival. First, IOs with built-in flexibility should be better at
adjusting to a changing environment (Koremenos et al., 2001). Second, more institution-
alized IOs should be more difficult to replace (Jupille et al., 2013; Wallander, 2000),
while IOs with larger bureaucracies should be better at resisting external pressures
(Chorev, 2012).
To test this institutional argument, this article makes use of survival analysis of a ran-
dom stratified sample of 150 IOs (1815–2014) drawn from the Correlates of War
Intergovernmental Organizations (COW IGO) dataset v3.0 (Pevehouse et al., 2020). For
each of these IOs, we coded indicators on institutional design, thereby providing new
data on institutional flexibility and the bureaucratic size of IOs. Furthermore, we recoded
the dependent variable, better distinguishing between three distinct instances of what can
be called “IO failure”: death, replacement, and integration. We contrast our institutional
theory with alternative explanations for IO death, which put an emphasis on external
developments such as wars between member states, power asymmetries, economic cri-
ses, and domestic member state politics.
The findings are surprising. Contrary to much of the realist approaches, which cur-
rently also predominate the debate on the demise of the liberal international order, the
most important variable explaining death of IOs is the size of the secretariat staff. In
contrast, diverging preferences among member states and low institutionalization can
explain the replacement of IOs (a structural change).1 Apart from the effect of diverging
preferences on replacement, none of the other external factors are significant for either
death or replacement. If we are to understand global governance in the post-liberal order,
we should thus pay much more attention to bureaucratic and institutional theory rather
than systemic international relations approaches, which put the cause of death outside
IOs themselves. And we should not write off the liberal international order all too quickly:
large IOs with significant bureaucratic resources, which are the cornerstone of liberal
order, are here to stay.
While we find strong support for secretariat staff size, we do not find support for our
hypothesis on institutional flexibility. This is equally surprising, as leading sociologist
Aldrich (1999: 194) notes “an organization that cannot change in fundamental ways will
Debre and Dijkstra
313
constantly be at risk, if its environment is evolving and it cannot keep pace.” It is further-
more surprising because flexibility clauses, such as withdrawal procedures, amendment
clauses, and contract precision, are often painstakingly negotiated and included in trea-
ties precisely to deal with external shocks and uncertainty (Koremenos, 2016; Pelc,
2016; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001). It also raises questions about the durability of more
flexible institutional designs, such as networked or informal governance (e.g. Goldstein
et al., 2000; Slaughter, 2004; Westerwinter et al., 2020).
This article differs notably from other articles on the death of IOs that have recently
been published (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020, 2021; Gray, 2018; see also Shanks et al.,
1996). First, our article explicitly tests theory-informed hypotheses on institutional
design. While our findings correspond to Gray, she focuses on vitality where we look at
failure. Shanks et al. and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020) are more inductive, whereas
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2021) uses case studies, and neither address institutional explana-
tions at great length. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2021), for instance, focuses on systemic
shocks. Second, this article uses newly available data from COW IGO v3.0, includes
time-varying predictors, and our own original data on flexibility and size. Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni (2020) does not provide annual data. Gray focuses only on international
economic organizations (since 1950) and the data of Shanks et al. stop at 1992. Third, we
provide a more focused conceptualization of IO death and separate it clearly from other
forms of structural changes such as IO replacement and integration. These differences
are important: not only do we find that institutional features matter much more than
external pressures, we also highlight that the death of large IOs is actually rare compared
to the headline findings of Gray and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni that IOs regularly die. That
large IOs are more resilient is good news for the liberal international order.
The article starts by identifying external factors that put pressure on IOs before sug-
gesting hypotheses on institutional flexibility, institutionalization, and bureaucratic size
to explain how IOs cope differently with these external pressures. The article continues
with research design, operationalization, and measurement of key variables, and statisti-
cal models before moving to the findings. The discussion section focuses on the key
findings and how this affects our understanding of IOs and the debate on the post-liberal
order.
Institutional theory: why flexible and larger IOs live longer
This article argues that the institutional design of IOs affects their longevity. The starting
point is that IOs are constantly under external pressure: wars break out, economic crises
occur, problems on the international agenda change, and domestic forces in IO member
states may oppose cooperation. Yet such pressures are unlikely to affect all IOs in exactly
the same way. After all, international institutions “are organized in radically different
ways” (Koremenos et al., 2001: 761). Some IOs may cope with external pressures, where
others may fail. Based on institutional theory, we hypothesize that (1) IOs with built-in
flexibility are less likely to fail as they can adapt to a changing environment; (2a) insti-
tutionalized IOs are less...
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