Integrationism, practice-dependence and global justice
| Published date | 01 October 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14748851211071047 |
| Author | Alex McLaughlin |
| Date | 01 October 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Integrationism, practice-
dependence and global
justice
Alex McLaughlin
Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Abstract
An increasingly popular approach to global justice claims we should be ‘integrationist,’
where integrationism represents an attempt to unify our theorising between different
domains of global politics. These political theorists have argued that we cannot identify
plausible principles in one domain, such as climate justice, which are not sensitive to
general moral concerns. This paper argues we ought to reject the concept of integra-
tionism. It shows that integrationism is either trivial, or it obscu res relevant disagre e-
ment by ignoring the distinctive methodological and substantive commitments held by
its opponents. The paper then argues that the relevant disagreement is actually about
the role of practices for political philosophy and, as such, should be framed in terms of
the distinction between practice-dependent and practice-independent theory. Finally, I
provide my own account of that distinction, identifying a practice-dependent claim that
those concerned about the narrowness of prominent accounts of global justice should
target.
Keywords
integrationism, practice-dependence, global justice, global egalitarianism, climate justice
Corresponding author:
Alex McLaughlin, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge, 16 Mill Lane, Cambridge,
CB2 1SB, UK.
Email: am2915@cam.ac.uk
Article
European Journal of Political Theory
2023, Vol. 22(4) 608–628
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14748851211071047
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When questions about global justice arise, they often do so in relation to specific political
issues. This can lead us to perceive them as isolated, raising problems which are distinct-
ive to a particular domain and which, as a result, ought to be addressed on their own
terms. Climate change can seem isolated in this way, and some philosophers have thus
devoted attention to questions of climate justice which arise apparently separately to
questions about justice in global trade, say, or in migration. At the same time, though,
we recognise that these purportedly distinct moral issues interact in complex ways: we
know that climate change is in part driven by the production of goods for global trade,
and we know its effects will prompt new claims for international migration. Recently,
the idea that we can bracket off different political issues, treating them as separate
spheres of global justice, has come under scrutiny. More specifically, a number of theor-
ists have pressed on the idea that we can identify (plausible) principles that are isolated
from broader concerns of justice. These theorists claim that we should instead be ‘inte-
grationist’, where integrationism represents some kind of attempt to unify our theorising
between global domains.
The debate about integrationism is an important one. If its proponents are right, the-
orists of global justice, by training their sights too narrowly, may have been arriving at
incorrect principles. Although we will likely be concerned by the level of injustice that
exists in global politics, perhaps we have mischaracterised it and misplaced our condem-
nation. There might be rather more injustice than we thought, or perhaps rather less. The
critique from integrationism therefore offers a potentially revisionary perspective on
these discussions. This perspective also represents a new frontier of the burgeoning
debate about methodology in political philosophy. As we will see, proponents often
frame their arguments in methodological terms, casting their view as making space for
a new approach to global justice. Debates about methodology are important: they help
us approach theorising more systematically and help us see where, and why, different per-
spectives depart.
This paper has two main aims. First, I show that integrationism is an unhelpful concept
in debates about global justice. On one reading it is trivial, and so does not reveal a
meaningful point of disagreement. On its other readings it smuggles in controversial
substantive or methodological commitments, and so actually obscures genuine disagree-
ment. Integrationism does not shed light on debates about global justice, so I will suggest
we ought to reject it. Second, I will develop an alternative diagnosis of the disagreement
between integrationism and the view against which it is counterposed, sometimes labelled
‘the internal approach’(Walton, 2020) or, as I will refer to it, ‘isolationism’(Caney,
2012; 2018a). Importantly, my rejection of integrationism does not signal an affinity
with isolationism; it is rather a rejection of the way in which the two views have been
distinguished. My claim is that viewing this disagreement as one between practice-
dependent and practice-independent theorists (Sangiovanni, 2008: 138) is a more pro-
ductive way of framing what is at stake. But this distinction too needs some clarifying.
I will further argue, against some alternative candidates, that the specific site of disagree-
ment is a claim about the appropriate role of the interpretation of a social practice for pol-
itical philosophy. By the end, I hope we will be left with a clearer picture of the
conceptual terrain available to theorists of global justice.
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