Intellectual disability and mental illness among women sentenced to death in the U.S.: Constitutional and evidentiary dilemmas
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1462474521998437 |
| Published date | 01 October 2022 |
| Date | 01 October 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Intellectual disability and
mental illness among
women sentenced to
death in the U.S.:
Constitutional and
evidentiary dilemmas
Kathryn Farr
Portland State University, USA
Abstract
This study examined the cases of women on death in which evidence of the defendant’s
intellectual disability or mental illness was presented at trial. Of the total population of
52 women on death row at the beginning of 2020 and seven recently-executed women,
over 50% qualified for the study. According to expert testimony, most of the women in
the sample had a below-average IQ score and/or a neurological deficit, and all but three
suffered from a serious mental illness. Almost all had abusive and dysfunctional back-
grounds. Recent Supreme Court rulings have banned the execution of defendants with
intellectual disability and opened the door to a consideration of execution exemption
for defendants with severe mental illness or brain abnormalities. However, considerable
judicial equivocation over the meaning and measurement of mental impairments
remains. Even as a mitigating factor, the mental health problems of the defendants in
this study were given little weight.
Keywords
death row, judicial process, mental health impairments, women
Corresponding author:
Kathryn Farr, Department of Sociology, Portland State University, 1825 SW Broadway, Portland, OR 97201,
USA.
Email: farrk@pdx.edu
Punishment & Society
!The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1462474521998437
journals.sagepub.com/home/pun
2022, Vol. 24(4) 571–591
Introduction
By mid-morning on 15 June 1990, 18-year-old Maria Alfaro had made her first
drug score. Some hours later the cocaine and heroin she had used to feed her
addiction were gone, and she needed money to buy more. Alfaro settled on a
burglary. Her target was the nearby home of a former high school friend whose
family had briefly taken a homeless Alfaro in during her second pregnancy. Now
pregnant with twins, carrying the younger of her two sons and accompanied by
two acquaintances, Alfaro approached the family’s home. Her friend’s nine-year-
old sister, home alone after school, recognized Alfaro and opened the door. Once
inside, Alfaro picked up a knife from the kitchen and stabbed the young girl more
than 50 times, then robbed the home of several objects and left. Alfaro eventually
confessed to the murder. In March of 1992, a California jury found her guilty of
first-degree murder, and in July of that year, she was sentenced to death. Due to
the heinous and cruel nature of the murder and a young child as its victim, her
death sentence was not unexpected.
Clearly, Alfaro had experienced a good deal of trauma and heartache in her
young life. Both she and her mother were victims of her alcoholic father’s physical
abuse. At age nine, she was raped by one of his friends. Her father eventually
abandoned the family. By age 14, Alfaro was pregnant for the first of three times.
She was already using drugs heavily, exchanging sex for drug money, and at times
living on the street. As difficult as her life had been, dysfunctional backgrounds
rarely carry much weight as mitigating factors in capital crimes (Smith et al., 2014;
Sundby, 1997).
However, Alfaro’s defense did present evidence of a mitigating factor that today
could exempt a defendant from a sentence of death regardless of the nature of the
crime. Per several U. S. Supreme Court rulings since Alfaro’s sentencing, proof of
a defendant’s intellectual disability (previously known and sometimes still referred
to as mental retardation) disqualifies her for execution, and thus from a sentence
(death) that cannot be carried out. Tests revealed that Alfaro had a significant
learning disability and an IQ of 78 (the “average” IQ score is typically set at 100,
with a score of 70 or below traditionally qualifying as intellectual disability). In his
testimony, mental health expert Dr Consuelo Edwards argued that Alfaro suffered
from an ongoing “organic mental disorder”; altogether, he described her intellec-
tual functioning as “borderline.” In addition to these cognitive deficits, Edwards
testified that Alfaro suffered from multiple forms of mental illness, including
dependent personality disorder, attention deficits, and adjustment issues charac-
terized by trauma-related anxiety and depression (see People v. Alfaro, 2007).
However, even severe mental illness does not necessarily protect a defendant
from a sentence of death. In spite of several appeals, Alfaro remains on death
row, where she has lived for over 27 years.
Terminology around mental health problems is marked by inconsistency. For
example, a particular impairment may be labeled a disability, disorder, deficit,
condition, illness, or disease. Sometimes these terms are given a distinct meaning
572 Punishment & Society 24(4)
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