Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism, Evidence and Learning
| Author | Ian Sanderson |
| Published date | 01 December 2009 |
| Date | 01 December 2009 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00791.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex
World: Pragmatism, Evidence and Learningpost_791 699..719
Ian Sanderson
Leeds Metropolitan University
The credentials of the evidence-based policy movement appear to be increasingly subject to challenge
based on research that has highlighted the limits on the use of evidence in policy making.However,moves
towards a more‘realistic’ position of evidence-informed policy making risk conflating prescription with
description and undermining a normative vision of better policy making. This article argues that we need
to review the ideas that underpin our thinking about evidence-based policy making, and move beyond
the territory of instrumental rationality to a position founded upon two intellectual pillars: our developing
knowledge about complex adaptive systems; and ideas from a pragmatist philosophical position –
especially those of John Dewey – about social scientific knowledge and its role in guiding action to
address social problems. This leads us to a conception of ‘intelligent policy making’ in which the notion
of policy learning is central.
A decade on from the accession to power of a ‘New Labour’ government
ostensibly committed to evidence-based policy making (EBPM), there appear to
be sufficient doubts and criticisms around EBPM to provide grounds for ques-
tioning the validity of the concept. It is, of course, widely acknowledged that
policy making involves much more than reference to evidence of ‘what works’;
the process of formulating and delivering policy takes place in a political context
and is subject to many legitimate influences from a range of stakeholders and
interests. Geoff Mulgan (2005, p. 224) has argued:‘In a democracy, the people,and
the politicians who represent them, have every r ight to ignore evidence’. In a
recent debate at King’s College London, Guardian journalist DavidWalker argued
that in democratic politics, policy makers ‘defer’ to knowledge from a range of
sources – opinion polls, party preferences, science, the media – and construct a
proportionate response,selecting from these sources on the basis of their expertise
in the adjudication of interests and values (Grayson, 2007). In essence, policy
making is more a ‘craft’ than a science; the ‘art of the possible’rather than the ‘art
of the optimum’.
But to what extent do we acquiesce to this ‘reality’? Do we just accept that
evidence is inevitably a ‘poor relation’ to power, influence, prejudice and whim?
Of course, we know that the influence of evidence depends upon context and
circumstances – both on the availability and robustness of evidence in relation to
particular policy decisions and on the degree of contention or conflict over the
ends and means of policy. Sometimes the evidence is very influential, even
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00791.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2009 VOL 57, 699–719
© 2009The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2009 Political StudiesAssociation
decisive; sometimes it is ignored; sometimes it is unable to provide practical
guidance. Acknowledging this,do we str ive to increase the influence of evidence
on policy formulation and delivery on the basis of a conviction that this will
increase the effectiveness of policy and improve public value? So,do we ‘throw in
the towel’or do we ‘stick to our guns’and restate the case for EBPM? Or is there
a third option? Should we, perhaps, re-examine the basic rationale and founda-
tional assumptions of EBPM to determine whether there is a better ‘normative’
model to guide our policy making in the increasingly complex and ambiguous
world that governments are charged with seeking to improve?
This article attempts to pursue this third option. I argue that the development of
thinking about EBPM reflects the attractions of instrumental rationality as a
response to the growing challenge of social complexity. More recent scepticism
about EBPM can be seen as a result of increasing research,which has highlighted
the limits on the use of evidence in policy making. However, I argue that
advocacy of a more ‘realistic’ position of ‘evidence-informed policy making’
conflates description with prescription, legitimises the status quo and potentially
undermines our ambitions for stronger use of evidence in policy making.
I go on to review briefly two bodies of ideas that might provide a more
appropriate basis for our thinking about EBPM. The first is a rapidly developing
body of knowledge about complex adaptive systems and the implications for
effective governmental inter vention in such systems, emphasising the importance
of ‘tr ial and error’or experimentation. The second source of ideas is pragmatism,
a philosophical tradition that provides ideas about the nature of social scientific
knowledge and the basis for rational action. Here I draw primarily on the work
of John Dewey – his views on the need for philosophy to engage in practical
affairs; his view of knowledge as tested by its capacity to help us in the solution
of social problems; and his notion of ‘intelligence’ as ‘practical-moral reasoning’
guiding us in our quest to improve the world. The foundation of Dewey’s
approach is experimentation in practice – and this central theme of experimen-
tation and learning chimes strongly with the lessons from the literature on
complexity.
I conclude, therefore, by emphasising the importance of learning in a Deweyan
conception of ‘intelligent policy making’, proposed as an alternative to‘evidence-
based policy making’, in which we accommodate the complexity surrounding the
application of intelligence in policy making, treat our policies as hypotheses to be
tested in practice, to be piloted where feasible and appropriate and to be subject
to rigorous evaluation, and in which we learn from these processes and apply the
intelligence thus gained to future policy thinking and decisions. And I argue that
we must attend to building capacity to support such a model of policy learning
by strengthening processes and channels for communication and dialogue across
government and beyond into civil society – promoting the conditions for true
Deweyan democracy.
700 IAN SANDERSON
© 2009The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2009 Political StudiesAssociation
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2009, 57(4)
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