Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation
| Author | Michael E. Smith |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066104040570 |
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and
European Foreign Policy Cooperation
MICHAEL E. SMITH
Georgia State University
The expansion of European Union (EU) foreign policy cooperation
since 1970 presents a number of puzzles for theorists of regional
integration and International Relations. It is not directed by suprana-
tional organizations, does not involve bargaining over policy alter-
natives, and is not dominated by the largest EU states. Nor do the EU’s
common foreign policy decisions reflect ‘lowest common denominator’
preferences. Instead, cooperation has been achieved through decen-
tralized institutional mechanisms, involving processes associated with
both intergovernmental and social constructivist theories. This article
first explains how changes in institutional context — in terms of
intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational procedures —
affect the propensity for cooperation. It then links processes of
institutionalization to an expansion of foreign policy cooperation
among EU member states. Finally, it explores three policy areas (the
Middle East, South Africa and nuclear non-proliferation) where EU
states have adjusted their national foreign policies in line with EU
foreign policy norms.
K
EY
W
ORDS
♦Common Foreign and Security Policy ♦European
Union foreign policy ♦European Political Cooperation ♦institu-
tionalization ♦international cooperation
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union clearly marks a new era in the
theory and practice of European integration. Much of the scholarly
attention in this area focuses on the European Union’s (EU) socioeconomic
policy domains, primarily in terms of developing the single European market
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998).1This achievement, however, tends to
overshadow an increasingly prominent area of European integration — the
pursuit of a common foreign policy. Foreign policy cooperation has been
European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2004
SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 10(1): 95–136
DOI: 10.1177/1354066104040570]
discussed in the EU since the 1950s, and led to European Political
Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 and its transition to the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) 20 years later. Although skeptics can cite a variety of
cases where the EU was unable to speak with a single voice in world affairs
(Gordon, 1997–8; Zielonka, 1998; Hoffman, 2000), the development of
EPC/CFSP has in fact resulted in a significant level of foreign policy
coordination among EU states since 1970 (for a recent extensive survey, see
Ginsberg, 2001). The EU’s achievement in this domain is even more unique
when compared to the feeble attempts at instituting political dialogue in
other regional organizations.2
European foreign policy cooperation also involves unique processes in
terms of institutional development and decision-making that can shed light
on fundamental debates concerning European integration and International
Relations (IR) theory. For theorists of European integration, the debate
involves the effects of intergovernmental and supranational procedures on
cooperation; for IR theorists, the debate involves the explanatory power of
rationalist versus constructivist assumptions about how states define and
pursue their national interests or preferences (Wendt, 1987; Dessler, 1989).3
Indeed, many scholars look to the EU as the prime example of how
supposedly egoistic states can learn to create a sense of common purpose,
whether as a ‘multi-perspectival polity’ or as a system of ‘epistemic
communities’ covering numerous issues (Ruggie, 1993; Wendt, 1994;
Mercer, 1995).
Arguments about the limits of rational choice approaches to European
integration have thus prompted a number of investigations into decision-
making in many EU policy domains.4However, the constructivist literature
also neglects to explain how collective goals are made to persist over time
and thus influence future behavior — the processes and consequences of
institutionalization (Florini, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Checkel, 1998). In
this article, I use the example of EU foreign policy cooperation to show how
rationalist and constructivist approaches to institutionalized cooperation
actually complement each other. First, EU foreign policy represents a ‘least
likely’ case not only in EU affairs but in international relations more
generally. States are usually expected to defend their sovereignty and
autonomy in foreign affairs with great vigor; evidence of both institutional
development and policy adaptation concerning this sensitive domain might
support the notion of socially driven cooperation. Second, foreign policy
adaptation cannot be explained in terms of domestic demands, as some
versions of rationalism (such as liberal intergovernmentalism; see Moravcsik,
1993, 1998) assume. Although there clearly has been a growth in public
support for the general idea of EU foreign policy,5issue-specific lobbying in
this area (at the national or EU levels) is virtually non-existent compared to
European Journal of International Relations 10(1)
96
that which takes place in Community affairs, where transnational actors
regularly participate in the rule-making process. Instead, those in charge of
EU foreign policy have a fairly high degree of ‘agency slack’ compared to
other EU policy domains, which should help facilitate the creation of shared
understandings and policy goals.
Third, changes in the foreign policies of EU member states cannot be
adequately explained in terms of ‘functional spillover’ as occurs in other EU
socioeconomic policy areas, typically as a result of the growth in cross-
border economic transactions.6Although the EU has increasingly used
economic tools for foreign policy ends, there are few if any direct economic
benefits to EU foreign policy; in fact, growing ambitions in this area have
the potential to seriously disrupt the economic activities of the EC. In
addition, no other regional economic organization has such overt preten-
sions of creating a common foreign (and security) policy, thus economic
interdependence alone, a prerequisite for functional spillover, cannot explain
the EU’s unique pursuit of this goal. Fourth, nor can changes in this area be
explained primarily in terms of ‘political spillover’ processes, which involve
the activities of supranational EC organizations. Although these organiza-
tions (chiefly the Commission) have been increasingly involved in foreign
policy, they clearly do not exert the same decisive influence over policy
outcomes and institutional development as in the EC’s socioeconomic policy
domains.
Moreover, although unanimity governs EU foreign policy decisions,7
policy outcomes have not always reflected ‘lowest common denominator’
positions, as studies of EU intergovernmental decision-making under
unanimity often assume.8Without some form of qualified majority voting
(QMV), goes the argument, the EU’s common position must conform to
the preference of the member state(s) favoring the status quo, or the lowest
degree of policy change. On any given foreign policy issue discussed in the
EU, often at least one EU state is tempted to use its veto to prevent a
discussion from moving to a concrete foreign policy action. Yet this has not
always been the case; in EU foreign policy, the preference-outliers often
adapt their positions in favor of the common one rather than veto such
decisions.9Although vetoes have occurred, there has been far more
cooperation under this system than we might otherwise expect given its
intergovernmental, unanimous procedures. In addition, given the self-
contained nature of EPC/CFSP, which prohibits issue-linkages with EC
affairs, and the taboo against voting in EPC/CFSP, EU states are able to
avoid permanent cleavages and power blocs. Even the celebrated Franco-
German relationship has not dominated EU foreign policy.10 Outside
influences, particularly US policies, have also been cited as a general
motivation for EU foreign policy cooperation (Nuttall, 1992) and it is clear
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