Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries
| Author | Shannon Lindsey Blanton |
| Published date | 01 March 1999 |
| Date | 01 March 1999 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343399036002006 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms
Imports and Human Rights Conditions In Developing
Countries*
SHANNON LINDSEY BLANTON
Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University
journal of
peace
R
ESEARCH
© 1999 Journal of Peace Research,
vol 36, no.2, 1999, pp. 233–244
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi)
[0022-3433(199903)36:2; 233–244; 008042]
Scholars traditionally have focused on arms as a means of deterring, initiating, maintaining, or termi-
nating international war. Indeed, based on the assumption that a coercive military response is required
if security is to be preserved, arms are widely viewed as an instrument of defense from external threat.
In the developing world, however, internal threats are far more common. Yet the role of arms in facil-
itating domestic political violence has received far less scholarly attention. This article endeavors to
expand upon both our understanding of arms as a source of conflict and our knowledge of the corre-
lates of human rights repression. To this end, this study tests the relationship between the importation
of arms and the repression of personal integrity rights. Employing a pooled time-series cross-sectional
design, the patterns of arms acquisitions behavior and human rights violations are examined for devel-
oping countries for the years 1982 through 1992. The results indicate that arms imports by developing
countries are linked to poor human rights conditions. Thus, arms acquisitions appear to contribute to
repression by making violent political acts more feasible.
Introduction
Arms transfers have long been viewed as an
important element of international affairs.
In accordance with realism, which views
security in terms of political-military threats
emanating from external sources (Goertz &
Diehl, 1990; Jervis, 1978; Waltz, 1979;
Young, 1978), arms traditionally have been
conceived as an instrument of national
security. This understanding of security and
arms rests on the assumption that a coercive
military response is required if security is to
be preserved. In other words, ‘the capacity to
coerce, kill, and destroy becomes the
important source of power, and thereby, the
safeguard for national security’ (Azar &
Moon, 1984: 106; see also Ayoob, 1991;
von Clausewitz, 1976/1832).
Along these lines, considerable scholarly
attention has been devoted to examining
how arms acquisitions affect the deterrence,
initiation, conduct, or termination of war.
Studies have focused largely on the impact of
indigenously produced arms in a major
power war, with arms races (Intriligator &
Brito, 1989; Siverson & Diehl, 1989), deter-
rence (Tarr, 1991; Vasquez, 1991), and the
security dilemma (Jervis, 1978) com-
manding particular interest. Recently, the
focus on arms and war has been expanded to
consider the role of externally provided mili-
* I would like to thank Robert Blanton, and the Editor
and anonymous referees from JPR, for advice on portions
of this manuscript. Jenna Martin, Sarah Diel-Hunt, and
Angela Povolish provided valuable research support. Any
errors, of course, remain mine alone. The data used in this
study can be obtained from: http//www.siu.edu/depart-
ments/cola/polysci/blanton.html.
233
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