Intelligence and the Core Executive
| Date | 01 January 2010 |
| Author | Martin J. Smith |
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076709347072 |
| Published date | 01 January 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Intelligence and the Core
Executive
Martin J. Smith
University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract Much of the analysis of intelligence and security in British government has
treated it as a separate and distinct sphere. This article argues that the core
executive framework provides a useful mechanism for integrating security
policy making with other aspects of the domestic policy process. The article
analyses the changing nature of the core executive and its impact on decision-
making. The article argues that if we look at intelligence through the core
executive framework we can analyse intelligence as a particular form of
knowledge that can provide the Prime Minister with considerable influence
on policy outcomes. This is not, however, to suggest that the Prime Minister is
presidential.
Keywords core executive, presidentialism, intelligence, policy making
Introduction
One of the intriguing aspects of the analysis of central government in Britain is that
scholars who work on the core executive pay little attention to the role of intelli-
gence (while acknowledging the central role of Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC]
within the core). Likewise, scholars concerned with the intelligence community
tend to discuss intelligence and the security services with little reference to the
wider structures of government; analysing it often as a distinct process of govern-
ing. Although there are, of course, a good number of exceptions (see for example
Aldrich, 2001; Davies, 2005; Dover, 2007; Phythian, 2005), ‘normal’ processes of
governing and ‘security’ issues are often treated as separate spheres. The aim of
this article is to indicate the ways in which intelligence issues can be built into a
core executive approach. The key argument of the article is that intelligence needs
to be understood not as stream of information but an important power resource.
DOI: 10.1177/0952076709347072
Martin J. Smith, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TU, UK.
[email: M.J.Smith@sheffield.ac.uk] 11
© The Author(s), 2010.
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Moreover, the particular nature of intelligence (the fact that it is on the whole secret
and difficult to challenge) means that it creates a complex set of relationships
within government between the Prime Minister and the intelligence community,
between the Prime Minister and his colleagues and between the core executive
and the electorate. Intelligence, because of its particular nature creates a series of
power asymmetries that favour those with the most direct access to intelligence.
This article will begin by analysing the core executive framework and examining
the recent changes in central government and their impact on power relationships.
The article will then use the core executive approach to analyse intelligence and
security and argue that the particular nature of intelligence material means that it
is a particularly useful resource within central government.
The Core Executive and the Power of the Prime Minister
Much of the recent debate about central government has focused on the concen-
tration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the development of what
is called presidentialism. A number of authors have argued that particularly since
the premiership of Margaret Thatcher we have seen a shift away from Cabinet
government to Prime Ministers operating in a particularly presidential manner. For
example, Heffernan and Webb (2005) argue
that prime ministers have taken great steps toward extending their authority within the
executive, possessing a degree of personalized power that marks a shift from a collec-
tive to a more individualized form of executive government. Widespread charges of
Presidentialism were levied against Margaret Thatcher when she was Prime Minister.
Where Thatcher blazed a trail, Tony Blair has followed. (Heffernan and Webb, 2005,
pp. 26–7)
It has been argued that Prime Ministers have increased their institutional capacity,
reduced their dependence on cabinet and become increasingly activist in terms of
policy. In addition, they have tended, like presidents, to place themselves above
party and the fray of politics and increasingly appealed directly to the electorate
(see Foley, 2000).
However, while there can be little doubt – as we will see later – that Prime
Ministers have increased their institutional resources and their role in policy
making, to talk of presidentialism makes little sense, particularly in the UK con-
text. First, there are numerous examples of both Thatcher and Blair being con-
strained by colleagues. For much of Thatcher’s period in office she relied on the
support of Willie Whitelaw and he was in a position to prevent her undertaking
certain policy options. Nigel Lawson famously implemented an economic policy
against the knowledge and wishes of the Prime Minister when he decided to permit
sterling to shadow the Deutschmark (Lawson, 1992). Similarly, Tony Blair despite
his professed dominance effectively granted Gordon Brown autonomy over eco-
nomic policy (as Heffernan and Webb [2005] acknowledge) and consequently
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